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SUMMARY
Over the last few centuries the carriage of goods by sea has gone through a constant
evolution. Only in the last century were the changes so noticeable. Since the early days of
shipping, maritime law has tried to adapt to the realities of its time. Change was slow and
not always easy to achieve. Prior to statutory regulation the practical reality was such that
carriers managed to escape most if not all of their responsibilities. In the last century
everything changed, the adoption of The Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules
transfonned the whole system of carriage of goods by sea and their system of
responsibilities. The maritime industry was marked by gradual evolution and maritime law
has never been the same since.
In the last few decades, maritime law went through various refonns and many changes.
Today, the shipping industry faces two carriages of goods by sea regimes, The Hague or
HagueNisby Rules and the new Hamburg Rules. Since the early nineteen hundreds, the
maritime industry, with the help of a number of international and national organisations,
have been working toward "one goal", the adoption of a universal convention regulating
maritime trade. The objective was to reach acceptability, predictability, certainty, clarity and
unanimity among all the parties involved i.e. carriers as well as shippers, insurers and
governments.
The 1924 Hague convention was a great innovator. For the first time in maritime history, an
international convention limited the carriers practice of using exoneration clauses to limit
their responsibilities. Article 3(8) of the Hague Rules regulated the issue in clear and simple
terms. Any exemption clause found to be contrary to the Hague Rules would be null and
void. The aim was to change the pattern of abuse that existed and promote fairness and
balance between shippers and carriers.
The carrier's rights and immunities are expressed in art. IV of the Rules. Here again, the
convention outlines the importance of the carriers responsibilities found in art. ill by
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restating them in art. IV(l). Only after discharging such duties, are carriers allowed to
follow with the use ofavailable defences (art. IV (2)).
For the fIrst time, a mandatory convention regulated affairs of carriage by sea, in particular
the use of exemption clauses by carriers. This was a novelty in such an old industry, whose
working was based on customs and the freedom of contract basis. Thus, it seemed natural to
praise such an accomplishment and indeed no one can contest that in those days, it was an
accomplishment.
In the late sixties, the Hague rules were amended. The amendments were adopted in
Brussels on February 23, 1968 and were known as the Visby Protocol. They represented the
response to modernisation and changes that have marked the shipping industry and that
were not covered by the original Hague Rules. Nonetheless, even with the changes brought
forth by the Visby Rules, international criticism over The Hague and Hague Visby Rules
persisted.
Thus, in 1978, the Hamburg Rules were adopted to answer the growing dissatisfaction of
shipper interests, particularly amongst developing nations. The adoption of the Hamburg
Rules meant the implementation of a new regime to govern the relationship between cargo
owners and carriers.
The adoption of the Hamburg Rules modernised the transit of cargo by ships. They replaced
the Hague Rules as well as clarifIed and simplified maritime shipping matters. They
abolished the list of available defences found in article 4(2) of The Hague, and changed the
carrier's basis of liability.
No longer will exoneration, in cases of fault or neglect, be accepted. The new system is
based on the presumption of fault or neglect. This issue is made clear in article 5 (l) of the
Hamburg Rules, which states that the carrier will be held responsible for the loss or damage
to the goods under his charge, until he proves he was not at fault and that he used the
vreasonable required measures to avoid such loss or damage.
In practice the Hamburg Rules are not universally accepted, none of the major trading
states (US, Britain, Canada, France etc... ) have adopted this new system. However, they are
more suitable for modem maritime shipping needs, they expanded into areas that Hague did
not cover or did not exist (electronic technology), and further, eliminated the perception of
bias and injustice that was perceived with the Hague Rules. Formulated by all parties
concerned they are more illustrative ofall interests involved
Today the question on everyone's mind is, which system should be the one to govern? Until
everyone agrees on the acceptable solution, if ever, we will have to face an industry being
regulated by two systems or three if we consider the HagueNisby System as distinct from
the original Hague Rules.
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Resume
Toujours en evolution Ie droit maritime est constamment en train de se moderniser.
Depuis ses debuts Ie droit maritime essaie de s'adapter aux realites de son temps. Le
changement fut lent et difficile it. atteindre. Au depart la pratique voulait qu'un
transporteur maritime puisse echapper it. presque toute responsabilite. L'application des
coutumes du domaine et du droit contractuel avait laisser place aux abus et aux inegalites
de pouvoir entre transporteurs maritimes et chargeurs/proprietaires de marchandises.
La venue du vingtieme siecle changea tout. L'adoption des Regles de la Haye,
HayeNisby et Hambourg a transfonne Ie systeme de transport de marchandise par mer tel
qu'on Ie connaissait jusqu'it. date. Ainsi une evolution graduelle marqua l'industrie
maritime, paralleIement Ie droit maritime se developpa considerablement avec une
participation judiciaire plus active.
De nos jours, les transporteurs maritimes sont plus responsables, or cela n'empeche pas
qu'ils ne sont pas toujours capables de livrer leurs cargaisons en bonne condition. Chaque
fois qu'un bateau quitte Ie port lui et sa cargaison sont en danger. De par ce fait, des biens
sont perdus ou endommages en cours de route sous la responsabilite du transporteur.
Malgre les changements et l'evolution dans les operations marines et l'administration du
domaine la realite demeure telle que Ie transport de marchandise par mer n'est pas garanti
it. cent pour cent.
Dans les premiers temps, un transporteur maritime encourait toutes sortes de perils durant
son voyage. Consequemment les marchandises etaient exposees aux pertes et dangers en
cours de route. Chaque annee un grand nombre de navires sont perdu en mer et avec eux
la cargaison qu'ils transportent. Toute la modernisation au monde ne peut eliminer les
hauts risques auxquels sont exposes les transporteurs et leurs marchandises. Vers la fin
des annees soixante-dix avec la venue de la convention de Hambourg on pouvait encore
constater que Ie nombre de navires qui sont perdus en mer etait en croissance. Ainsi
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meme en temps moderne on n'echappe pas aux probU:mes du passe.
"En moyenne chaque jour un navire de plus de 100 tonneaux se perd corps et biens (ceci
veut dire: navire et cargaison) et Ie chiffre croit: 473 en 1978. Aces sinistres majeurs
viennent s'ajouter les multiples avaries dues au mauvais temps et les pertes pour de
multiples raisons (marquage insuffisant, erreurs de destination...). Ces perils expliquent :
(1) Ie systeme de responsabilite des transporteurs ; (2) la limitation de responsabilite des
proprietaires de navires; ... "I
L'historique legal du systeme de responsabilite et d'indemnite des armateurs demontre la
difficulte encourue par les cours en essayant d'atteindre un consensus et uniformite en
traitant ses notions.
Pour mieux comprendre les differentes facettes du commerce maritime il faut avoir une
comprehension du role des armateurs dans ce domaine. Les armateurs representent Ie
moyen par lequel Ie transport de marchandises par mer est possible. Leur role est d'une
importance centrale.
Par consequent, Ie droit maritime se retrouve face a des questions complexes de
responsabilites et d'indernnites. En particulier, la validite de l'insertion de clauses
d'exonerations par les transporteurs pour se liberer d'une partie ou de toutes leurs
responsabilites. A travers les annees cette pratique a atteint un tel point d'injustice et de
flagrant abus qu'il n'est plus possible d'ignorer Ie probleme. L'industrie en crise se
trouve obliger d'affronter ces questions et promouvoir Ie changement.
En droit commun, l'armateur pouvait modifier son obligation prima facie autant qu'ille
voulait. Au cours des ans, ces clauses d'exception augmentaient en nombre et en
complexite au point qu'il devenait difficile de percevoir quel droit on pouvait avoir contre
Ie transporteur.
Rene RODleRE, I.e droit maritime, Presse universitaire de France, 1980, p. 26
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Les proprietaires de marchandise, exportateurs et importateurs de marchandises i.e.
chargeurs, transporteurs, juristes et auteurs sont d'avis qu'il faut trouver une solution
relative aux questions des clauses d'exonerations inserees dans les contrats de transport
sous connaissement. Plus precisement ces clauses qui favorisent beaucoup plus les
armateurs que les chargeurs. De plus, depuis longtemps la notion du fardeau de preuve
etait obscure.
II etait primordial pour les pays de chargeurs d'atteindre une solution concernant cette
question, citant qu'en pratique un fardeau tres lourd leur etait impose. Leur desir etait de
trouver une solution juste et equitable pour toutes les parties concernees, et non une
solution favorisant les interets d'un cote seulement. Le transport par mer etant en grande
partie international il etait evident qu'une solution viable ne pouvait etre laissee aux
mains d'un pays. La solution ideale devait inclure toutes les parties concernees.
Malgre Ie desir de trouver une solution globale, Ie consensus general fut long aatteindre.
Le besoin urgent d'uniformite entre les pays donna naissance aplusieurs essais au niveau
prive, national et international. Au cours des ans, on tint un grand nombre de conferences
traitant des questions de responsabilites et d'indemnites des transporteurs maritimes.
Aucun succes n'est atteint dans la poursuite de l'uniformite. Consequemment, en 1893
les Etats Unis prennent la situation en mains pour regler Ie probleme et adopte une loi
nationale.
Ainsi: «Les reactions sont venues des Etats Unis, pays de chargeurs qui supportent mal un
systeme qui les desavantage au profit des armateurs traditionnels, anglais, norvegiens,
grecs... Le Harter Act de 1893 etablit un systeme transactionnel, mais imperatif... »2
On constate qu'aux Etats Unis la question des clauses d'exonerations etait enfin regie et
2
Rene RODleRE, Le droit maritime Presse universitaire de France, 1980, p. 27
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par consequent en grande partie leur application limitee. L'application du Harter Act
n'etant pas au niveau international son degre de succes avait des limites. Sur Ie plan
international la situation demeure la meme et Ie besoin de trouver une solution acceptable
pour tous persiste.
Au debut du vingtieme siecle, I'utilisation des contrats de transport sous connaissement
pour Ie transport de marchandise par mer est pratique courante. Au creur du probleme les
contrats de transport sous connaissement dans lesquels les armateurs inserent toutes
sortes de clauses d'exonerations controversees. II devient evident qu'une solution au
probleme des clauses d'exonerations abusives toume autour d'une reglementation de
l'utilisation des contrats de transport sous connaissement. Ainsi, tout compromis qu'on
peut envisager doit necessairement regir la pratique des armateurs dans leurs utilisations
des contrats de transport sous connaissement.
Les annees anterieures et posterieures a la premiere guerre mondiale furent marquees par
I'utilisation croissante et injuste des contrats de transport sous connaissement. Le besoin
de standardiser la pratique devenait alors pressante et les pays chargeurs s'impatientaient
et reclamaient l'adoption d'une legislation semblable au Harter Act des Etats Vnis. Vne
chose etait certaine, tous les interets en cause aspiraient au meme objectif, atteindre une
acceptation, certitude et unanimite dans les pratiques courantes et legales.
Les Regles de la Haye furent la solution tant recherchee. lIs representaient un nouveau
regime pour gouverner les obligations et responsabilites des transporteurs. Leur but etait
de promouvoir un systeme bien balance entre les parties en cause. De plus elles visaient a
partager equitablement la responsabilite entre transporteurs et chargeurs pour toute perte
ou dommage causes aux biens transportes. Par consequent, l'applicabilite des Regles de
la Haye etait limitee aux contrats de transport sous connaissement. Avec Ie temps on a
reconnu aux Regles un caractere international et on a accepte leur place centrale sur Ie
plan global en tant que base des relations entre chargeurs et transporteurs.
xAu depart, la reception du nouveau regime ne fut pas chaleureuse. La convention de la
Haye de 1924 fut ainsi sujette a une opposition massive de la part des transporteurs
maritimes, qui refusaient l'imposition d'un compromis affectant l'utilisation des clauses
d'exonerations. Finalement Ie besoin d'uniformite sur Ie plan international stimula son
adoption en grand nombre. Les regles de la Haye furent pour leur temps une vraie
innovation une catalyse pour les reformes futures et un modele de reussite globale. Pour
la premiere fois dans 1'histoire du droit maritime une convention internationale regira et
limitera les pratiques abusives des transporteurs maritimes. Les regles ne laissent pas
place aux incertitudes ils stipulent clairement que les clauses d'exoneration contraire aux
regles de la Haye seront nulles et sans valeur. De plus les regles enoncent sans equivoque
les droits, obligations et responsabilites des transporteurs.
Neanmoins, Ie commerce maritime suivant son cours est marque par Ie modemisme de
son temps. La pratique courante exige des reformes pour s'adapter aux changements de
l'industrie mettant ainsi fm ala periode d'harmonisation. Les regles de la Haye sous leur
forme originale ne repondent plus aux hesoins de l'industrie maritime. Par consequent a
la fin des annees soixante on adopte les Regles de Visby. Malgre leur succes les regles
n'ont pu echapper aux nombreuses critiques exprimant l'opinion, qu'elles etaient plutot
favorables aux interets des transporteurs et au detriment des chargeurs.
Repondant aux pressions montantes on amende les Regles de la Haye, et Ie 23 fevrier
1968 elles sont modifiees par Ie protocole de Visby. Essayant de complaire a
l'insatisfaction des pays chargeurs, l'adoption des Regles de Visby est loin d'etre une
reussite. Leur adoption ne remplace pas Ie regime de la Haye mais simplement met en
place un supplement pour combler les lacunes du systeme existant.
Les changements qu'on retrouve dans Visby n'etant pas d'une grande envergure, la
reforme fut critiquee par tous. Donnant naissance a des nouveaux debats et enfin a une
nouvelle convention. Visby etant un echec, en 1978 la reponse arrive avec l'instauration
d'un nouveau regime, different de son prooeeesseur (Hay/Haye-Visby). Les Regles de
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Hambourg sont Ie resultat de beaucoup d'efforts sur Ie plan international. Sous une
pression croissante des pays chargeurs et plus particulierement des pays en voie de
developpement la venue d'un nouveau regime etait inevitables. Le bon fonctionnement de
l'industrie et la satisfaction de toutes les parties interessees necessitaient un compromis
qui repond aux interc~ts de tous.
Avec l'aide des Nations Unis et la participation de toutes les parties concernees les
Regles de Hambourg furent adoptees. Accepter ce nouveau regime impliqua Ie debut d'un
nouveau systeme et la fin d'une epoque centree autour des regles de la Haye. II n'y a
aucun doute que les nouvelles regles coupent les liens avec Ie passe et changent Ie
systeme de responsabilite qui gouveme les transporteurs maritimes. L'article 4(2) de la
Haye et sa liste d'exception sont elimines. Un demi-siecle de pratique est mis de cote, on
tourne la page sur les experiences du passe et on se tourne vers un nouveau futuro
II est clair que les deux systemes regissant Ie droit maritime visent Ie meme but, une
conformite internationale. Cette these traitera la notion de responsabilite, obligation et
indemnisation des transporteurs maritimes sous les regles de la Haye et Hambourg. En
particulier les difficultes face aux questions d'exonerations et d'indemnites. Chaque
regime a une approche distincte pour resoudre les questions et les inquietudes du
domaine. D'un cote, la these demontrera les differentes facettes de chaque systeme, par la
suite on mettra l'accent sur les points faibles et les points forts de chaque regime.
Chaque pays fait face au dilemme de savoir quel regime devrait gouverner son transport
maritime. La question primordiale est de savoir comment briser les liens du passe et
laisser les Regles de la Haye dans leur place, comme predecesseur et modele pour Ie
nouveau systeme.
II est sur qu'un grand nombre de pays ne veulent pas se departir des regles de la Haye et
continuent de les appliquer. Un grand nombre d'auteurs expriment leurs desaccords et
indiquent qu'il serait regrettable de tourner Ie dos a tant d'annees de travail. Pour se
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departir des Regles de la Haye, il serait une erreur ainsi qu'une perte de temps et d'argent.
Pendant plus de 50 ans les cours a travers Ie monde ont reussi a instaurer une certaine
certitude et hannonisation sur Ie plan juridique. Tout changer maintenant ne semble pas
logique.
Tout de meme l'evident ne peut etre ignorer, les Regles de la Haye ne repondent plus aux
besoins du domaine maritime modeme. Les questions de responsabilite, immunite,
fardeau de preuve et conflit juridictionnel demeurent floues. La legislation intemationale
necessite des reformes qui vont avec les changements qui marque l'evolution du
domaine. Les precurseurs du changement decrivent les Regles de la Haye comme
archaiques, injustes et non conforme au progreso Elles sont connues comme Ie produit des
pays industrialises sans l'accord ou la participation des pays chargeurs ou en voie de
developpement.
Ainsi I'adoption des Regles de Hambourg signifie Ie remplacement du systeme precedent
et non pas sa reforme. L'article 5(1) du nouveau systeme decrit un regime de
responsabilite base sur la presomption de faute sans recours aune liste d'exoneration, de
plus les nouvelles regles etendent la periode de responsabilite du transporteur.
Les Regles de Hambourg ne sont peut etre pas la solution ideale mais pour la premiere
fois elle represente les interets de toutes les parties concemees et mieux encore un
compromis accepte par tous. Cela dit, il est vrai que Ie futur prochain demeure incertain.
II est clair que la plupart des pays ne sont pas presses de joindre ce nouveau regime aussi
merveilleux soit-il.
Le debat demeure ouvert Ie verdict delibere encore. Une chose demeure sure, l'analyse
detaillee du fonctionnement de Hambourg avec ses defauts et merites est loin d'etre
achevee. Seulement avec Ie recul on peut chanter les louanges, la reussite ou I'insucces
d'un nouveau systeme. Par consequent, Ie nombre restreint des parties y adherants rend
l'analyse difficile et seulement theorique. Neanmoins il y'a de l'espoir qu'avec Ie temps
l'objectif recherche sera atteint et qu'un commerce maritime regi par des regles et
coutumes uniformes it. travers Ie globe sera pratique courante. Entre temps la realite du
domaine nous expose it. un monde divise et regi par deux systemes.
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1INTRODUCTION
Maritime trade is an evolving industry, one that has gone through many changes.
Since the early days of shipping, maritime law has tried to adapt to the realities of its time.
Change was slow and not always easy to achieve. Prior to statutory regulation the practical
reality was such that carriers/shipowners managed to escape most if not all of their
responsibilities. In the last century everything changed, the adoption of The Hague, Hague-
Visby and Hamburg Rules transformed the whole system of carriage of goods by sea Thus,
the maritime industry was marked by gradual evolution and maritime law has undergone
considerable development, with a more active judiciary.
Today's carriers are more responsible and thus liable, nonetheless, the carrier's duty
to deliver goods safely to destination is not always possible. Each time a ship sails from port
she and her cargo are at risk. Consequently, goods have been lost or damaged whilst in the
custody of shipowners. Regardless of evolution and change in the operation and
administration of the shipping industry, the reality is that carriage by sea is not full proof.
From the early days of maritime trade shipowners encountered all sorts of perils
whilst in transit, and hence, the goods they carried were exposed to loss and damage.
Every year, a large number of ships are lost at sea and with them the goods carried. All the
modernisation in the world cannot eliminate the high risks they are exposed to during their
voyage. By the time the Hamburg Rules were adopted in the late seventies, the number of
ships lost at sea was still on the rise. As a result, the shipping industry and in particular
shipowners were still facing the same old issues.
2" En moyenne chaque jour un navire de plus de 100 tonneaux se perd corps et biens
(ceci veut dire: navire et cargaison) et Ie chi/fre crolt: 473 en 1978. Aces sinistres
majeurs viennent s'ajouter les multiples avaries dues au mauvais temps et les pertes
pour de multiples raisons (marquage insuffisant, erreurs de destination.. .). Ces
perils expliquent : (1) Ie systeme de responsabilite des transporteurs ; (2) la
limitation de responsabilite des proprietaires de navires ,o ••• " 1
The legal history of the shipowners system of responsibility and liability
demonstrates how difficult it was for the judiciary to reach some sort of consensus and
uniformity in dealing with these issues. All attempts to understand the disparate aspects of
maritime trade implicitly assume some understanding of the shipowners role in this arena.
History tends to emphasise the important role they hold. Consequently, to fully comprehend
the working ofthe carriage ofgoods by sea, one needs to concentrate on its players.
Shipowners represent the means by which carriage ofgoods by sea is made possible.
Their position is ofgreat importance. However, their role has led to many unresolved issues,
such as the responsibility and liability of shipowners in cases of loss or damage to the cargo
they carry. In particular, the use of exception clauses exonerating shipowners from some or
all liabilities. Over time, this practice reached a point of flagrant abuse and injustice. Thus,
leaving the shipping world in a crisis and in desperate need ofchange.
1 Rene RODleRE, I.e droit maritime, Presse universitaire de France, 1980, p. 26,
Nicholas TERRASIER, "Le transport maritime dans la mondialisation : globalisation
et fragmentation" 2000 Vol XVIII Annuaire de Droit Maritime et Oceanique,
p349, "En trente ans, de 1970 a 2000, Ie trafic maritime mondial a plus que double
passant de 2605 millions de tonnes a 5064 millions. », Maritime Transportation System,
An Assessment of the U.S. Marine Transportation System A Report to Congress,
September 1999 " The United States is the world's most active trading nation, accounting
for 1 billion metric tons or nearly 20 percent of the annual world oceanborne overseas
trade. By the year 2020, Us.. overseas trade - approximately 95 percent of which is
carried by maritime transportation - is projected to more than double. ", Samuel Robert
MANDELBAUM, "Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea Carriage of
Goods Under the Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conventions" 1996 23 :425
Transport lawjournal ,472
3" At common law the shipowner, whether he carried the goods under a charterparty
or under a bill oflading, could modify his prima facie liability as carrier as much as
he wished, and in the course of the years the protective exceptions in these
documents increased both in number and complexity to such an extent that a careful
scrutiny of the documents became necessary in order to ascertain what rights they
conferred against the shipowner. " 2
A general agreement existed amongst shippers, shipowners, maritime lawyers and
authors, that a solution must be found to allow the regulation of shipping contracts, and in
particular the use of bills of lading exception clauses, unjustly favouring one party at the
others expense.
" Shippers and consignees, on their side, complained amongst other things that an
unfair burden of proof was thrust on them whenever they had cause to try and
establish the carrier's liability for loss of or damage to the goods during transit.
Some means, therefore, had to befound to regulate the situation and providefor the
balance being held fairly between the two sides. As sea carriage is largely
international, it was obvious that little good would result from isolated action by
one country alone. ,,3
For the longest time such general agreement did not exist. Nonetheless, the desire to
achieve some sort of conformity amongst nations has led to several attempts at the private
level, as well as at the national and intemationallevels.
2 Sir Alan AMOCATA, Sir Michael J. MUSTILL & Stewart C. BOYD, Scmtton on
Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 19th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1984, p. 409
3G.G. WATKJNS, F.N. HOPKJNS, Business and T,aw for the Shipmaster,
Glasgow, Nautical Press, 1986, p. 549,
Samuel Robert MANDELBAUM, "Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for
Sea Carriage of Goods Under the Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conventions" 1996
23:425 Transport JawjollmaJ ,475
4Over the years, a number of conferences dealing with maritime shipping matters
were held. Not one succeeded in its search for uniformity. As a result, the United States
took matters in their own hands, and in 1893 adopted a domestic legislation to resolve this
Issue.
" Les reactions sont venues des Etats Unis, pays de chargeurs qui supportent mal un
systeme qui les desavantage au profits des armateurs traditionnels, anglais,
norvegiens, frees... Le Harter Act de 1893 etablit un systeme transactionnel, mais
imperatif... '
Hence, the exception clauses found in bills of lading were now regulated, and to a
great extent limited. Nonetheless, the Act was more or less successful since its scope was
far from international. Thus, the international maritime arena was still in search of a
solution. A regulated solution, not one left to the voluntary agreement of the parties
involved. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the use of bills of lading in carriage
by sea was a well-established practice. Bills of lading were at the heart of the matter,
since that is where most of the exoneration clauses were inserted. Their central role made
it obvious that the solution to the problem evolved around them. Therefore, any sort of
compromise in resolving the issue implied some regulation of shipowners use of bills of
lading exoneration clauses.
4 R. RODleRE, ibid., id. Note 1, p. 27, Samuel Robert MANDELBAUM,
"Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea Carriage of Goods
Under the Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conventions" 199623:425
Transport lawjoJlmal ,475
5" In the years before and immediately after the 1914-1918 War, as the terms ofbills
oflading became more diverse, the needfor standardisation became more and more
insistent and increasing demand was made on the part of importers and exporters
for the imposition by legislation, on the lines of the American Harter Act 1893, of
certain minimum liabilities ofsea-carriers who issued bills oflading. ,,5
The Hague Rules were the solution. It represented the new regime governing the
responsibilities and liabilities of the carriers. Their goal was to create a system based on fair
balance, as well as one that regulates cargo losses between shippers and shipowners.
Consequently, the applicability of these Rules was limited to cases in which bills of lading
or other negotiable document were issued.
Over time, their scope became international, and therefore they represented the basis
of shippers and shipowners relationships in most parts of the world. By the 1960'S the
Rules had been incorporated in legislation enacted by the great majority ofmaritime nations
all over the world.6
" The 1924 Convention at the outset was opposed by the carriers who objected to
the compromise affecting their exemption clauses, and also by the then-rudimentary
organisations representing shippers. However, the crucial need for international
uniformity stimulated legislative activity that led to widespread adoption of the
7Hague Rules. "
5 Sir Alan AMOCATA et autres, ibid., id. note 2, p. 410,
C. DEBATTISTA, Sales of Goods Carried By Sea, Butterworths, 1990, p. 9, Stewart C.
BOYD, Andrews BURROWS, David FOXTON, Scmtton on Cbarterparties and Bills of
I,ading, London, Sweet & Maxwell, Twentieth edition, 1996, p. 404
6 Martine Remond-Gouilloud, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993 p.333 ... « Ie
25 aout 1924, est adoptee la " Convention de Bruxelles pour l'unification de
certaines regles en matiere de connaissements", heritiere directe du Harter Act:
nous vivons toujours sous son empire. Elle sera ratifiee par l'essentiel de la
communaute maritime internationale de l'epoque. »
7 John G. HONNOLD, " Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness- Hague
or Hamburg? ", (1993) 24 I Mar I, & Com, 77-78,
Samuel Robert MADELBAUM, "Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for
Sea Carriage of Goods Under the Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conventions"
6Nonetheless, in the late sixties, the Hague rules were amended. The amendments
were adopted at Brussels on February 23, 1968 and were known as the Visby Protocol.
They represented the response to modernisation and changes that have marked the shipping
industry and that were not covered by the original Hague Rules.
Even with the changes brought forth by the Visby Rules, international criticism over
The Hague and Hague Visby Rules persisted. Thus, in 1978, the Hamburg Rules were
adopted to answer the growing dissatisfaction of shipper interests with regard to the Hague
Rules, particularly amongst developing nations. Cargo owning nations always felt that the
Hague rules were pro carrier interests. Shippers felt that there was no fair balance of
interests amongst parties involved. Thus the adoption of the Hamburg Rules meant the
implementation of a new regime to govern the relationship between cargo owners and
carriers. Furthermore, accepting these new rules implied the end of The Hague Rules era
and the beginning of a new one. Any state that became a contracting state to the Hamburg
convention and which is also party to the Hague rules must repeal the Hague Rules once the
Hamburg convention comes into force. So long as states do not enact to adopt the Hamburg
Rules the carriage ofgoods by sea will remain governed by the Hague Rules. 8
" It is beyond cavil that the Hamburg Rules alter the scheme of carrier liability.
Gone are the limited duties of The Hague Rules, as are nearly all of the seventeen
defences ofHague's article 4(2)-including the nauticalfault defence.,,9
(1996) 23:425 Transport lawjoJlrnal ,477
8 Rene RODIERE, Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed, Dalloz,
1997, at p. 374, Martine REMOND-GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime, 2e
edition, Pedone, 1993 p.340 « Les Regles de Hambourg coupent court aux
querelles de frontiere avec les texte concurrents: tout Etat qui y devient partie
doit denoncer la Convention de 1924 ;
cette denonciation prend ejJet a l 'instant ou les Regles entrent en vigueur a son
egard (art. 31-1). Comme elles se veulent le modele de l'avenir pour toutes les
conventions de marchandises, leur champ d'application est le plus large
possible ...Ainsi les Regles de Hambourg s 'octroient le plus large empire: plus que
la Convention de 1924, meme apres l'elargissement de 1968,
puisque le port de dechargement y est ajoute et la reference obligee au
connaissement escamotee au profit du titre faisant preuve de transport; »
9 Douglas A. WERTH, "The Hague Rules Revisited-A Look at U.S. Options ", (1991) 22
7Thus, The Hague Rules, the Visby amendments and the Hamburg Rules lO, all seek
the same goal, to achieve international conformity. This paper will mainly concentrate on
the analysis of The Hague and Hamburg Rules regarding shipowners responsibilities,
liabilities and more precisely, their use of exoneration clauses liberating them from their
responsibilities and liabilities.
Each set of Rules has a different method of approaching these issues. Thus, on the
one hand, we will demonstrate how each system deals with the issues at hand, and on the
other hand, we will stress the strong and weak points of each system. To start, we will trace
an historical overview of the carriers system of responsibility and liability with their
strengths and lacunas. It will be followed by the analysis of the relevant articles in each
system. Thus, a detailed study ofarticles Ill(1) and Ill(8) stipulating the responsibilities and
liabilities ofcarriers.
As well as an analysis of articles IV (1) and IV (2) of the Hague Rules which proclaim
the carriers rights and immunities, and in particular which lists the seventeen exceptions
found in article IV (2).11
I Mar I! & Com , 66
10 Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules ofLaw Relating to Bills of
Lading, Aug. 25,1924,51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931,120 L.N. T.S. 155, 1931 Gt. Brit. T.S.
No. 17, Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules ofLaw Relating to Bills ofLading, Feb. 23, 1968, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 83
(Crnnd.6944), United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978
(Hamburg Rules), G.A. res. 48/34, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp.(No. 49) at 331, U.N. Doc.
A/48/49 (1993)
11 article IV(2) ofthe Hague Rules, " Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be
responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from:-
(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in
the navigation or in the management of the ship.
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier.
(c) Perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters.
(d) Act ofGod.
(e) Act ofwar.
(f) Act of public enemies.
8Subsequently, a brief analysis of the Visby amendments and the changes they propose
in the carriers system of responsibility and liability will briefly be made. Finally, we will
analyse the latest proposed Rules; the Hamburg Rules. Here again, we will trace the
underlying principles of the carriers responsibility and liability system. A study of article
V(l) of the Hamburg Rules which stipulates that a carrier, his servants and agents, have a
duty to take all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid loss and damage to the
goods, as well as exonerate the shipowner, will be closely outlined. Furthermore, a
distinction between The Hague and Hamburg's approach will also be made. Each part will
be concluded with a critical analysis of the Rules impact, with arguments in favour of or
against maintaining them.
" The overriding question which faces governments and countries today in the field of
carriage by sea is whether to continue to operate on the basis of the Hague Rules of
1924 (or the Hague Rules together with the Visby amendments of 1968) or,
alternatively, to go over to a totally new regime and introduce the Hamburg Rules of
1978. Both these systems are codes, which essentially impose a duty of care on
shipowners. Neither is based on a strict liability concept. Both systems reject freedom
of contract in favour of imposing minimum standards of liability on shipowners.
However, the systems are, in many respects, rather different, and, in order to exercise
an intelligent choice, it is necessary to go into some ofthe detail. ,,12
(g) Arrest or restraint ofprinces, rulers or people, or seizure under legal process.
(h) Quarantine restrictions.
(i) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agents or representative.
(j) Strikes or lockouts or stoppage or restraint of labour from whatever cause, whether
partial or general.
(k) Riots and civil commotion's.
(1) Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea.
(m) Wastage in bulk of weight or any other loss or damage arising from inherent defect,
quality or vice ofthe goods.
(n) Insufficiency ofpacking.
(0) Insufficiency or inadequacy of marks.
(P) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence.
(q) Any other cause arising without the actual fault or privity of the carrier, or without the
fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the burden of proof shall be on
the person claiming the benefit of this exception to show that neither the actual fault or
privity of the carrier nor the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier
contributed to the loss or damage."
12 Peter KHON SOON KWANG, Carriage of Goods by Sea, by Anthony DIAMOND,
" Responsibility for Loss of, or Damage to, Cargo on a Sea Transit: The Hague or
9Once a state adhere to the Hamburg Rules there will no longer be a choice between two
or more systems but rather a new regime (Hamburg) which will solely govern the carriage
of goods by sea. We will conclude by siding with one system, the Hague Rules (or
HagueNisby) or the Hamburg Rules. Establishing that they are best suited for today's
carriage of goods by sea, and more importantly by demonstrating that they are the one most
able to achieve world wide acceptability and uniformity.
Hamburg Conventions?" Singapore, Butterworths, 1986, p. 110. Martine Remond-
Gouilloud, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993 p.340« Les
Regfes de Hambourg ... : tout Etat qui y devient partie doil denoncer fa
Convention de 1924,. cette denonciation prend effet a ['instant ou fes Regfes
entrent en vigueur a son egard (art. 31-1) »,
Rene Rodiere, Emmanuel de Pontavice, Droit Maritime,
12e ed, Dalloz, 1997 at p. 374 «Le 31 Mars 1978, fa Conference des Nations Unies
sur fe transport par mer a adopte fe texte d'une nouvelle convention ... Cette conference, ...
est destinee a rempfacer fa Convention de Bruxelles de 1924, amendee en 1968 et en
1979. »
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Introductory Chapter
A. HISTORY OF THE CARRIER'S LIABILITY - THE"ABSOLUTE LIABILITY"
THEORY
Shipowners are fundamental to the regular functioning of maritime trade. History
has demonstrated, that over time, their role became so important that it reached a point
where they had unilateral control over most shipping matters. Thus, it is not contested that
they have always had great power in the shipping world. However, their status, in terms of
maritime law, was not always clear. What were they? Insurers or bai1ee's?l3
In the early days, defining what really constituted the carriers duties, obligations and
liabilities, was not always a simple task. There was no formal or precise definition to rely
on. Nonetheless, the common understanding everyone agreed on was that carriers had a
duty to deliver the goods in their possession. Furthermore, this responsibility implied at any
risk or cost. The goods were supposed to reach destination in the same condition as they
were at the start of the voyage. Thus, as a general rule, shipowners were liable for any loss
or damage that occurred to the goods they carried. An important question needed to be
answered what was implied by liable and to what degree? The Civil and Common Law
legal systems did not approach this issue in the same manner:
13 Richard R. SIGMON, MilJer's Law of Freight Loss And Damage Claims, 4th ed, Allyn
and Bacon, 1974, p. 2" Just a century before the decision in Coggs v. Bernard, it
was held in Southcote v. bennet, 4 Coke 83b, Cro. Eliz. 815 (l1iJ11), that a bailee was
liable for loss ofgoods even though his defense was that they had been stolen from him
without his fault. The Rule ofabsolute liability ofthe bailee was thus recognized in
clear terms and, with a minor exception, was the rule made applicable to all
bailments. "
11
" While in England the emphasis in early times was placed upon the care and
custody ofthe goods in the hands ofthe shipowner, in France the emphasis was on
the suitability ofthe ship: ifthe ship was seaworthy, the goods would be secure.,,14
B. THE COMMON LAW APPROACH
Under the Common Law regime carriers were held liable as insurers and their
liability was absolute. The responsibility was very strict, and only in exceptional cases did it
allow for exoneration from liability. In the late eighteen hundreds, a number of cases
confIrmed this theory, and thus, paved the way to the modem understanding we have of it.
In Liver Alkali Co v. Johnson,15 Brett J., then of the Exchequer Chamber, expressly
addressed the issue of shipowners liability. He clearly expressed the view that this theory
was an accepted English custom, and that a shipowner carrying goods for hire, carried them
at his own absolute risk. The only acceptable exception was the act of God and the Queen's
enemies. Furthermore, in Nuget v. Smith,16 Brett J. reaffirmed the opinion he held in Liver
Alkali! Co. v. Johnson:
" The true rule is that every shipowner or master who carries goods on board his
ship for hire is, in the absence of express stipulation to the contrary, subject by
implication [ ..} by reason of his acceptance of the goods to be carried, to the
liability ofan insurer, except as against the act ofGod or the Queen's enemies [ ..}
not because he is a common carrier, but because he carries goods in his ship for
h. ,,17lre.
14 Malcolm Alistair CLARKE, Aspects oftbe Hague Rules, the Hague, Martinus Nijhoff,
1976, p. 113, Richard R. SIGMON, Miller's Law ofFreight Loss And Damage
Claims, 4th ed, Allyn and Bacon, 1974, p. 6-7 , C. Hill, Maritime Law, 4th ed., Lloyd's
ofLondon Press LTT, 1995, p. 385
15 Liver Alkali Co. v. Johnson, (1872) L.R. 7 Ex. 267, and affirmed in the
Exchequer Chamber (1874) L.R. 9 Ex. 338
16 Nugetv. Smith, (1875) 1 C.P.D. 19
17 ibid., id. note 16, p.33.
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As a result, most states accept the general maritime law principle, holding
shipowners absolutely responsible for loss or damage to the goods. To escape such strict
liability, the shipowner needs to prove not only that the loss does not result from his
negligence, but also that it falls in one ofthe accepted exceptions.
Each State has its own acceptable exceptions. They vary and were not uniform. In
England, for a long time, the only acceptable exceptions were the act of God or the Queen's
enemies. In the United States we could find more exceptions, the shipper's fault, inherent
vice of the goods, public enemies and the act ofGod.18
Hence, the general rule was based on a no-fault basis. The carrier was liable without
fault, therefore, making his responsibility very onerous and severe. Thus, supporting the
view that the shipowner was an insurer. As shown, some uniformity regarding liability in
cases of loss or damage to the cargo did exist amongst states. However, the irony with this
theory lies in the fact that such absolute liability was not at all characteristic to those
times,19 when capitalism and freedom of contract were at their peak and clearly in contrast
18 Michael F. STURLEY, " The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules ", (1991) 22
J Mar T, & Com 1, Notara v. Henderson (1872) L.R. 7 Q. B. 225 at p. 236, Nuget v. Smith
(1876) 1 c.P. D. 19 at p. 33, and Liver Alkali Co. v. Johnson (1874) L.R. 9 Ex. 338 at p.
344, Grill v. General Iron Colliery Co. (1886) L.R. 1 C.P. 600 at p. 612, The Xantho (1887)
12 App.Cas. at p.515, Hamilton v. Pandorf(1887) 12 App.Cas. at p. 526
19 Michael F. STURLEY, ibid., id. note 11, p.5., Robert GRIME, Shipping T,aw ,
2 ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991, p. 159, Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS,
David FOXTON, Semtton on CharteqJarties and Bil1s of T,ading, Twentieth edition ,
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996, p. 202 "The liability of an insurer , said to be
undertaken, in the absence ofexpress agreement, by all shipowners lending their vessels for
hire, rests on the authority ofBrett J. (later Lord Esher), who expressed that opinion in
1874, in the Liver Alkali case, and repeated it in 1875, in Nugent v. Smith, where he said,
Denman J. concurring, "The true rule is that every shipowner or master who carries goods
on board his ship for hire is ... to the liability ofan insurer, ... Cockburn c.J., admitting that
the point was not involved in the case, took occasion to dissent entirely from the view of
Brett J. in a very elaborate judgement, in which he held that no such liability existed, but
that shipowners, other than ofgeneral ships, were only bailees, and bound to use ordinary
care and diligence. On this two questions arise(1) as to the history ofthe rule; (2) as to its
present position. (1) As to its history , the view ofBrett J. was that the common law of
England as to bailments is founded on the Roman Law, that therefore bailees are liable
13
with such a theory.
History has shown that the strict liability theory, was not the accepted general rule
amongst authors. Some authors argued that a distinction should have been made between
common carriers and charter carriers. Thus, that the strict liability principle did not apply to
all carriers, but only to common carriers. Consequently, the non-common carriers were only
liable as bailee's, implying that they were only expected to use ordinary care and diligence
when the goods were in their custody.
The strict responsibility was very difficult to bear and in the nineteenth century
carriers tried to show that they were not common carriers or used the freedom of contract
concept to cover privately the carriage of goods by sea relationship between shippers and
carriers. This allowed carriers to reduce or exclude their duty to take due care of the goods.
In Nuget v. Smith, 20 Cockburn, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal, refuted the
view that the strict liability theory was the general rule, and argued that it was the exception
to the rule. He went on explaining its origin, dating it back to the reigns of Elizabeth I and
James I, who introduced it as an exception. Thus, he was of the opinion that the general rule
was based on the duty to use ordinary care in trying to avoid loss or damage to the goods,
and that the strict liability theory was not the ordinary rule, and therefore, should not be
considered as such.
onlyfor ordinary care unless they fall within certain classes, who are absolute insurers, the
historical origin of these classes being found in the Praetor's Edict. This historical view
was persuasively attacked by Oliver Wendell Holmes in his work on the Common Law.
Cockburn c.J. took the view that the strict liability ofcarriers was introduced by custom in
the reigns ofElizabeth I and James I as the exception to the ordinary rule that bailees were
bound to use ordinary care. Holmes maintained that the stricter liability is the older ofthe
two and that the present liability ofcarriers is therefore a survival ofthe old rules ... "
20 Nuget v. Smith, (1876) C.P.D. 423
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The authors Payne and Ivarny's 21 support the view that a common carrier has an
absolute responsibility to the owner of the goods, the common carrier has the responsibility
of an insurer. Thus, if a shipowner is not a common carrier he must only use due care and
diligence with the goods carried, being liable as a bailee for hire only. Mr. O.W. Holmes
disagreed with this view, and expressed the generally accepted opinion that the stricter
liability (the absolute liability) is the older of the two, and consequently, the present system
ofliability draws its legitimacy from this old rule.22
Scrutton, supports the view that the absolute liability theory only applies to common
carriers, and charterparty carriers are only liable if they did not use reasonable care in
handling the goods in their custody. On the other hand, Carver adopts the view that a
carrier, whether common or not, is liable in its strictest sense.
" Carver's view is to be preferred because the reason ofpolicy that led to strict
liability for the common carrier would seem equally relevant to the shipowner
whose ship is on charter. ,,23
21 PAYNE & IVAMY'S, Carriage Of Goods by Sea, 13th ed., London and Edinburgh,
Butterworths, 1989, p.178, Fuji Electronics and Machinery Enterprise v. New
Necca Shipping Corpn, The Golden lake [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep 632, Raoul P.
COLINVEAUX, Carver on Carriage By Sea, 11 th ed, London, Stevens & Sons Limited,
1963, p. 3 "The common law, with regard to the liability ofa public carrier of
goods, is strict. Apartfrom express contract he is, with certain exceptions,
absolutely responsible for the safety ofthe goods while they remain in his hands as
carrier.", Coggs v. Bernard, (1703) 2 Ld.Raym. 909; 1 Smith's L.c., 13th ed., 175,
186, Richard R. Sigmon, Miller's Law ofFreigbt Loss and Damage Claims, 4th ed.,
Allyn and Bacon, 1974, p.5 " Under the common law, the liability ofcommon
carriers was so rigid that they were often regarded as insurers ofthe goods ... "
22 Sir AlanAMOCATA, Sir Michael J. MUSTILL & Stewart C. BOYD, Scmtton on
Cbarterparties and Bills ofLading, 19th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1984,
Richard R. SIGMON, Miller's I,aw ofFreigbt I ,ass And Damage Claims, 4th ed.,
Allyn and Bacon, 1974, p. 4
23 Malcolm Alistair CLARKE, Aspects of the Hague Rules, the Hague, Martinus Nijhoff,
1976, p. 114
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The one principle everyone agrees on is that shipowners who are common carriers
have an absolute liability in cases of cargo loss or damage. Subsequently, Lord Wright, of
the Privy Council, in Paterson Steamship v. Canadian Wheatl (and in Coggs v. Bernard),24
reaffirmed the Common Law position regarding the responsibility associated to the carriage
of goods by sea. Thus, once more we have an example of the carrier's responsibility being
that of an insurer and not a bailee. In Canada the common Law position regarding the
carriers strict responsibility applied until the adoption ofthe Hague rules in 1936.25
C. WHY SUCH A STRICT RULE?
The objective of the strict liability theory should be viewed in association with the
common shipping conditions of those times. In most cases, once the goods were in transit
and no longer in the hands of the shipper, the only party that could know what happened to
the goods, are the carrier and his crew. Furthermore, under such conditions, it was
impossible for the shipper to prove that the carrier or his servants were negligent. It
therefore seemed unjust, to say the least, to put this kind of burden on the shipper.
Consequently, one can clearly find a logical justification for holding the carrier absolutely
24 Paterson Steamship v. Canadian Wheat [1934] A.C. 538, Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld.
Raym. 909, Richard R. SIGMON, Miller's I,aw of Freigbt I,oss And Damage
Claims, 4th ed., Allyn and Bacon, 1974, p. 2, Raoul P. Colinvaux, Carver Carriage by
thSea, 11 ed., Vol I, London, Stevens & Sons, 1962, p. 7
25 Michel POURCELET, Le Transport Maritime SOllS Connaissement Droit Canadien,
Americain et Anglais, Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p.5-9, Hague-
Magreb Essays 3, Carriage of Goods by Sea, Maritime Co11isions, Maritime Oil
Polllltion, Commercial Arbitration, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1980, p. 4-5 « It is not surprising that in those countries that could be
Regarded as nations ofimporters and exporters and where the shipowners interests
played a minor role, such as the United States, Canada and Australia, the first
legislations were passed to restore the disturbed balance between shippers and
carriers. In the United States the Harter Act was passed in 1893 and Canada
followed with the Water Carriage ofGoods Act 1910. .. The Hague Rules which
formed the compromise between cargo owners and maritime carriers were to a
large extent inspired by the Canadian Water Carriage ofGoods Act and the Harter
Act... "
16
responsible for the safe arrival ofgoods under his care:
" Goods in transit inevitably run the risk of being lost or stolen, damaged or
destroyed. The risk can be reduced, but not eliminated, by physical precautions
taken by those persons having custody of the goods during transit, which, for this
purpose, may be regarded as beginning with the preparation of the goods for
carriage at the place from which they are consigned and ending with their delivery
to the consignee at their destination. ,,26
Hence, the carrier and his agents are the only one's with all the answers concerning
what happened to the goods in transit. Furthennore, they are the only one's that physically
can do something to avoid any loss or damage to the goods. Since the goods are within their
custody, it is impossible for anyone else, and in particular the shippers, to intervene, and
furthennore, to really know what happened to those goods.
In Riley v. Horne,27 a clear explanation was given for the Common Law rule of strict
liability: " When goods are delivered to a carrier, they are usually no longer under the eye of
the owner; he seldom follows or sends any servant with them to the place of their
destination. If they should be lost or injured by the grossest negligence of the carrier or his
servants, or stolen by them, or by thieves in collusion with them, the owner would be unable
to prove either of these causes of loss; his witnesses must be the carrier's servants, and they,
knowing that they could not be contradicted, would excuse their master and themselves. To
give due security to property, the law has added to that responsibility of a carrier, which
immediately arises out of his contract to carry for a reward, namely, that of taking all
reasonable care ofit, the responsibility ofan insurer. ,,28
26 Lord Diplock K., " Conventions and Morals - Limitation Clauses in International
Maritime Conventions ", ~1969-70) 1 {Marl, & Com, 525, at 525-526, R. Colinvaux
Carver Carriage hy Sea, 13 t ed., Vol I, ,London, Stevens & Sons, 1982, p. 4
27 Riley v. Horne, (1828) 5. Bing. 217, at Malcolm Alistair CLARKE, Aspects of the
Hague Rules, the Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, p. 113 at 117
28 Riley v. Horne, (1828) 5. Bing. 217 at 220, R. Colinvaux, Carver Carriage hy Sea, 13th
ed., Vol I, by, London, Stevens & Sons, 1982, p. 3-4., Robert GRIME, Shipping Law,
2 ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991, p. 159
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This rule of strict liability was hard to bear and resulted in carriers fmding ways to
escape liability. Initially Common Carriers liability for the goods carried was so onerous,
the law held carriers responsible for the goods they carried against all events except for the
act of God or public enemy hence, the practice to insert a number of exoneration clauses in
the carriage contract began?9 The Contractual freedom of the parties aloud carriers to
negotiate maritime contracts on a private basis with no constraint. This situation was not
altered in shipowning states in particular England who carried a substantial part of the world
trade. However, nations who were substantially representative of cargo interests i.e. the US
contested these maritime customs and in 1893 attained a first compromise with the Harter
Act.
29 Richard R. SIGMON, Mjl1er's Law of Freigbt Loss and Damage Claims, 4th ed.,
Allyn and Bacon, 1974, p 59" One ofthe briefest statements ofthe common
carrier's Liability is that ofJustice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the Common Law
( [ Boston:Little, Brown and Co., 1881), p. 180): "A common carrier is liable for
goods which are stolen from him, or otherwise lost from his charge except by the act
ofGod or the public enemy. "
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D. THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT CONCEPT
The freedom of contract concept is a very old Common Law principle, well
established and accepted. In modem day some of its original strength has been lost, due to
legislative and judicial intervention.3D The Hague and Hamburg conventions both reject the
freedom of contract concept and put forth a system based on minimum standards of
liability. However, in the early years of maritime law, this concept was at its peak. Freedom
of contract implied absolute freedom with no statutory or judicial intervention.
Since the law of contract regulated carriage by sea, the common law rule of strict
liability applied only when no contract regulated the parties' relationship. Thus, the
principle imposing strict liability on shipowners was not at all representative of the common
practice of those times. In principle, it remained the accepted theory, but in actual reality
shipowners found ways to escape such severe obligation. Liabilities were reduced by
catalogues of immunities and exemptions.
30 Robert P. GRIME, Shipping T,aw, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p. 80-81 "The
history ofthe common carrier has had its effect, ...He was, as it was sometimes said,
the " insurer "ofthe shippers goods. As a result, from early times, he sought, by law
and by contract, to restrict or limit this heavy liability ...Another restriction was the
practice ofusing contractual stipulations to reduce the liabilities ... Uncontrolled and
unpredictable exclusions meant that the rights which bills oflading represented might
vary considerably and consignees orpurchasers from them might be prejudiced by
contracts made on disadvantageous terms by the original shipper ofthe goods. To
bring some stability into the system, ... The Hague Rules in 1921 produced a set of
rules to govern the liabilities ofcarriers by sea. The Hague Rules were intended to be
introduced into contracts andprovide a predictable andfair distribution ofliabilities
between carrier and cargo owner. ",
Martine Remond-Gouilloud, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993 p. 406-407,
Richard R. SIGMON, Miller's Law of Freight Loss And Damage Claims, 4th ed., Allyn
and Bacon, 1974, p. 5 "Under the common law, a common carrier was free to contract
against liability for loss or damage due to causes other than his own negligence. ",
Hague-Zagreb Essays 3, Carriage of Goods by Sea, Maritime Collisions, Maritime Oil
Pollution, Commercial Arbitration, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1980, p.5
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" La determination de l'etendue de la responsabilite de l'armateur devrait avoir une
tres grande importance, mais, cette importance est tres attenuee, parce que
l'etendue de cette responsabilite est toujours flXee al'avance par les parties, lors de
la redaction du contrat de transport. Les chartes-parties et les connaissements,
rediges d'apres des formules imprimees, prevoient avec soin toutes les hypotheses
dans lesquelles la responsabilite du transforteur se trouverait engagee et
suppriment ou moderent cette responsabilite. ,,3 .
The insertion of exoneration clauses became so abusive and at the same time the
accepted practice, a maritime custom. What all of this meant in practice was that carriers
were no longer held liable for any wrongdoing.32
E. THE CIVIL LAW APPROACH
ill the Civil law, as well as in the Common law approach, the origins of the
shipowners liability theory are traced back to Roman law:
" La responsabilite du transporteur, au regard du Common Law aussi bien que des
codes ecrits s'inspirant du droit romain, etait tres stricte et a survecu pendant plus
de deux mille ans. ,,33
31Georges RIPERT, Droit maritime, 4th ed. II, Rousseau et Cie, 1952, p. 605-606,
Robert GRIME, Shipping Law, 2 ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991, p. 158-9,
Peter KHON SOON KWANG, Carriage of Goods hy Sea, by Anthony DIAMOND, "
Responsibility for Loss of, or Damage to, Cargo on a Sea Transit: The Hague or
Hamburg Conventions ?", Singapore, Butterworths, 1986, p. 110, Peter KHON SOON
KWANG, Carriage ofGoods hy Sea, by Anthony Evans, " Shipowner's Limitation of
Liability ", Singapore, Butterworths, 1986, p. 121-122
32 Payne & Ivamy's, Carriage Of Goods hy Sea, 13 th ed., London and Edinburgh,
Butterworths, 1989, p.180" ... a shipowner is quite free to exclude his liability for loss
or damage in any way that he thinks-rt.", Richard R. SIGMON, Miller's Law of
Freight Loss And Damage Claims, 4 h ed., Allyn and Bacon, 1974, p. 5-7
33 G. ASSONITIS, Reglementation intemationale des transports maritime dans Ie cadre de
la CNIICED, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1991, p. 201
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Nonetheless, under the Civil law approach, the emphasis was not put on the care
given to the goods in the carrier's custody, but rather on the ship itself. The notion of
seaworthiness was at the base of this approach. The idea was to have a ship in good
condition fit to deliver the goods. This position should be viewed with the knowledge that,
in the early years and in most circumstances, the shipowner was also the captain ofthe ship.
Consequently, the captain \ shipowner was held directly responsible for the loss or damage
to the goods on his ship. Furthermore, he was expected to provide a seaworthy ship, and
hence, this obligation was described as a guarantee. Therefore, courts did not distinguish
between captains and shipowners, and treated all captains as shipowners. As a result, the
strict liability theory developed:34
" Seaworthiness may be defined as the state of a vessel in such a condition, with
such equipment, and manned by such a master and crew, that normally the cargo
will be loaded, carried, cared for and discharged properly and safely on the
contemplated voyage. ,,35
The seaworthiness obligation represents the culmination ofpast practices ofa period
when shippers were part of the transit, and still in possession of the goods. The Common
Law approach regarded the situation from the premise that carriers were responsible for the
goods they carried regardless of the fact that shippers were part of the voyage. Consequently
under the Civil Law approach the emphasis was not on the custody of the goods, but rather,
on the ship itself: 36
34 Malcolm Alistair Clarke, ibid.,id. note 14, p. 114, Robert P. GRIME, Shipping Law,
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p. 103 " In effect, the absolute obligation of
Seaworthiness and "cargo-worthiness is replaced by the Rules with an obligation to
use due diligence." (Until the advent of an international agreement limiting the
carriers liability, carriers had an absolute obligation regarding seaworthiness), Steel
v. State Line (1887) 3 A.C. 72 at p. 86, Raoul P. Colinveaux, Carver on Carriage By
Sea, 11th ed, London, Stevens & Sons Limited, 1963, p. 108" The shipowner is
liable at common lawfor failure to make the ship seaworthy in fact, although he
may have taken all reasonable pains and precautions to do so. He undertakes
absolutely that she shall be fit, on sailing upon the voyage, to carry the cargo which
she has on board, ... "
35 William TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, 2 ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 1978, p. 157
36 Malcolm Alistair CLARKE, ibid., id. note 14, p.114
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" When something was let on hire, the primary obligation ofthe owner was that the
thing be fit for the purpose contemplated, that the horse be soundfor normal riding,
and thus that the ship befit to put to sea. ,,37
With maritime carrier modernisation the lack of emphasis on the goods became an
apparent problem. Maritime practices and customs changed, the liner trade evolved making
it unnecessary for shippers to be part of the voyage. Thus, changing the focus and with it the
shipper's interests. Seaworthiness was no longer the central issue, and consequently, the
Common Law approach, with its concern for the custody of the goods, resurfaced. Hence,
the maritime operations of the ship were no longer the shippers concern, on the other hand,
the safe arrival of the goods to destination became its main preoccupation.
Regarding the burden of proof issue, the Civil Law tradition followed a similar
reasoning as the one found in the Common Law approach. It accepted the view, that, since
the shipper was not part ofthe voyage, it had no real way ofknowing what happened to the
goods in transit. As a result, it should not have the burden ofproving so. Thus, there appears
to be a presumption that carriers are the one with this obligation. Subsequently, courts were
hard on carriers since they were the one who had the upper hand when it came to evidence
and knowledge on how the loss or damage to the goods occurred.38
37Ma1co1m Alistair CLARKE, ibid., id. note 14, p.114, R. COLINVAUX, Carver
Carriage by Sea, 13th ed., Vol I, London, Stevens & Sons, 1982, p. 109
38 Malcolm A. CLARKE, ibid., id. note 14, p. 118, Robert P. GRIME, Shipping I,aw,
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p. 101-102" Common carriers were treated with
very great suspicion. This was probably partly because, in medieval times, carriers
were in a goodposition to enter into agreements with thieves and pirates and
share the spoils at the expense of the cargo owner. It might also have had its origin
in the political needs of trading country such as Great Britain to ensure the safety ofits
carrying trade for foreign merchants. It has also been argued that carriers by sea
are always treated similarly to common carriers, at common law, even if their
business does not properly fall within the accepted definition of a common
carrier... ", E.R. Hardy IVAMY, Carriage of goods by sea, 13th ed., London,
Butterworths, 1989, p. 98, Raoul P.COLINVAUX, Carver Carriage by Sea, 11 th ed.,
Vol I, London, Stevens & Sons, 1962, p. 128
Mors v. Slew (pr Sluce) (1672) T Raym 220, Russell v. Niemann (1864) 34 LICP 10,
Lloyd v. Guibert (1865) LR 1 QB 115, Baxendale v. Great Eastern Rly Co (1869) LR 4
QB 244, Taylor v. Liverpool and Great western Steam Co (1874) LR 9 QB 546, The
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By the early nineteen hundreds, the civil law and common law approach reached a
theoretical unifonnity. Both systems were in agreement to hold carriers responsible in the
strictest sense. Nonetheless, the similarity was mostly theoretical. ill theory the Common
Law and Civil Law accepted the freedom of contract approach however, in practice, the
civil law tradition was not as accepting of the freedom ofcontract concept:39
" Se basant sur Ie principe de la liberte contractuelle reconnu par la common law et
les droits ecrits, les armateurs ont cherche ainserer dans les connaissements des
clauses visant non seulement les exceptions admises par la common law, mais aussi
les autres risques de mer en vue d'echapper aleur responsabilite. L 'usage ainsi fait
de la liberte contractuelle a permis au transporteur de se degager de presque toutes
ses responsabilites meme si la perte ou Ie dommage subi par les marchandises
etaient dus aunefaute ou negligence de sa part. ,,40
The two systems differed in their acceptance of the use of exception clauses and in
particular the applicability of the freedom of contract concept. As a generally accepted rule,
the law of contract regulated carriage by sea. However, in Civil law jurisdictions, the courts
were not lenient with shipowners that were constantly trying to escape their liability. Thus,
not every exception incorporated in a contract was accepted. The practical reality was such,
that in States of civil law tradition some sort ofliability still existed, unlike the common law
41
system.
Xantho (1887) 12 A.c. 503, Smith, Hogg v. Black Sea & Baltic [1940] A.c. 997,
39 Malcolm Alistair CLARKE, ibid., id. note 14, p.117 " English law had reached a
position comparable to that ofFrench law on carriage under bills oflading, ... the two
countries new liability that was similar - in theory. In practice there was considerable
divergence, the English shipowners had used and abused thefreedom ofcontract
allowed by English law, afreedom not accorded so readily to their French
counterparts, ... the similarity ofliability was apparent rather than real: a difference in
degree, i.e. in the number and extent ofthe exceptions, had become a difference in kind,
and the position ofthe English shipowners could almost be described as no liability
with certain exceptions. "
40 G. ASSONITIS, ibid., id. note 33, p. 201, R. COLINVAUX, Carver Carriage
thby Sea, 13 ed., Vol II, ,London, Stevens & Sons, 1982, p. 631,
"Les Connaissement", Rapport du secretariat de la CNUCED, doc. TD/B/c.4/ISU6Rev.2,
Nations Unies, New York, no de vente 72. II.D.2, 1972, p.12
41 Malcolm Alistair CLARKE, ibid., id. note 14, p.117
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F. THE END TO THE ABSOLUTE LIABILITY THEORY AND THE PRE-
HAGUE ERA
By the late eighteen hundreds, the underlying issues regarding the shipowners
responsibility and liability became critical. In practice, carriers managed to escape their
responsibilities and liabilities, therefore creating a situation ofchaos with no uniformity and
predictability in the law. The unrestricted use of exoneration clauses became a problem
associated to bills oflading.
Bills of lading always held a central place in the regular course of shipping
transactions, not only as a contract, but also as a document of title and trade. A person
holding a bill of lading acquires rights and liabilities that usually follow with its possession.
Since bills oflading are contracts of adhesion, on the one hand, they give carriers enormous
advantages, and on the other hand, they limit shipper's rights in these matters. In theory
carriers and shippers were supposed to have equal economic and bargaining powers. Since
their existed no mandatory legislation to govern their relationship both parties were
supposed to defend their respective interests. Early on it became apparent that the market
circumstances and economic conditions were more favourable to carriers who abused these
advantages to escape liabilities. Over time with the maritime industry technical evolution in
navigational instrument and the fact that shippers no longer required to charter the whole
ship to carry their goods, they only needed a limited space for their cargo, increased carriers
d h· 42a vantage over sIppers.
42 Watkins v. Rymill (1883) 10 QBD 178, Richardson, Spence & co and Lord Gought SS
Co v. Rowntree [1894] A.C. 217, Crooks v. Allan (1879) 5 QBD 38, C.F. POWERS, A
Practical Guide To Bi11s Of I ,ading, New York, Oceana Publications, Inc., 1966, p. 2-8,
Esso Belgium v. Nathaniel Bacon [1951] A.M.C. 1435 at p. 1440 (U.S. Court ofAppeals)
" ... the individual shipper has no opportunity to repudiate the document agreed upon by
the trade, even ifhe has actually examined it and all ofits twenty-eight lenghty
paragraphs ... This lack ofequality in bargaining power has long been recognised in our
law;.. ", Martine REMOND-GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993
p.331 «La position de faiblesse du chargeur - nous sommes en presence de cette formule
economique desequilibree que I'on qualifiera plus tard de contrat d'adhesion -, lui
interdit toute negociation contractuelle : if doit en passer par les clauses du transporteur
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Thus, in practice, shipowners use standard type contracts that allow them to escape
all responsibilities and liabilities, simply by inserting all sorts of exception clauses43 in their
bills of lading. By the early nineteen hundreds, the increasing amount of exceptions that
could be found in the bills of lading were so great diverse and complex, it became very
apparent that the situation got out of control. It became a grave problem of international
maritime law in pressing need of a remedy.
So many exception clauses could be found that an attempt to establish an exhaustive
list of them turned out to be a mission impossible. Nonetheless, Scrutton has attempted to
draw a detailed list establishing most of the exceptions. Demonstrating how serious the
situation was and supporting the view that some sort of change was needed. The seriousness
of the situation is quite obvious since any excuse to avoid responsibility found itself an
bb · .1 44escape y ecommg an exoneratIOn cause as a result Scrutton took on the task to
ou renoncer au contrat. »
43 Sample of a Himalaya bill of lading clause Exemptions and immunities of all servants
and agents of the Carrier" It is hereby expressly agreed that no servant or agent of the
carrier (including every independent contractor from time to time employed by the
carrier) shall in any circumstances whatsoever be under any liability whatsoever to the
Shipper, Consignee or Owner of the goods or to any holder of this Bill of Lading for any
loss, damage or delay of whatsoever kind arising or resulting directly or indirectly from
any act, neglect or default on his part while acting in the course of or in connection with
his employment and, but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions in
this clause, every exemption, limitation, condition and liberty herein contained and every
right, exemption from liability, defence and immunity of whatsoever nature applicable to
the Carrier or to which the Carrier is entitled hereunder shall also be available and shall
extend to protect every such servant or agent of the Carrier acting as aforesaid and for the
purpose of all the foregoing provisions of this Clause the Carrier is or shall be deemed to
be acting as agent or trustee on behalf of and for the benefit of all persons who are or
might be his servants from time to time (including independent contractors as afore-said)
and all such persons shall to this extent be or be deemed to be parties to the contract in or
evidenced by this Bill of Lading."
44 Sir Alan Amocata et autres, ibid., id. note 2, p. 211-217, HenryN. Longley, Common
Carriage of Cargo, New York, Matthew Bender, 1967, p. 2, Jean Pineau, I.e contrat de
transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p.165-166, Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews
BURROWS, David FOXTON, Scmtton on Charterparties and BiJ1s of T,ading, Twentieth
edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996, p. 208 " The early bills oflading (between 1531
and 1541 (my emphasis» and charterparties de not contain any exceptions at all. The first
provision of this kind was "the danger of the sea only excepted ". As the result ofa case
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enumerate the most commonly used exceptions. He demonstrated how over the year's
carriers managed to escape responsibility and liabilities. This list encompasses almost all-
case scenarios used by carriers to counter their responsibility.
G. THE HARTER ACT
The United States were amongst the first nations to try and settle the growing
problem related to the exoneration clauses. The U.S. goal was to defend shipper interests.
Until then, the general practice has been favourable to the shipowners interests.
Furthermore, the bargaining balance ofpower between shippers and shipowners was unfair.
Shippers in need of carriers to transport their cargo had no other choice than to
accept the shipowners conditions for the voyage. The situation reached a point that shippers
were in such a weak position, they no longer had a say regarding which clauses should or
should not be inserted in their bills of lading. However, in practice, the U.S. courts were not
easily favourable and accepting of all exoneration clauses. In some instances, they simply
refused to accept those clauses, and in effect, limited their applicability.45
" During the 19th century, courts of the United States and a few other countries
held that .carriers 'bill of lading clauses that disclaimed responsibility for
negligence violated public policy; other courts, notably in the United Kingdom,
enforced these disclaimers. ,,46
tried in 1795, the exceptions were enlarged to read "the act ofGod, the Kings enemies, fire,
and all and every other dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers, and navigation of
whatever nature and kind soever excepted. This clause has been stillfurther extended, until,
as has been said, "there seems to be no other obligation on the shipowner than to receive
the freight ". "
45 Pan American world Airways, Inc. V. california Stevedore & Ballast Co., 559 F.2d
1173 (9th Cir. 1977), Tapco Nigeria, Ltd.. v. M/V Westwind, 702 F.2d, 1255 (5 th Cir.
1983)
46 John O. HONNOLD, "Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness-Hague
or Hamburg? ", (1993) 24 I Mar L & Com, 76-77, Sunkist Growers, Inc. v.
Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd., 603 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979)
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Since US courts were sensitive to cargo owners concerns regarding carriers use and
abuse of exoneration clauses, it came as no surprise that in 1893, the United States started
the movement for change. Their objective was to remedy the inequalities in the power of
bargaining. Thus, they adopted a national legislation to regulate the responsibility and
liability of carriers. Known as the Harter Act, and named after its founder, this legislation
formalised for the first time the carrier's duties and obligations. The U.S. Congress voted
for the Harter Act on February 13, 1893. This new law put an end to the previous system,
which was based on the freedom of contract principle and the voluntary agreement
amongst parties. This innovative statute rendered illegal the arbitrary use of exoneration
clauses. The main objective of the Harter Act was to achieve a fair balance between
shippers and carriers interests. The Act limited the use of exoneration clauses.
Subsequently, any clause which tried to exonerate the carrier from his obligation to care for
the goods in his custody, was declared invalid:47
" Under bills of lading incorporating the American Harter Act 1893 (which by
section 1 provided that it was not lawful for the shipowner to insert in a bill of
lading any clause relieving him from "liability for loss or damage arising from
negligence, fault, or failure in proper loading, stowage, custody, care or proper
delivery ofany and all lawful merchandise orproperty committed" to his care)... ,,48
Furthermore, the carrier had the duty to use due diligence in supplying a seaworthy
ship and, on the other hand, it would not be held liable for loss and damage due to error in
the navigation and management of the ship. It was also the first time that a statute
distinguished between error in management or navigation of the vessel from a commercial
error associated with the management of the cargo. The Act stated that the shipowner could
not exonerate himself from error in management of the cargo, but only from errors in the
management or navigation of the ship, so long as due diligence was used.
47 Blanchard Lumber Co. v. Ss. Anthony II [1967] AMC 103 at p. 115, Seald-Sweet
Sales v. Finnlines, 1974 AMC 2006 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)
48 Sir Alan Amocata et autres, ibid., id. note 2, p. 443-444
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As a result, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, were some of the nations that
followed the American example. And thus, the Harter Act was for its time a great innovator
and predecessor to future international conventions. The Harter Act inspired Canadian Law
which followed with the Water Carriage of Goods Act sanctioned May 4, 1910 and
modified May 19, 1911. Furthermore, the Harter Act and the Canadian Water carriage of
Goods Act served as examples and inspired the adoption of the Hague Rules. Canada did
not ratify or accede the Brussels Convention of 1924. It adopted the Hague Rules into
National law i.e. the Carriage of Goods by Water Act in 1936, the Canadian Act only
applies to outward bills of lading i.e. carriage from a Canadian port.49
49 Jean Pineau, l,e contrat de transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p.166,
Michel Pourcelet, l,e Transport Maritime SOllS Connaissement Droit Canadien,
Americain et Anglais, Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p.5, Hagne-
Zagreb Essays 3, Carriage of Goods by Sea, Maritime Collisions, Maritime Oil
Pollution, Commercial Arbitration, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1980, p. 5 "The Hague Rules whichformed the compromise between
cargo owners and maritime carriers were to a large extent inspired by the Canadian
Water Carriage ofGoods Act and the Harter Act... ", Dominion Glass Co Ltd.. v.
The Anglo-Indian [1944] S.c.R. 409 at p. 417
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H. THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS AT UNIFORMITY
Why do we really need international unifonnity? W. Tetley answered this question
with 3 principles.5o
1) Unifonnity ofLaw
2) Certainty of law
3) Justice
According to Tetley the unifonnity of law is especially important in maritime law
context due to the high number of ships that pass from one jurisdiction to another. Having a
unifonnity of law would eliminate the practice of forum shopping. The certainty of law
would ensure citizens of the world would know their rights and obligation no matter where
events arose. The concept ofjustice emanates from the ideal to attain fair, equitable and just
rights and obligations for all parties concerned.
For the longest time, it was believed that a solution to the insertion of exoneration
clauses in bills of lading could be resolved in practice on a voluntary basis without any state
intervention. The idea was to avoid States regulation and intervention. Until then, a
functional international solution to this problem did not exist, and would only occur with
the adoption of the Hague rules. However, the adoption of the Harter Act by the United
States, and later followed by some commonwealth states, paved the way to international
conferences dealing with these issues. The future showed that the adoption of the Harter Act
was of great importance in helping achieve some sort of future international unifonnity and
h · 51co eSlOn.
50 William TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, 2 ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 1978, p.40-45,
at p. 41 " In the Riverstone Meat (Muncaster Castle) decision, Viscount Simonds Stated:
'To ascertain their meaning (the Hague Rules) it is, in my opinion, necessary to pay
particular regard to their history, origin and context... " Viscount Simonds then
referred to the Conference ofBrussels of1922 and 1923, the United States Harter Act
of1893,the Australian Sea Carriage ofGoods Act of1904, and the Canadian Water
carriage ofGoods Act of1910. "
51 Michel POURCELET, I.e Transport Maritime SOllS Connaissement Droit Canadien,
Americain et Anglais, Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p.5, Hague-
Zagreb Essays 3, Carriage of Goods by Sea, Maritime Collisions, Maritime Oil
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Attempts at solving this problem with non-regulation were unsuccessful. In the late
eighteen hundreds, the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations
(which adopted its modem name in 1895, to the International Law Association) tried to find
a solution and attain international uniformity in international matters and in particular, in
maritime law matters. Therefore, in 1882 the Association held, in Liverpool, a conference
dealing with bills of lading matters. Shippers and carriers were amongst the parties that
attended the conference where a model bill of lading was adopted. Thus, the adopted
standard bill of lading was to be known as the Conference form, and was available amongst
. lb' 52partIes, on a vo untary asIS:
" The central element ofthis compromise was the conclusion that the carrier should be
liable for negligence "in all matters relating to the ordinary course of the voyage,"
such as the stowage and care of the cargo, but should be exempt from liability for
"accidents ofnavigation, " even though losses might be attributable to the negligence of
the crew. In addition, the draft introduced the concept of a carrier's obligation to
exercise "due diligence" to make the vessel seaworthy...and included a list ofspecific
"exceptions"... for which the carrier would not be responsible. ,,53
However noble the objectives were, uniformity was not attained and in practice, the
model bill of lading was not working. Regardless of the fact that the goal sought was not
reached, the main features adopted at the Liverpool Conference would resurface in future
conferences. Thus, its objectives became an example for future attempts at uniformity. In
1885, the Association held another conference, the Hamburg conference. At this
conference, the aim was to adopt a different solution to the problem. Thus, instead of
adopting a model bill of lading, the idea was to adopt a set of rules that could be inserted
voluntarily in the bills of lading. 54
Pollution, Commercial Arbitration, T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1980, p. 5
52 Michael F. STURLEY, " The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules ", (1991) 22
TMarL& Corn, 6
53 Michael F. STURLEY, ibid., id. note 52, p. 7
54 Please refer to Annex A for Historical Chart
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Here again, the attempt to attain uniformity failed. However, the method used was the
adoption of a set of rules, which also remained an example for future attempts.55 By the
early nineteen hundreds the need to find an international solution was pressing. The
situation was such that more and more states were trying to handle the issue of exoneration
clauses with domestic legislation. The aim to attain uniformity of law amongst nations was
not a reality. The International Law Association was not successful in its attempts at finding
an international solution.56
The Comite Maritime International (CMI created in 1897) also began work in trying to
find a solution for specific maritime matters. Under the direction of the CMI, negotiations
were started between shipowners, shippers and insurers. However, the International Law
Association did not give up and by 1921 at The Hague meeting, the differing interests
groups adopted The Hague Rules. The CMI, modified these rules in 1922, and at the 1924
Brussels diplomatic conference, they were officially adopted as the current Hague Rules. It
was the first time that an international approach at solving the problem succeeded.57
55 Michael F. STURLEY, ibid., id. note 52, p. 8
56 PAYNE & IVAMY'S, Carriage Of Goods by Sea, 13th ed., London and Edinburgh,
Butterworths, 1989, p.93, Edgar GOLD, Maritime Transport, Massachusetts, Toronto,
Lexington Books, 1981 p. 208-209
57 G. ASSONITIS, ibid., id. Note 33, p. 202, Robert P. GRIME, Shipping Law,
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, p.81, Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS,
David FOXTON, Scmtton on Charterparties and Bil1s of I,ading, Twentieth edition ,
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996, p. 404-405, Edgar GOLD, Maritime Transport,
Massachusetts, Toronto, Lexington Books, 1981 p. 207-209 " Of great importance was
the adoption in 1924 ofthe Bills ofLading Convention- the famous
"Hague Rules"- ... This convention solved a number ofgreat problems in international
contracts of affreightment caused by the diversity of national contractors and the
excessive use of "negligence" and "exemption" clauses, which gave little or no
protection to the shipper ofgoods ... The need for uniform international legislation was
quickly recognized, but it was to take several decades of difficult negotiations before
agreement could be reached... These rules were eventually molded into a convention by
the CMI andfinally emerged in 1924 as the International Convention for the Unification
ofCertain Rules ofLaw Relating to Bills ofLading. It was a remarkable achievement. "
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PART I THE INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION TO THE CARRIERS LIABILITY
SYSTEM: THE HAGUE AND HAGUE VISBY RULES
Chap 1 - THE HAGUE RULES
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the issue of bills of lading exception
clauses divided the world in two opposing groups ofnations. On the one hand, we had ship-
owning nations. On the other hand, we had cargo-owning nations. The pre-Hague system
was one sided, totally favourable to carriers, as was seen with the abusive use of the
freedom of contract concept and the insertion of exoneration clauses in bills of lading and
later with the use of standard type bills of lading. Achieving some sort of compromise
between the two opposing interests groups turned out to be difficult to attain. 58
The United Kingdom was under tremendous pressure from the Dominion States
who were mostly shipper interests States and who were very hostile to the contract of
adhesion that the English carriers imposed on them. Therefore, under the initiative of the
government of the United Kingdom, the Hague Rules were introduced. The United
Kingdom, having the largest shipping fleet in the world, was in the best position to initiate
such legislation.
58 L.M.S. RAJWAR, M.G. VALENTE, J.J. OYEVAAR, W.R. MALINOWSKI, Les
Transports Maritimes et les Pays en Voie de Developpement, Bruylant Bruxelles, 1972
at p.13 «Le troisieme objectifdes pays en voie de developpement provient de leur
insatisfaction concernant les principes de base des reglements en vigueur dans les
transports maritime internationaux. La legislation des transports maritimes fut elaboree
pendant des siecles dans des conditions tres differentes des conditions actuelles. Les pays
en voie de developpement soutiennent que, puisque Ie droit maritime en vigueur a ete
elabore a une epoque ou it ne pouvaient pas fa ire etat de leurs opinions et de leurs
besoins, il favorise les armateurs aux depens des proprietaires de la cargaison. lIs
pretendent q~e la legislation internationale sur les transport maritime devrait offrir les
garanties necessaires pour proteger leurs interets, compte tenu de leur position
vulnerable,. its sont essentiellement des utilisateurs et non des fournisseurs des services
de transports maritimes. » Great china Metal Industries Co. Limited. V. Malaysian
International Shipping Corp. (The Bunga Seroja) [1999] A.M.e. 427 at p. 429 and 451.
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Consequently, on August 25, 1924 the International Convention for the Unification
of certain rules of law relating to bills of lading was signed at Brussels.59 The novelty with
this new system lies with its mandatory effect on the contracting parties.60
The central goal ofthe rules was to divide cargo losses between carriers and shippers. Thus,
giving concessions to one side implied taking away rights from the other side.61 The Hague
Rules were perceived for a certain time at least, as an acceptable compromise between the
differing interests groups. To further comprehend the compromise, one needs to look
closely at the features they represent.
59 Ibid., id. Anthony DIAMOND in Peter KHON SOON KWONG, p. 110, Brussels
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules ofLaw Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug.
25,1924,51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931,120 L.N. T.S. 155, 1931 Gt. Brit. T.S. No. 17, Jean
PINEAU, I.e contrat de transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p.166-167, M.J.
Shah,« The Revision ofthe Hague Rules on Bills ofLading within the UN System - Key
Issues» in SamirMANKABADY~The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods By Sea,
London, A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden/Boston, 1978, p. 4« Three main points needperhaps to be
particularly noted regarding the Hague Rules. First, opposition by the shipowners' lobby
was only overcome by unremittingpolitical exhortation from the British Dominion and
several Continental European countries; and much ofthe motivatingforce impelling these
countries (strongly supported by United States legal and commercial philosophy) was
directed against the nullification ofthe carte blanche afforded carriers by common law to
exculpate themselves from negligence, a unique privilege denied other entities in most legal
systems...Secondly, freights did not apparently rise as the direct result ofthe introduction of
the Hague Rules '" Thirdly, the Hague Rules compromise retained (and this remains the
major issue today) the main carriers' exceptions from liability, andparticularly those
relating to negligence in management and navigation, perils ofthe sea, fire, etc ... "
60 Rene RODIERE, Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed , Dalloz,
1997, at p. 375 «Dans Ie meme ordre d'idees, la Convention precise qu 'elle ne s 'applique
imperativement qu 'aux « cargaisons commerciales ordinaires, faites au cours
d'operations commerciales ordinaires », .. p.339 « Ces regles imperatives s 'appliquent
ineluctablement a toute la periode qui va depuis la prise en charge de la marchandise
par Ie transporteur jusqu'a sa livraison a l'ayant droit. »
01 Wharton POOR, American I.aw ofCharter Parties and Ocean Bills ofI.ading, 5th ed.,
New York, Matthew Bender, 1986, p. 145, Great china Metal Industries Co. Limited. V.
Malaysian International Shipping Corp. (The Bunga Seroja) [1999] A.M.e. 427.
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sec 1 THE CARRIER'S RESPONSIBILITY
The carrier's system of responsibility is outlined in article ill of the Hague Rules62 .
Rule 1 of Article ill can be considered as one of the most important and also one of the
most controversial.
Article ill{l) reads: The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to
exercise due diligence to:
(a) Make the ship seaworthy
(b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship.
(c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which
goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.
Article ill{l) has generated some confusion and uncertainty, as well as brought up
some obvious questions. The " due diligence" concept, what does it imply? On who rests
this obligation? When does it apply? What is meant by " seaworthiness "?
The Hague Rules did not provide a detailed guide with specific instructions, on how
to interpret these provisions. This task was left to the judiciary. Since no particular court
was aimed at, national courts from around the globe took on the duty to answer these
questions. Thus, the amount of cases dealing with these issues is enormous, and not always
clear.63
62 Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading, Aug. 25, 1924,51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N. T.S. 155, 1931 Gt. Brit. T.S.
No. 17
63 Chester D. Hooper, testimony before the "Subcommittee on Surface Transportation
and Merchant Marine", "Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation" United
State Senate, April 21, 1998
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paragraph 1 THE STANDARD OF CARE:- the "Due Diligence" obligation
Prior to The Hague Rules carriers had the obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel.
Since it was an absolute obligation, proving that one was "due diligent" was not enough.
However, with the adoption of the Hague Rules carriers only need to prove due diligence to
show that the vessel was seaworthy.64 Thus, the new regime imposed a due diligence
standard of care. It became central to the carrier's system ofresponsibilities and immunities.
Thereafter, a search for a better understanding of the due diligence concept and its
implications began.
The due diligence obligation was described in the case of Grain Growers Export
Co. v. Canada Steamship Lines Ltd.65, where the court ascertained that the duty of due
diligence is not merely a praiseworthy or sincere, though unsuccessful effort, but such an
intelligent and efficient attempt as shall make it so, as far as diligence can serve:66
" Due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy may be defined as genuine, competent
and reasonable effort%the carrier to fulfil the prerequisites set out in art. 3(1)(a),
(b) & (c) ofthe Rules.'
With such a vague definition, one cannot help and ask what is a reasonable effort or
an intelligent and efficient effort? There is no one formal answer, each case has to be tried
on its facts and merits. As a result, the amount of cases dealing with this issue is large, and
to find only one applicable definition is difficult. Consequently, the cases covering this topic
are not unanimous in their fmdings. 68
64 William TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, Toronto, Carswell, 1965, p. 93
65 (1918) 43 O.L.R. 330, (1919) S.C.R. 643
66 ibid., id. note 65, p. 330
67 William TETLEY, ibid., id. note 35, p. 165
John Richardson, F.C.I.I., A Guide to the Hague and Hague Visby Rules, Lloyd's of
London Press, 1989, p. 38
68 Chester D. Hooper, testimony before the "Subcommittee on Surface Transportation
and Merchant Marine", "Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation" United
State Senate, April 21, 1998, " In addition, several nations have amended their laws
governing the carriage ofgoods by sea to laws other than Hague/Visby or Hamburg.
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The due diligence obligation is essential to the carrier's regime ofresponsibility.
In 1950, the Canadian case of Toronto Elevators Ltd. v. Colonial SS. Ltd.69 set a precedent.
The court explained that the obligation stipulated in article III(l), was not a simple
obligation but a pre-condition to article IV(2). Thus, to benefit from the provisions ofarticle
IV(2), the" due diligence" obligation first must be fulfilled. 70
The famous case ofMaxine Footwear v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine7 !
confirmed the opinion of the Canadian court. Lord Somervell of the Privy Council restated
the accepted view that article III(l) was an overriding obligation and a prerequisite to article
IV(2). It established that "before and at the beginning of the voyage" meant before the
loading ofcargo has commenced and until the ship weighs anchor to sail.
The American jurisprudence is unclear and confused on this issue. This confusion
stems from the fact that American justices were exposed to the Harter Act before the Hague
Rules adoption. The US Congress enacted the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.72 As a result
their decisions demonstrate a confusion to distinguish between the differing rules set in each
Act. Demonstrated in Firestone Syn. Fibers Co. v. Black Heron 73 and in Bernstein Co. v.
M\S Titania74, two ofthe many cases.
Over the years, various courts ofvarious countries have interpreted the Hague Rules and
Hague/Visby Rules somewhat differently. As a result, the law governing the carriage of
~oods is now confused. "
[1950] Ex. C.R. 371
70 Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS, David FOXTON, Semtion on Cbarterparties
and Bills ofT ,ading, Twentieth edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996, p. 95-103, p. 97
"the prudent man test"
7! [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 105
72 Wemhoener Pressen v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc., 5 F.3d 734, (4th Cir. 1993), The
(COGSA) Carriage of Goods by Sea Act codified the Hague Rules into US national law
in 1936 and superseded for the most part the Harter Act.
73 [1964] A.M.C. 42
74 [1955] A.M.C. 2040
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The Harter75 Act stipulated that the duty of due diligence had to be proved in every
respect. On the other hand, the American national law COGSA76 which is the Hague Rules
with slight modifications stipulated that due diligence need only be proved in respect to the
loss claimed. The enactment of the US COGSA in 1936 limited the applicability of the
Harter Act to domestic trade, the COGSA applies from the time the goods are loaded on
board, and from the time they are discharged from the ship until proper delivery has
occurred. The Harter Act can still apply before the goods are loaded and after they are
discharged from the vessel. Not directly exposed to the Harter Act, the Canadian and
English positions are clearer and more constant. Therefore, they are the one that should be
77followed.
75 Harter Act, 1893,46 U.S. Code App. 190-196
76 Carriage ofGoods by Sea Act 1936,46 U.S. Code App. 1300-15
77 William TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, 2 ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 1978, p. 154,
Jean PINEAU, I.e contrat de transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p.169, Union
Steel America Co. v. M/V Sanko Spruce, 14 F. Supp.2d 682, (D.NJ. 1998), the court held
that the Harter Act imposed a duty on carriers to deliver the cargo from wharf to wharf, to
notify the consignee of the arrival of the ship, and to protect the goods until the consignee
removes it in reasonable time. Wemhoener Pressen v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc., 5
F.3d 734, (4th Cir. 1993), The Harter Act will apply to damage which happened before
loading and after discharge of goods until proper delivery, since COGSA does not cover
those periods. Nonetheless, the COGSA permits the parties (carriers and shippers) to enter
into a special agreement that extends the responsibility and liability coverage of the COGSA
to the periods before loading and after discharge of the goods. Neither the Harter Act or the
COGSA apply once proper delivery has occurred, Allied Chemical Int'l Corp. v.
Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, 775 F.2d 476, (2nd Cir. 1985), 89 L. Ed.2d 903
(1986), B. Elliott (Canada) Ltd. v. John T. Clark & Son, 704 F.2d 1305 (4th Cir. 1983)
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A. When should "due diligence" be exercised?
The case of Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd. v. Canadian Government Merchant
Marine Ltd. 78 defined the meaning of art. IIT(I) " before and at the beginning of the
voyage". Meaning the period from at least the beginning of the loading until the vessel
starts her voyage, it covers the whole period from beginning of loading until sailing. It
could also include the time before loading.79 In the court opinion, the word "before" does
not only mean at the commencement of loading since it is not stated as such, it could also
be before loading started when the goods were still in the custody ofthe carrier. However,
if unseaworthiness is detected after the required period, the carrier will not be responsible,
so long as due diligence was exercised.
"Due diligence must be exercised "before and at the beginning of the voyage"
which means before loading ofcargo has commenced and until the vessel weighs anchor or
slips. The exact moment ofthe beginning ofthe voyage is difficult to determine. One gathers
it is when all hatches are battened down, visitors are ashore and ordersfrom the bridge are
given so that the ship actually moves under its own power or by tugs or both. Thus it is
submitted that the controversial decision in Ss. Sud is correct. There the vessel, while
leaving a dock with the assistance ofa tug, was swung around and struck the dock. It was
held that the voyage had commenced. It has been held that when some act to make a vessel
seaworthy can be done at sea and is properly planned to be done at sea, then the vessel is
h h h ·l ,,80not unseawort y w en s e Sal s.
78 [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 105,
79 William TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, 2 ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 1978, p. 154
"Some Americans cases on the point seem confused and contradictory. It should first be
noted that the American Statute, Cogsa, at art. 3 (2) does not have the words "subject to the
provisions of art. 4 ... "of which Lord Somervell spoke in Maxine Footwear. But the
confusion seemsto arise from the difference between the Harter Act and Cogsa. Under the
Harter Act due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy had to be proved in every respect,
while under Cogsa, which is the American version of the Hague Rules, due diligence need
only be proved in respect of the loss claimed. ", Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS,
David FOXTON, Scmtton on Chm1etparties and BiI1s of T,ading, Twentieth edition ,
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996, p.428-429
80 William TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, 2 ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 1978 p. 164, SS
Del Sud [1959] A.M.C. 2143 (U.S. Ct. ofAppeals), Orient Ins Co. v. United SS Co. [1961]
A.M.C. 1228, The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 316 at p.329-30 « ... the obligation on
the shipowner was to exercise due diligence before and at the beginning ofsailingfrom the
loading port to have the vessel adequately bunkeredfor the first stage to San Pedro and to
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B. What happened to the common law theory of stages?
The common law theory of stages implied that a ship needed to be seaworthy at
each stage of the voyage. If it were not, it would be held responsible for the loss or damage
to the goods it carried. However, with the adoption of the Hague Rules, this theory no
longer applied. Article III(l) of the Rules clearly expressed when the carriers duty applied.
The obligation is only at the port of loading. But a controversy remained over the timeframe
between the operation of loading and the start of the voyage. Does the duty of due diligence
apply to the period oftime between those two activities?
" Le Consei! priwi a retenu la responsabilite du transporteur en enom;ant que
l'obligation de navigabilite devait etre exercee durant toute la periode s'etendant du
debut du chargement jusqu 'au depart du navire. Les juges ont renonce aappliquer
la doctrine des" stages" en invoquant Ie principe de l'uniformite internationale. lis
interpreterent Ie texte des " Regles de la Haye" en faisant abstraction des decisions
judiciaires anterieures. De plus, ils estimerent qu'i! serait pour Ie moins etonnant
que Ie devoir d'exercer une diligence raisonnable cesse des Ie debut des ~erations
de chargement pour reapparaztre ensuite juste avant Ie depart du navire. '
arrange for adequate bunkers ofa proper kind at San Pedro. "
81 Guy LEFEBVRE, "L'obligation de navigabilite et Ie transport maritime sous
connaissement ", (1990) 31 I.es Cabiers de Droit, 81 at p. 107, Jean PINEAU, I.e contrat de
transport) Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p.198, The Chyebassa, Leesh River Tea
Co. v. British India Steam [1966] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 193, American Mai! Line v. Us. A. [1974]
A.M.C.1536
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c. On whom does the obligation of due diligence apply?
The carrier has the obligation to exercise due diligence in his operations to make the
ship seaworthy. However, one wonders if this obligation is a unilateral one dependant solely
on the carrier, or can it be delegated to others. In cases ofdelegation, the responsibility rests
on the carrier in the advent ofloss or damage to the goods. 82
In the well-known case of The Muncaster Castle- Riverstone Meat Co. Pty. Ltd. v.
Lancashire Shipping Co. 83, the court gave the answer. It held, that the duty of due diligence
was non-delegable. That the carrier had a vicarious liability for the default ofhis agents and
servants in their due diligence duty to make the ship seaworthy. Furthermore, in cases of
sub contractors hired by him, and failing to exercise due diligence, the carrier remains
liable, and is therefore, not entitled to the benefits of article N(2) found in the Rules. The
argument was, that a shipowner cannot shed his obligation of due diligence by hiring a
competent firm to make his ship seaworthy. Thus, their failure to use due diligence is his
failure. 84 The reality is such, that it is in the courts hands to decide upon looking at the facts,
if due diligence was used or not by the sub-contractors:
82 William TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, 2 ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 1978, p. 168
« The carrier may employ some otherperson to exercise due diligence, but ifthe delegate is
not diligent, then the carrier is responsible. It is not sufficient to declare that the delegate
was chosen with diligence or that the delegate was a responsible person ... »
83 [1961] Lloyd's Rep. 57, Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS, David FOXTON,
Scmtton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, Twentieth edition, London, Sweet &
Maxwell, 1996, p. 429, Robert P. GRIME, Shipping Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell,
1978, p 161
84 Cranfield Bros. Ltd. v. Tatem Steam Nav. Co. 64 LL L. Rep. 264, Can. Transport Co.
v. Hunt, Leuchars, Hepburns Ltd. [1947] Ex. c.R. 83, Artemis Maritime Co. v. S. W
Sugar Co. [1951] AM.C. 1883, Louise [1943] AM.C. 1246, Amtorq v. Wildwood [1941]
AM.C. 1717
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" Le transporteur ne peut s'exonerer de responsabilite en prouvant qu'il a exerce
cette diligence raisonnable en confiant ades experts le soin de mettre le navire en
etat de navigabilite. A cet egard, on doit se demander queUe est la valeur des
certificats de navigabilite ou d'inspection emis par l'inspecteur du lloyd ou par les
experts des chantiers navals ou le navire fait periodiquement l'objet d'une
inspection. La production de certificats de visite et d'inspection ainsi que les
attestations d'experts constituent une presomption favorable pour le transporteur,
mais il ne s'agit pas d'une presomption irrefragable... ,,85
Consequently, it is up to the judiciary to decide when due diligence was used or not,
since the "due diligence" test was not commonly used in maritime law cases prior to its
incorporation. There is no formal rule or guide that we can follow to determine what is
implied by the due diligence concept in maritime matters, and therefore, the domain
. di bl 86remams unpre cta e.
"La multiplicite des causes d 'exoneration ouvertes au transporteur fait parfois taxer
La loi maritime d'indulgence excessive. Mais d'une part ces cas d'exoneration ne
sont admis, a l 'etranger au moins, que si le transporteur prouve avoir fait
d .l. ,.87llgence.
85 M. POURCELET, Le transport maritime SOliS connaissement, Montreal, Les presses de
l'Universite de Montreal, 1988, p. 67
86 The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air October 12, 1929478 U.N.T.S. 371 also known as The Warsaw Convention.
Under the Warsaw Convention the carrier is presumed liable upon simple proofof
damage or loss to the cargo. The International Convention Concerning the Carriage of
Goods by Rail, May 9, 1980 also known a CIM. The Liability system under the CIM has
been assessed to be based on absolute liability, strict liability or system of liability
without fault i.e. art. 27(1). As for the Convention on the Contract for International
Carriage of Goods by Road, Geneva, May 19, 1956 also known as CMR the basis of
liability is a presumption ofliability against the carrier once the cargo owner has
established the fact of the loss or damage.
87 Martine REMOND-GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993 p.374
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paragraph 2 THE SEAWORTHINESS THEORY
The notion of seaworthiness is not a novel one. It dates back to the beginning of
shipping time, when shipowners had the absolute duty to make their ship seaworthy. What
does seaworthiness mean? On a great number of occasions the courts have had the
opportunity to ponder this issue.
" Seaworthiness means many things - a tight hull and hatches, a proper system of
pumps, valves and boilers, and engines, generators and refrigeration equipment in good
order. A seaworthy vessel must be equipped with up-to-date charts, notices to mariners and
navigating equipment; the crew must be properly trained and instructed in the ship's
operation and idiosyncrasies. Equipment must be properly labelled; diagrams must be
available andposted.,,88
In Reed v. Page89, Lord Scrutton explained why the theory of seaworthiness can
cause confusion. The confusion stems from the fact that seaworthiness implies two
obligations. The first is to have a ship fit for sailor the expected voyage, and the second is,
to have a ship fit to receive the goods carried (to have sufficient ventilation, refrigeration...).
88 William TETLEY, ibid.,id. note 26, p. 157, Federazione Italiana v. Mandask Compania
[1968] A.M.C. 315, Yawata Iron & Steel v. Anthony Shipping [1975] A.M.C. 1602, Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. American President Lines [1972] 1 Lloyd's 385, [1971] A.M.C. 2255
hatches should be tight for the ship to be seaworthy, Liberty Shipping A.M.C. [1973] 2241,
Atlantic Banana Co. v. M/V Calanca [1972] AM.C. 880, Karobi Lumber Co. v. SS Norco
[1966] A.M.C. 315, B.C. Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. The Ship Thor I [1965] 2 ex. C.R. 469,
Greenwich Marine Arbitration [1965] AM.C. 98, Chickasaw [1966] A.M.C. 2219, [1969]
A.M.C. 1682, Iristo [1943] AM.C. 1043, The Roberta 58 LL L. Rep. 159, Heinrich Horn
v. Cia de Navegacion [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 191, [1968] AM.C. 2548,The Anthony II
P966] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 437
9 (1927) 1 K.B. 743
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Hence, the notion of seaworthiness covers many things, an efficient and adequate
system of pumps, boilers, generators, valves, engines, refrigeration machinery, a staunch
hull and hatches. It also covers the crew, officers and master, who must be adequately
qualified and properly trained in all the relevant and necessary features of the operation of
the vessel. Furthermore, equipped with instruction manuals and guides, and able to counter
any reasonable and foreseeable eventualities.
" Seaworthiness may be defined as the state of a vessel in such a condition, with
such equipment, and manned by such a master and crew, that normally the cargo will be
loaded, carried, cared for and discharged properly and safely on the contemplated
,,90
voyage
The judiciary has had a great task, and in many cases a difficult one, in interpreting
article 1lI(1). Nonetheless, today we can state with enough confidence, that most questions
have been answered, and most concepts are not as abstract or unclear. Thus, equipped with
an enormous case law from world-wide spectra, can we now state, that we have reached
universal conformity on the issue? Unfortunately history has demonstrated that such is not
the case.
" In 1978, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law finished
drafting a completely different set of rules, the Hamburg Rules. Uniformity suffered as a
result. In addition, several nations have amended their laws governing the carriage of
goods by sea to laws other than the Hague/Visby or Hamburg. Over the years, various
courts of various countries have interpreted the Hague Rules and Hague/Visby Rules
somewhat differently. As a result, the law governing the carriage of goods is now
,r. d" 9[J-
conjuse .
90 William TETLEY, ibid.,id. note 35, p. 157, Canada Steamship Lines Ltd. V. Desgagne
[1967] 2 Ex C.R. 234
91 Chester D. Hooper, testimony before the "Subcommittee on Surface Transportation
and Merchant Marine", "Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation" United
State Senate, April 21, 1998, Roger Clarke, "Cargo Liability Regimes", prepared for the
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development) Maritime Transport
Committee, January 2001 p.ll " There is consequently a growing concern among
governments and industry over the unnecessary complexities, delays and costs that the
growing diversities inflict on international trade, and there is a correspondingly
enhanced desire for the establishment ofa single regime that countries around the world
would agree to apply consistently. "
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A. THE HAGUE RULES AND BILLS OF LADING CLAUSES (i.e art 111(8), IV(1),
and IV(2).)
Article III(8)92 states that it is not acceptable to insert any clause covenant or
agreement in a contract of carriage aiming the exoneration from liability or the lessening of
liability for the loss or damage that arose from the carrier or ship's negligence, fault or
failure in fulfilling the duties and obligations, that are set out in this article. This article
therefore limits the carrier's ability to escape liability and thus, such clauses are considered
null and void and given no effect.
The main goal of article III(8) is to eliminate conflict and confusion regarding the
effect of any bills of lading clauses, and hence, to bring some security in a field where such
cohesion was long overdue. Thus, once a bill of lading is issued, any incorporated clause
derogating from the standard set in the Hague Rules, will be held invalid and given no
effect. The novelty of such an article lies in the fact that, for the first time, a formal
document at the international level set mandatory-standards to be followed uniformly by
carriers issuing bills of lading.93 The Rules established basic standards of responsibility to
which carriers could not escape simply by using exoneration clauses. Furthermore, in cases
ofconflict between a bill oflading clause and the Hague Rules, the Rules will prevail:
92 Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules ofLaw Relating to Bills of
Lading, Aug. 25, 1924,51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N. T.S. 155, 1931 Gt. Brit. T.S.
No. 17
93 Rene RODIERE, Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed, Dalloz,
1997, at p. 339 and p. 379 « La Convention etablit, comme notre loi interne, un systeme
imperatifde responsabilite. El/e pose Ie principe que « Ie transporteur sera tenu, avant et
au debut du voyage, d'exercer une diligence raisonnable' pour mettre Ie navire en bon
etat de navigabilite, I 'armer, I 'equiper et I 'approvisionner et, pour mettre en etat
convenable les lieux ou la marchandise sera entreposee (cals, magasins, chambres
frigorifique . ..), Jean PINEAU, I.e contra! de transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis,
1986, p.197« On rappel/era, enfin, que ces dispositions s 'appliquent imperativement
durant Ie temps qui s 'ecoule depuis Ie chargement des marchandises a bord du navire
jusqu'a leur dechargement du navire (art. I (e) R.L.H). », Martine REMOND-
GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993 p.373 « Aussi ce regime est-if
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" The Brussels Convention of 1924, by limiting the carrier's power to exculpate
itself, was a very early precursor of modern thinking in this respect. The Harter Act,
adopted 31 years before the Hague Rules, was an even more extraordinaryforerunner. ,,94
The objective of the Hague Rules and particularly article ID(8) of the Rules, was
to create a sense of fairness and balance amongst shippers and carriers. Incorporating this
article made such an objective a reality. Furthermore, in practice, the judiciary that dealt
with it (art. ID(8», found it to be a straightforward rule with no hidden meaning or
ambiguous interpretation. The article is concise, clear, simple and to the point. Whenever, a
bill of lading clause tries to exculpate carriers from their responsibilities below the
minimum standard set in the Hague Rules, art ID(8) will intervene and nullify it. In Can
National SS v. Bayliss, the court expressed the opinion regarding the use of exception
clauses within the Hague Rule system.
" The defence resting upon the bill of lading exception referred to can have no
separate effect and becomes merged in the exceptions contemplated by art. IV rule
2(q). In other words, such clause does not give to the carrier any greater protection
than he has under said subsection (q). ,,95
Thus, the carrier cannot allot himself more security then the rules permit, and in the
case he does, it will be nullified with the application ofHague's art. ID(8).
imperatif: it ne peut y etre deroge en faveur du chargeur. »
94 William TETLEY, ibid., id. note 35, p. 409, Jean PINEAU, I.e contrat de transport,
Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p.173-174
95 [1935] A.M.C. 427 at p. 434, [1937] A.M.C. 290.
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Sec 2 - THE CARRIERS RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES
Article N of the Hague convention96 covers issues of carrier responsibilities and
immunities. It starts with art. N rule (1) which restates the carriers duties and obligations.
" Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or
resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want ofdue diligence on the part
of the carrier to make the ship seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is properly
manned, equipped and supplied, and to make the holds, refrigerating and cool
chambers and all other parts ofthe ship in which goods are carriedfit and safe for
their reception, carriage and preservation in accordance with the provision of
paragraph 1 ofart. IlL whenever loss or damage has resultedfrom unseaworthiness
the burden ofproving the exercise ofdue diligence shall be on the carrier or other
person claiming exemption under this article. "
As stated, art. N (1) sets the basic framework of carriers rights and immunities. Its
purpose has been to serve as a review of art. ill and a preview of art. N (2) and its list of
exceptions. Article N(1) serves as a reminder, of all the carriers responsibilities, outlining
once more the importance of the seaworthiness concept, as well as, the carrier's due
diligence obligation and burden ofproof in cases of loss or damage to the goods carried.
A memory check is one way to construe the reiteration of the carrier duties and
obligations, set forth in art. N (1). Thus, avoiding misunderstanding with interpretation and
application. Furthermore art. N (1) serves as a pre-requisite for carriers wanting to use art.
N (2) and its list of exceptions. The message is clear, carriers have a mandatory duty to
fulfil their obligations, before any successful use of art. N (2) can be made. Thus, articles
ill and N (1) are used to set the minimum standard carriers issuing bills of lading must
observe. Once such obligation is fulfilled, carriers can try and escape liability by using one
of the exceptions found in art N (2). Consequently, an essential element of the Hague Rules
is to be found in art. N (2).
96 Brussels Convention for the Unification ofCertain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading, Aug. 25, 1924,51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N. T.S. 155, 1931 Gt. Brit. T.S.
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Since the early days of shipping and long before the adoption of The Hague Rules,
the list of exceptions that are found in art 4(2) were part of the every day maritime reality.
One may then wonder why such controversy, conflict and more precisely, division in the
shipping world, over the interpretation and importance allotted to this rule. Thus, to
comprehend the complexity more accurately, one needs to know what this particular article
stipulates.
Art. IV (2) reads as follow:
" Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or
resulting from:
(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the
navigation or in the management of the ship.
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier.
(c) Perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters.
(d) Act ofGod.
(e) Act ofwar.
(t) Act ofpublic enemies.
(g) Arrest or restraint ofprinces, rulers or people, or seizure under legal process.
(h) Quarantine restrictions.
(i) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent or representative.
(j) Strikes or lockouts or stoppage or restraint of labour from whatever cause, whether
partial or general.
(k) Riots and civil commotion.
(1) Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea.
(m) Wastage in bulk of weight or any other loss or damage arising from inherent defect,
quality or vice ofthe goods.
(n) Insufficiency of packing.
(0) Insufficiency or inadequacy ofmarks.
(P) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence.
(q) Any other cause arising without the actual fault of the carrier, or without the fault or
neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the burden ofproof shall be on the person
claiming the benefit of this exception to that neither the actual fault or privity of the carrier
nor the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier contributed to the loss or
damage. "
No. 17
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Upon reading art. IV (2), one is not surprised that so much has been said and re-said
regarding this article. At first glance, one might get the impression carriers can escape any
responsibility and exonerate themselves with no great difficulty. In practice the enormous
caseload on the issue has shown that the applicability of art. IV (2) is not so simple, nor
easy. One must always keep in mind that art. IV (2) of The Hague Rules does not work
alone, the carriers obligations of seaworthiness and due diligence are not easily proven, and
consequently without it the use of art. IV (2) is impossible. Furthermore, the carrier has the
duty to prove what caused the loss or damage to the goods before he could make use ofany
one of the 17 listed exceptions. Hence, if the cause of loss or damage to the goods does not
fall within one ofthe 17 listed exceptions, the carrier cannot exculpate himself.
Article. IV (2) is by far the most tried rule of the Hague Rules and therefore, the
most heard of and known within the industry. Since the adoption of The Hague Rules,
carriers have always tried to exculpate themselves by referring to the Hague list of
exceptions. Thus, the courts have had ample opportunity to try and retry all of these
exceptions. Consequently, culminating with controversy surrounding the Hague Rules lack
ofcohesion and unanimity regarding the meaning given to each ofthe exceptions.97
97 Chester D. Hooper, testimony before the "Subcommittee on Surface Transportation
and Merchant Marine", "Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation" United
State Senate, April 21, 1998,
Roger Clarke, "Cargo Liability Regimes", prepared for the OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development) Maritime Transport Committee, January
2001
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paragraph 1 - THE EXCEPTIONS TO LIABILITY
ARTICLE IV (2) AND THE LISTED EXCEPTIONS
A. Art. IV (2)a, i.e. also known as: ERROR IN THE NAVIGATION OR IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF THE SHIP
Article IV (2) a, is considered the most important exception of the Hague Rules. It
gave rise to an enormous caseload and a multitude of interpretations. The origin of this rule
goes a long way back, further back than the Hague Rules adoption in 1924. It can be traced
to the common practices of the early shipping days, when carriers incorporated in their bills
of lading similar exception clauses, a.k.a "negligence clauses". Years later the American
Harter Act of 1893, in art. III. adopted a similar rule.
The origin of this rule can be linked to the early days of sail when the owner lost
control of his ship once it vanished in the horizon. It can also be linked to the "accident of
navigation excepted" clauses seen in the early bills of lading forms and later in the 1880's
inserted by the P&I clubs. One thing is sure, "accident of navigation" or "errors of
navigation" clauses excusing the carriers were common practice.98
98 R. Glenn BAUER, " Conflicting liability regimes: Hague- Visby V. Hamburg Rules - A
case by case analysis" (1993) 24 I Mar L & C 54, Rene RODIERE, Emmanuel de
PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed, Dalloz, 1997, at p. 339 and p. 343 Jean
PINEAU, I,e contrat de transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p.197, Martine
REMOND-GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993 p.373, Stewart C.
BOYD, Andrews BURROWS, David FOXTON, Scmtton on Cbarterparties and Bills of
Lading, London, Sweet & Maxwell, Twentieth edition, 1996, p.240-241, Rene RODIERE,
Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed, Dalloz,1997, at p. 345-346
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The interesting aspect of this rule lies in the distinction it makes between, error in
the management and administration of the ship on the one hand, and error in the handling of
the cargo, on the other hand. Article N (2) a. of the Rules, is specific on at least one issue,
clearly stating, that only in cases oferror in the navigation and management of the ship, the
carrier/shipowner will not be held responsible. By omission It implied that fault in the
handling of the cargo is not covered, and therefore, not exemptible.99
" Faute nautique et faute commerciaIe ne sont pas placees sur Ie meme plan. La
faute nautique se detache sur un fond de faute ou de faits qui engagent la
responsabiliM du transporteur. II faut la definir avec I'idee sous-jacente que ce qui
n'entrera pas dans cette definition tombera dans Ie sort commun, c'est -a-dire dans
la masse des causes, connues ou inconnues, qui engagent la responsabiliM du
100transporteur. "
The courts stipulated that a clear distinction should be made between error in
management ofthe ship on the one hand, and error in the handling ofthe cargo on the other.
Such distinction being none existent in the formal text of The Hague Rules. Consequently,
the courts agreed that since the rules were silent on the issue of error in the handling of the
cargo it meant that carriers should be responsible in such cases. The difficulty with this rule
has been to define what is meant by error in the management of the ship, from error in
management of the cargo. Practice has demonstrated that fulfilling this task is far from
b · . 1 101emgslmp e;
99 Martine REMOND-GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993 p.376
« En acquerant valeur legale I'exoneration s 'est precisee: if s 'agit seulement de
« l'erreur in the navigation and the management of the ship» soit d'une fa ute dans la
navigation ou I'administration du navire ,. par opposition, Ie transporteur reste tenu des
fautes commerciales, les « errors in the management of the cargo ». L 'interpretation de
ces formules a donne lieu a d'innombrables difficultes. »
100 Rene RODrERE, "Faute nautique et faute commerciale devant la jurisprudence
Fran9aise ", (1961) 13 D M F, 451-452
101 Kalamazoo Paper Co. v. C.P.R. {The Nootka} [1950] S.C.R. 356; [1950] 2 D.L.R.
369, [1951] A.M.C. 165 The Supreme Court held that failing to pump efficiently is an
error in the management of the ship on the ground that the purpose of the pumping was to
save the ship.
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" ... Ie rec/amateur et Ie transporteur donnent aux fautes qui sont l'antecedent du
dommage une qualification difJerente, Ie transporteur soutenant qu'ilfaut y voir une
faute nautique et son adversaire qu'il n'en est rien. ,,102
The first step the courts follow is to determine what was the cause of loss or damage
to the goods, then to decide whether such cause was the result of error in the navigation or
management ofthe ship or error in the handling of the cargo; 103
" La difficulte nait en pratique de l'absence de demarcation tres nette entre la faute
nautique et la faute commerciale ainsi qu'en temoignent les decisions
jurisprudentielles en la matiere. En effet, une faute dans la navigation ou
l'administration du navire peut avoir des consequences desastreuses al'egard de la
cargaison transportee ; l'erreur ou l'omission constitue-t-elle effectivement une
faute nautique ou n'est-elle pas plutot une negligence dans les soins aapporter dans
Ie transport de la marchandise ? Adefaut de precisions dans les textes de lois tant
a l'echelon national qu'international, il faut dans l'appreciation de la faute a
l'origine du dommage et pour la determination de sa nature veritable se referer a
certains critere desormais bien etablis par les tribunaux. ,,104
The difficulty in dealing with this rule lies in the fact, that no clear definition to
work with was given to the courts. Consequently, a grey zone exists regarding what
constitutes an act or omission affecting the ship, from one that affects the cargo. On the
102 Rene RODIERE, ibid.id., note 100, p. 452
103 Gosse Mil/erd Ltd. v. Can. Government Merchant Marine 29 Ll. L. Rep. 101 and 190;
[1928] 1 K.B. 717. The dissenting opinion of Greer L.J., in the court of appeal (and
upheld in the House ofLords 32 Lloyd L.R. 91; [1929] A.c. 223) at p. 200 "If the cause
ofthe damage is solely, or even primarily a neglect to take reasonable care ofthe cargo,
the ship is liable, but ifthe cause ofthe damage is a neglect to take reasonable care of
the ship, or some part of it, as distinct from the cargo, the ship is relievedfrom liability;
for ifhe negligence is not negligence towards the ship, but only negligentfailure to use
the apparatus ofthe ship for the protection ofthe cargo, the ship is not so relieved. "In
the case at hand the court held that it was not an error in the management of the ship since
the repairman working on the ship made an error in taking off tarpaulins used to cover the
cargo and thus affecting the cargo who was damaged by rain, Foreman & Ellams Ltd. v.
Federal Steam Navigation Co. 30 lloyd L.R. 52 at p. 62, [1928] 2 K.B. 424
104 M. POURCELET, I.e transport maritime SOlIS connaissement, Montreal, Les presses
de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p. 97
Claude CHAIBON, Clauses legales d'exoneration du Transporteur Maritime dans Ie
transport de marcbandises, Paris, Librairie Generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1965,
85-96
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other hand, the process of detennining what constituted error in the navigation of the ship
did not cause the courts difficulty or confusion. It was perfonned with no great complexity,
unlike the task of deftning what constituted management ofthe ship.
" La faute dans la navigation est une negligence, une erreur, une omission dans la
conduite du navire. II s'agit donc d'une faute purement technique: sont consideres
comme des fautes dans la navigation, l'erreur de manoeuvre aboutissant a
l'echouement du navire, Ie mauvais choix du mouillage, un accostage defectueux,
une vitesse excessive par temps de brouillard, une faute dans Ie choix de la route
• • ,,105
marztzme, etc.
Thus, deftning "error in the navigation" has not been a very complicated task and
has not given rise to much confusion. The courts in dealing with this issue refer to national
and international rules and conventions relating to navigational matters. Canadian courts
followed the Carriage of Goods by Water Act of 1936 (national law) and the Hague Rules
(international convention), The United States use the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936
Th UK use the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924 and 1971. France also adopted a national
Law in 1936 and later modifted it in 1966. Prior to this, courts used the 1900 Merchant
Shipping Act, the parties contract of carriage and the negligence clauses that were inserted
to detennine what was meant by error in the navigation, since carriers inserted clauses that
were able to exonerate them from such error in the navigation.
However, the same cannot be said for error in the management of the ship. Deftning
management of the ship has turned out to be more complex and burdensome. It did not
follow a pre-established meaning and did not have a speciftc or technical deftnition
explaining the ambiguity in such a task. 106
105 M. POUCELET, ibid.,id. note 104, p. 97, Jean PINEAU, T,e contra! de transport,
Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p. 201-203
106 Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS, David FOXTON, Scmtton on Cbarterparties
and Bills ofT ,ading, Twentieth edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996, p.243, Hourani v.
Harrison (1927) 32 Com.Cas. 305 (C.A.), Leesh River Tea Co. v. British India Steam
Navigation Co. [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 450; [1966] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 193 (C.A.), International
Packers v. Ocean SS. Co. [1955] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 218 at p. 230-234
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The courts might face an additional problem when they encounter cases in which
the cause of loss is traced, to an error that results from negligence that can be seen as
both, error in the management of the ship, and default in the handling of the cargo. Courts
dealing with similar situations, expressly stated, that an error cannot be defined at the
same time as both a fault in the management of the ship and of the cargo. Nonetheless, in
practice the same error can affect both the ship and the cargo, and in these cases, the carrier
can avoid responsibility only if it can prove that the original purpose of the error/act was
aimed towards the ship and not the cargo. 107
" En d'autre termes, i! faut se demander a quoi tendait l'acte au cours duquel la
faute a ete commise et distinguer ce qui devait interesser Ie navire de ce qui devait
interesser la cargaison. Interesser n 'est pas concerner. Un acte interesse Ie navire
lorsqu'i! est entrepris dans son interet et non pas lorsqu'i/ concerne les organes du
navire. ,,108
ill Gosse Miller Ltd. v. Can. Government Merchant Marine,109 the dissenting
opinion of Greer L.J. stated that the carrier will be held liable, only if the damage is linked
to neglect in taking reasonable care of the cargo. But, if the damage is linked to neglect in
taking reasonable care of the ship, distinct from the cargo, the carrier will be relieved from
liability. However, ifthe neglect in failing to use the apparatus ofthe ship was to protect the
goods, the carrier will be held liable. I 10
107 William TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, 2 ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 1978, p.173,
Rene RODIERE, Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed, Dalloz,1997, at
p. 345-6, (Oak Hi/l) Eisenerz-G.m.b.H v. Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. Ltd.,
[1970] Ex. c.R. 192, [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 332, [1970] A.M.C. 227, upheld by the
Supreme Court ofCanada [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 105
108 Rene RODIERE, ibid., id. note 100, p. 454
109 [1928] 29 Ll. L. Rep. 190, [1928] All ERRep 97, HL
liD ibid., id. note 109, p. 200, Jean PINEAU, I,e contrat de transport, Montreal,
Les Editions Themis, 1986, p. 201
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Therefore, in determining what constitutes an error in the management of the ship,
the courts need to decide what was the primary purpose of the act or omission that caused
the loss or damage to the goods carried. Hence, in Kalamazoo Paper Co. v. C.P.R. III the
court stipulated once more, that in determining what can be considered management of the
ship, it is of the outmost importance for the courts to look at the original purpose of the act
or omISSIon.
In the case at hand, the ship servants failed to efficiently pump the ship, such an act would
of saved the vessel and the cargo it carried. Hence, the primary function of the act was to
save the vessel, even if, with it, the cargo carried was also saved. Consequently, the error
was primarily in the management of the ship and not the cargo.
The courts, dealing with the issue of error in the management of the ship, faced a
long and hard road ahead of them. Since the causes of loss are not always clear in order to
be able and decide whether the origin of the loss or damage was really an error in the
management, or rather an error in the care given to the cargo, it was necessary for them to
define each act or omission.
In dealing with these issues, the controversies and difficulties arose. Courts from
around the world, with differing backgrounds and legal systems, were expected to
interpret acts and omissions with the same end results. In practice it was not possible to
attain uniformity and cohesion. The caseload demonstrates the difficulties encountered
trying to reach the desired uniformity. For instance in the cases of Gosse Millerd Ltd. v.
Canadian Government Merchant Marine112 and Inernational Packers London Ltd. v. Ocean
Steamship Co. Ltd. l13 the courts arrived to contrary decisions for similar situations. In the
first case the court held that taking off tarpaulins used to cover the cargo was not an error in
the management of the ship but rather an error in the management of the cargo, since the
error only affected the cargo. In the latter case the court found that it is erroneous to
III [1951] A.M.C. 165
112 [1929] A.C. 223
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consider that tarpaulins and wedges are primarily intended for the protection of the cargo
and thus judged the error as an error in the management of the ship.
"Le point de savoir si l'on est en presence d'une faute nautique " est souvent discute
devant les tribunaux et les solutions de notre jurisprudence n 'ont pas ele toujours
coherentes. ,,114
For example, in Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. SS. Mars 115, the court held that heading
into a storm and consequently closing off ventilators, resulting in the loss of the cargo, was
an error in the navigation and management of the ship. However, in C.NR. v. E.& S.
Barbour Ltd. 116, the court held that a ship maintaining his course, in view of bad weather
and ice, was not considered an error ofnavigation.
Nonetheless, over time and with an increased number of tried cases, some sort of
general acceptance in the interpretation of the rule was reached. Thus, the act of "ballasting"
was defined as error in the management of the shipll7 (subject to some exceptions)118. The
act of maintaining course through a storm, instead of slowing down, causing the loss or
damage to the cargo was defined as error in the handling of the cargo.
"Les tribunaux ont retenu la faute nautique dans les cas suivants : introduction d'un
tuyau d'eau en vue du ballastage du navire, dans un reservoir destine arecevoir la
113 [1955] L.L.L.R. 218
114 R. RODleRE and E. du PONTAVICE, Drojt Maritime, llem ed., Paris, Dalloz, 1991,
p.284
115 [1959] AM.C. 2035, [1961] AM.C. 1727.
116 [1963] S.c.R. 323.
117 Bernstein Co. v. Wilhelmsen [1956] AM.C. 754., " The sea water would not have
been in the deep tank, had not it been determined that the ship should be ballasted
to trim herfor heavy weather... the act ofballasting to trim had as its main and
principal aim the general care and safety ofthe whole vessel to protect ship, crew, cargo,
freight ... " McKinnon Co. v. Moore-McCormackLines [1959] AM.C. 1842., Orient Ins.
Co. v. United SS. Co. [1961] AM.C. 1228., Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille July 7,
1950; 1951 D.M.F. 398., Point Chico [1941] AM.C. 1468
118 Brazil Oiticica v. SS. Bill [1942] AM.C. 1607.,fnstituto Cubano v. Star Line
[1958] AM.C. 166.
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cargaison; Ie defaut de fermeture du trou d'hommes situe pres des reservoirs
destines au ballastage du navire; l'echouement du navire ala suite de l'omission du
capitaine d'utiliser la nouvelle carte marine de bord indiquant les bouees et les
phares; l'erreur de lecture des compteurs indiquant Ie degre de remplissage des
ballasts; Ie mouillage de la marchandise resultant de l'ouverture des vannes d'eau
reliant tous les reservoirs du navire, en vue de son equilibrage ; l'attitude du
capitaine qui, n 'ayant pas contourne la tempete, est oblige d'arreter les appareils de
ventilation, Ie defaut de ventilation endommageant la marchandise. ,,119
However, in cases where two separate errors exist, one in the management of the
ship and the other in the care of the cargo, the carrier will be held responsible, so long as
he does not prove the damage done by each separate error. Thus, the carrier must prove
the cause of loss, as well as demonstrate that the loss derives from only one type of error,
error in the navigation or management of the ship, and not error in the care of the
cargo. 120 The carrier, first of all, must prove the cause of the loss, then due diligence to
make the vessel seaworthy and, finally, the defence of error is open to him. The onus of
proving that the act or omission was, in effect, an error in navigation or management of the
ship is on the carrier; (the person relying on an exception, usually must prove the
. ) 121exceptIon.
119 M. POUCELET, ibid.,id. note 104, p. 100-101, Mormacsurf [1960] AM.C. 1103,
Firestone Synthetic Fiber Co. v. Black Heron [1964] A.M.C. 42, Aakre [1941] AM.C.
1263, Commerce Oil Corp. v. Dixie Carriers Inc. [1958] AM.C. 815
120 William TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, 2 ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 1978, p. 173
"As pointed out above, where the single error is both in the management ofthe ship and in
the care ofthe cargo, the carrier normally is not responsible, because the error is, in effect,
relative to the whole venture. Where, however, there are two separate errors, one in the
management of the shipand one in the care of the cargo, the carrier must be able to
separate the damage done by each, otherwise he will be responsible for all damage. ",
(Oak Hill) Eisenerez-G.m.b.H v. Federal Commerce & Navigatio Co. Ltd. [1975] I Lloyd's
Rep. 105 the supreme court held that in case there are two errors and that you cannot
separate the two the carrier will be held responsible.
12 Willliam TETLEY, ibid.,id. note 64, p. 104, Jean PINEAU, I.e contrat de transport,
Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p.198
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The caseload on rule N (2)a is enonnous, it is the most known, used and
controversial. Its adoption was followed by years of hard labour, first by trying to
understand it, define it, set its boundaries, and later, most importantly, in trying to create
some universal interpretation, accepted and followed by all judiciaries world wide.
Today, we can state with enough confidence that some of the goals set early on,
were met. The maritime world today, in dealing with art. N (2)a, has a better and clearer
image of what the article stands for, due in great part to the work of the judiciary.I22
However, for the few situations where the rule is not clear, where no unifonnity exists,
cargo interests (in shipping states and developing countries) step forward and argue that
fonnal guidance is needed, with well established definitions, accepted by all parties
involved (cargo and carrier interests) to be followed globally.
"... notre jurisprudence... Privee de guide, elle a generalement donne la solution
equitable. Mais ses decisions donnent trop souvent, par la pauvrete de leurs motifs,
l'impression que les tribunaux disent la faute " nautique " lorsqu'i! leur parait juste
de liberer Ie transporteur et la qualifient de " commerciaIe " quand i! leur parait
equitable de Ie condamner. ,,123
Shipping states request a more precise rule to quiet the insecurities and
controversies emanating from the adoption of the error in the navigation and management
of the ship exception. Some shipper oriented states further argue that the best solution to
avoid confusion would be to eliminate this exception altogether. 124
122 Chester D. Hooper, testimony before the "Subcommittee on Surface Transportation
and Merchant Marine", "Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation" United
State Senate, April 21, 1998, " Uniformity with regard to cargo loss and damage existed
in a great majority ofthe maritime world when COGSA 36 was enacted by the United
States. The unity was based on the Hague Rules which were finalized in 1924. They were
enacted domestically, with minor exceptions, as the United States Carriage ofGoods by
Sea Act in 1936, and were ratified by the United States with the same exceptions in
1937. "
123 Rene RODrERE, ibid.,id note 100, p. 459
124 Chester D. Hooper ibid.,id. note 122
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B. THE FIRE EXCEPTION IV (2)b
The fire exception is the only immunity in the Hague Rules that departs from the
other listed exceptions. Also known, as the special exclusion of The Hague Rules, this
article got preferential treatment long before the rules were adopted. From the early days of
shipping, fire has been the greatest and most devastating peril of the seas. As a result, this
exception has been treated differently. Before the adoption of the Rules, the fire issue was
already legislated in Britain and the U.S., and was also given a special statuS.125 The early
legislation's exempted the carrier in cases of loss and damage due to fire. Therefore, it came
as no great surprise that the fire exception was treated differently, when the Hague Rules
were adopted:
" Fire has always fallen into a special category because ofthe introduction into the
law ofspecial statutes excusing shipowners from liability for loss of or damage to
cargo caused by fire. For example, the British government passed a fire statute as
early as 1786. The Us. Fire Statute was passed in 1851 as a part ofthe Shipowners
Limitation ofLiability Act. These statutes, which predate the Hague Rules, and are
still in effect, excuse a shipowner in respect ofloss or damage" by reason offire. 126
Hence, art. IV (2)b of the Hague Rules exonerates maritime carriers for loss or
damage to cargo caused by fire. However, other carriers are not subject to such exoneration.
Land and air carriers are not entitled to the same fire exemption.127 Maritime carriers are
getting privileged treatment, and are only held responsible in cases where the fire is caused
by their actual fault or privity. The courts trying this article needed to interpret its scope and
125 Michel POURCELET, I.e Transport Maritime SOliS Connaissement Droit Canadien,
Arnericain et Anglais, Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p.118-123, Stewart
C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS, David FOXTON, Semtion on Cbarterparties and Bills of
T,ading, London, Sweet & Maxwell, Twentieth edition, 1996, p.235
126 R. Glenn BAUER, " Conflicting liability regimes: Hague Visby v. Hamburg Rules- A
case by case analysis ", (1993) V.24 TMar I. & Corn, 65, Jean Pineau, I.e contrat de
transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p. 204
127 William TETLEY, ibid.,id. note 64, at p. 111 "Under the Hague Rules, carriers by
water are not responsible for damage to cargo caused byfire. This is a special right
which is not given to land carriers and bailees, who usually have little defence for
damage byfire. "
meaning. What does fire and actual fault or privity imply?
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Under the Hague Rules a carrier who is trying to exonerate himself with art. 4 (2)b
of the Rules, must first establish the actual cause ofloss and that he used due diligence128,
before being able to benefit from any of the 17 exceptions, this includes the fire exception.
Once these requirements are fulfilled, carriers must make sure that fire was the actual cause
of loss. Thus, "fire" implies some glow and flames, not mere heat. ill the case of Buckeye
State129 the court held that damage to the goods carried i.e. grains due to heat emanating
from light bulbs left on in the holds was not damage caused by fire, and therefore, the fire
exception did not apply. ill Tobacco Co. v. SS. Katingo Hadjipatera130 the court held that
the carrier is responsible to damage that is the result ofactual fire. Smoke is not sufficient to
exonerate the carrier under art. 4(2)b of the Rules, it is necessary for the fire to engage
flames that actually damaged the goods.
Maritime law has undergone considerable development in recent years and moved
away from the more lenient attitude adopted in the early days of shipping. fuitially, courts
were willing to construe this exception liberally. However, over the years, courts also went
through changes, and thus, were no longer so tolerant in their application ofthe exception.
Today, courts interpret the fire exception narrowly. Thus, fire implies some flames,
not only heat or smokel3l . Furthermore, the fire exception applies to carriers and owners of
the ship not guilty of actual fault or privity132 in causing the fire, and does not apply to the
master and crew i.e. employees or agents. Therefore, there is a need to establish a direct link
between the carrier, the cause of fire and the loss or damage to the goods carried. Carriers
128 American Mail Line v. Tokyo M & F. Insurance Co. [1959] AM.C. 2220 " ... it is the
duty ofthe carrier to use reasonable precaution ... the carrier failed to take the measures
which a reasonably prudent person would have taken to control the fire after it knew or
should have known ofthe existence in No.1 hold. This duty exists irrespective ofwho was
primarly responsible for the setting ofthe fire ... "
129 [1941] AM.C. 1238.
130 [ 1949] AM.C. 49.
131 American Tobacco v. S.S. Katingo Hadjipatera, [1949] AM.C. 49.
132 William TETLEY, ibid.,id. note 64, at p. 112-113 "The fault and privity ofthe carrier
must be the fault ofthe carrier himselfand not merely ofan employee or agent. This
means normally a senior employee or officer ofthe company", Maxine Footwear co v.
Can. Government Merchant Marine [1956] Ex. c.R. 234.
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are not responsible, for the fault of their officers and crew in starting the fire. However, the
carrier has a duty to use due diligence in making the ship seaworthy, hence, hiring able and
competent crew to deal with such hazards.133
One cannot forget the obligation of due diligence, irrespective of which exception
we are going to use. The carrier's duty of due diligence and seaworthiness art. III (1) of the
Hague Rules still apply, and represent a mandatory standard the carriers cannot escape. The
court clearly stated its view on this issue in Maxine Footwear c. Canadian Government
Merchant Marine Ltd134 where it stated that art. III(1) of the rules is an overriding
obligation. Consequently, courts dealing with the fire exception must be able to decide upon
looking at the facts what is the actual cause of fire. They must also be convinced that the
carrier is himself (and not his employees) guilty of such cause and therefore that the cause is
directly linked to the carrier and that the privity and fault requirement is fulfilled. Above all,
they must make sure that the carriers duty of seaworthiness and due diligence i.e. Article
III(1) has been proven before granting any immunity135.
In cases where the cause of fire cannot be established, the carrier is exonerated of
any responsibility. Carriers manage to escape responsibility and cargo owners have no way
to prove actual fault or privity. The fire exemption is far from being uncontroversial. When
the carrier is a corporation there is difficulty in establishing actual fault or privity since it
implies persons. However time and tradition has granted this exception a special status and
1 .. 136egltlmacy.
133 American Mail Line c. Tokyo M & F. Insurance Co., [1959] AM.C. 2220.
134 [1959] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 105, the issue can also be found in Riverstone Meat Co. Pty Ltd.
v. Lancashire Shipping Co. [1961] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 57.
135 Sunkist growers v. Adelaide Shipping, 1979 AM.C. 2787, 1980 AM.C.
2101 Westinghouse Elec Corp. v. M/VLeslie Lykes, 1985 AM.C. 247, 1985 AM.C. 2400.
136 . f th L dE.R. Hardy IVAMY, Payne and Ivamy's Carnage a Goods by Sea,10 ed., on on,
Butterworths, 1976, at. p.160, " Thefault or privity ofhis servants (e.g. officers on board)
is not sufficient to render the shipowner liable. Where the shipowner is a company, the
fault or privity must be that of "the person who is really the directing mind and will of
the corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation ...Fault or
privity of the shipowner includes culpable acts of omission on the part of a managing
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In recent years, cargo owning states i.e Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the US,
and most developing countries are dissatisfied with such a rule and have expressed their
opinions loudly. Nonetheless, the roots of this rule are so strong and well established that
departing from them remains a difficult task. The burden of proof regarding the issue of
"fault or privity of the carrier" in the fire exception has also been cause for confusion. The
United States and Great Britain both have national statutes regulating this issue. 137
Canada and France on the other hand have no fire statute and rely solely on the Hague
Rules. In the US the burden of proof is on the cargo claimant and in Great Britain the
carrier has the burden of proving that there was no fault or privity on his part. For cases
under the Hague Rules the courts follow precedents found in their respective national
laws. 138
owner"
Jean PINEAU, Le contrat de transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p. 205,
R. COLINVAUX, Carver British Shipping T,aw , Vol 2, ,London,
Stevens & Sons, 1963, p. 182, W. TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, 2 ed., Toronto,
Butterworths, 1978, p. 186-7
137 The U.S. Fire Statute, 46 U.S. Code, s. 182, R.S. 4282, " No owner ofany vessel shall
be liable to answerfor or make good to any person any loss or damage which may
happen to any merchandise whatsoever which shall be shipped, taken in, orput on board
any such vessel, by reason or by means ofanyfire happening to or on board the vessel,
unless such fire is caused by the design or neglect ofsuch owner. "
The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 502(1) "The owner ofa British seagoing ship or
any share therein, shall not be liable to make good to any extent whatever any loss or
damage happening without his actualfault orprivity in the following cases, namely:- (1)
where any goods, on board his ship are lost or damaged by reason offire on board the
ship .... "Rene RODIERE, Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed,
Dalloz,1997, at p. 351
138 Sandgate Castle [1939] AM.C. 463, The Shell Bar (Fire) [1955] AM.C. 1429,
Lennard's Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. [1915] AC. 706 at p. 713 "A ship was
sent to sea in an unseaworthy state, and as a result she stranded and her cargo was
destroyed byfire. The vessel belonged to a limited company ofwhich a Mr. Lennard was
a director. He took an active part in her management. Held, that Lennard was the "alter
ego" ofthe company and not merely a servant. The Company could not therefore exclude
its liabilityfor loss byfire under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, s. 502, for it had not
shown that the loss had occurred "without its actualfault or privity. The action of
Lennard was the very action ofthe company, and he was atfault. "
Edmund Fanning [1953] AM.C. 86, Silvercypress [1943] AM.C. 224.
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The Hague Rules differ on two issues from the American and British Fire Statutes.
The duty of "due diligence" is only required under the Hague Rules. Further, under the
Hague the carrier is responsible ifhis agents or servants have not exercised due diligence in
making the ship seaworthy. In Canada the carrier will be responsible for fire damage if his
servants or agents have not exercised due diligence. 139
139 Maxine Footwear Co. v. Can. Government Merchant Marine [1959]
2 Lloyd's Rep. 105.
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C. PERILS, DANGERS AND ACCIDENTS OF THE SEA OR OTHER
NAVIGABLE WATERS, art. IV (2)C
At first glance, in theory this exception seems to be very wide and an easy escape for
carriers. However, practice has demonstrated otherwise. In its application, art. IV (2)c, is
very complex and ambiguous. As in the other exceptions, there is no clear definition or
standard. The courts facing this issue must work on a case by case basis with no
predetermined interpretation of the rules. Therefore, trying to determine what is meant by
"perils of the sea" is a difficult task. The caseload on the subject is abundant. Nonetheless,
to find a uniformly accepted view is difficult. Some argue that this rule implies an element
of extraordinary nature, others disagree. Some apply the reasonable mariner in the same
situation test, and others argue the test should be more onerous. 140
Furthermore, the definition may depend on geographic, weather, season, location etc...
The result is differing opinions and views amongst the courts. Thus, the trend within the
U.S. courts has been to be very strict, interpreting this exception narrowly. The English
courts have been more balanced and less rigid then there American counterpart. The
Canadian courts have been the most lenient in their interpretation of art. IV (2)c.
140 • f ~ th L dE.R. Hardy IVAMY, Payne and wamy's Carnage a Goods byea,10 ed., on on,
Butterworths, 1976, at. p.153-154, also refer to Supreme Courts judgements
Falconbridge Nickel Mines, Ltd., Janin Construction, Ltd. and Hewitt Equipment, Ltd. v.
Chimo Shipping, Ltd., Clarke s.s. Co., Ltd. and Munro Jorgensson Shipping, Ltd., [1973]
2 Lloyd's Rep. 469, Charles Goodfellow Lumber Sales, Ltd. v. Verreault Hovington and
Verreault Navigation Inc., [1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 185, [1971] S.C.R. 522 at p. 528 "
.. .even ifthe loss is occasioned by perils ofsea, the ship owner is nevertheless liable ifhe
failed to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy at the beginning ofthe voyage
and that unseaworthiness was a decisive cause ofthe loss. " At p. 535 "... by invoking
art. 4(2)c ... and raising the defence ofperils ofthe sea, the respondents assumed the onus
ofshowing that the weather encountered was the cause ofthe damage and that it was of
such a nature that the danger ofdamage to the cargo arisingfrom it could not have been
foreseen or guarded against as one ofthe probable incidents ofthe voyage. ", U.S.A. v
Eastmount Shipping (The Susquehanna) [1974] A.M.C. 1183, [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 216
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The French do not have this exception in their national version of the Hague Ru1es. 141
Hence, according to Tetley, " Whether or not a storm is a peril has depended on the
geographic area, the time of the year and the intensity of the storm. Any analysis of the
decisions of the Courts of various countries have consistently defined a peril as a much
more severe storm than other countries. ,,142
The American Courts have defined peril of the sea as severe weather, catastrophic in
magnitude, unexpected, and where an efficient crew was not negligent and could not stop
the loss or damage. 143 Therefore, the recurring element in the American cases is the courts
severity and narrow analysis in determining whether the situation was catastrophic,
extraordinary and unanticipated. 144 In England, the similarities are few.
141 William Tetley, ibid., id. note 64 p. 117 "A "peril ofthe sea" is the most common
defence ofthe carrier and has been described as "the carrier's best though least
dependable friend". Ifa carrier can prove that a peril ofthe sea caused damage to cargo
under his care, then the carrier is not responsible for the loss under the Hague Rules. The
definition of "peril ofthe sea" is, therefore, very important. Unfortunately, it is difficult
to define a peril, because more fact than law is involved. ", Stewart e. BOYD, Andrews
BURROWS, David FOXTON, Scmtton on Cbarteq>arties and Bills ofLading, London,
Sweet & Maxwell, Twentieth edition, 1996, p.225, The Arakan [1926] A.M.e. 191, Rene
RODIERE, Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed, Dalloz,1997, at p. 348
142 William Tetley, ibid., id. note 64 p. 117, The Rosalita 264 Fed. Rep. 285, The Naples
Naru [1939] A.M.e. 1087, Jean PINEAU, Le contrat de transport, Montreal, Les Editions
Themis, 1986, p. 206, Michel POURCELET, I,e Transport Maritime SOllS Connaissement
Droit Canadien, Americain et AngJais, Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972,
p.123 "Le transporteur n 'est pas tenu des dangers qui sont inherents au milieu dans
lequel s 'effectue Ie transport. II ne s 'agit pas des dangers qui surviennent en mer mais de
ceux qui en proviennent...Ainsi Ie transporteur peut invoquer l'exception de peril de mer
lorsque Ie dommage provient de la penetration de I'eau de mer dans les cales du navire,
ou quand Ie desarrimage de la marchandise provient de la force des vents ou de la
violence de la houle. Si dans la plupart des cas, Ie peril de mer implique I 'action directe
de la mer, il n 'en est pas toujours ainsi : l'echouement ou la collision constituent
egalement des dangers ou accidents de la merpour lesquels Ie transporteur peut
s 'exonere. "
143 The Shickshinny [1942] AM.C. 910, R.T. Jones Lumber Co. v. Roen s.s. Co.
[1960] AM.e. 46, Jordan Int!. v. Piran [1975] AM.e. 130.
144 Edouard Materne v. Ss. Leerdam [1956] AM.C. 1977, R.T. Jones Lumber Co. Roen
Ss. Co. [1960] AM.e. 46 (U.S. Court ofAppeals), The Southern Sword [1951] AM.e.
1518, Mormackite [1958] A.M.e. 1497, Sokol & Co. v. A/S Rudolf[1961] AM.e. 1231,
Middle East Agency v. Ss. J B. Waterman [1949] A.M.e. 1403, Freedman & Slater v.
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The British courts showed a little more tolerance toward this exception, making it less of a
. . E 1 d 145ranty m ng an .
Scrutton's definition of perils of the sea clearly demonstrates the difference in
interpretation and application that exist between the British and the Americans: " The term
"perils of the sea" whether in policies of insurance, charterparties, or bills of lading, has the
same meaning, and includes any damage to the goods carried caused by sea water, storms,
collision, stranding, or other perils peculiar to the sea or to a ship at sea, which could not be
foreseen and guarded against by the shipowner or his servants as necessary or probable
"d fth d 146mCI ents 0 e a venture.
The Canadian's lenient position has been demonstrated in Keystone Transport Ltd.
v. Dominion Steel & coal Corp147 where Justice Taschereau stipulated: " ...to constitute a
peril of the sea the accident need not be of an extraordinary nature or arise from
irresistible force. It is sufficient that it be the cause ofdamage to goods at sea by the violent
action of the wind and waves, when such damage cannot be attributed to someone's
1° " 148neg 1gence.
M/V Tofeva [1963] A.M.C. 1525,
145 The Assunzione [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 468, Cooper Stewart v. C.P.R. 45 Lloyd L.R.
246, Spear & Thorpe v. Bolivier (1931), 40 Lloyd L.R. 13, w.P. Wood & Co. v.
Hanseatische 37 Lloyd L.R. 144, W. Angliss & Co. v. P. & 0. Steam Navigation Co. 28
Lloyd L.R. 202.
146 Sir Alan Amocata et autres, ibid., id. note 2, p.227-228, Great china Metal Industries
Co. Limited. V. Malaysian International Shipping Corp. (The Bunga Seroja) [1999]
A.M.C. 427 at p.439 and 462.
147 ][1942 S.C.R. 495.
148 ibid.,id. note 147, p. 505
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Hence, we can see that the Canadian standard is less rigid, and not as onerous as
their American or British counterparts. 149 We need not find the cause ofloss or damage to
be catastrophic, extraordinary or even unexpected. It should be added, that with such
differing views, it is of no great surprise that the caseload on the issue is far from uniform.
Consequently, the problem in dealing with this exception lies in the fact that the same facts
in different countries can result in conflicting outcomes.
There is no recognised standard that defines this exception. The standard varies with
seasons, weather, location, time, as well as different countries having differing judiciary
views. Therefore, supporting the view that confusion and unpredictability surrounds the
applicability of the Hague Rules. The perils of the sea exception, is one of the most often
raised exception, nonetheless, it can be said with certainty that it is the hardest one to
succeed with. The difficulty with this defence rests on the fact that proving the fulfilment of
art. ill (1) and its requirements, together with this rule, can be onerous. The argument
being, if the ship would of been seaworthy it should of escaped the encountered perils since
it did not, it must of been unseaworthy. 150 Thus, the use of article N (2)c might appear like
. k h 1· ed th . lSIa sure tic et to success, owever rea Ity prov 0 erwlse.
149 Donaldson Line Ltd. v. Hugh Russell & Sons [1940] 3 D.L.R 693, Parrish &
Heimbecker Ltd. v. Burke Towing & Salvage Co. [1942] Ex. c.R 159, C.NR. v. E. & S.
Barbour Ltd., [1963] S.C.R 323
150 Blackwood Hodge v. Ellerman Lines [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 454, Palmer Dist. Co. v. SS
American Counsellor [1957] AM.C. 2384, The Ulven 32 Lloyd L.R 7
151 Diethelm & Co. v. SS. Flying Trader [1956] AM.C. 1550, Edouard Materne v. SS.
Leerdam [1956] AM.C. 1977, RT. Jones Lumber Co. Roen SS. Co. [1960] AM.C. 46
(U.S. Court ofAppeals), Continex, Inc. v. SS. Flying Independent [1952] AM.C. 1499,
The Southern Sword [1951] AM.C. 1518, Virgin Islands Corp. v. Merwin Ltge. Co.
[1958] AM.C. 294 (U.S. Court ofAppeals), Mormackite [1958] AM.C. 1497, Vizcaya
[1946] AM.C. 469, Sokol & Co. v. A/S Rudolf[1961] AM.C. 1231, Middle East Agency
v. SS. J. B. Waterman [1949] AM.C. 1403, Freedman & Slater v. M/V Tofevo [1963]
AM.C. 1525, St Paul F. &MIns. Co. v. Moore-McCormackLines [1964] AM.C. 751
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D. ANY OTHER CAUSE ARISING WITHOUT THE ACTUAL FAULT OR
PRIVITY OF THE CARRIER... ART. IV (2)q
This exclusion is the last of the 17 Hague exceptions. Its main attraction lies in the
fact that it appears as a great escape clause, a catch-all rule. Shipowners will resort to this
exception when none of the others apply. Its scope might be broad. However, to be able to
discharge the burden ofproofrequired, is another matter altogether. I52
Since most of the causes of loss or damage are covered by the previous exceptions
(art's. N (2)a-p), art. N(2)q is not as wide as it would seem at first glance. Thus, when a
cause of loss does not fall in one of the enumerated exceptions, the carrier will turn to this
last resort (art. N (2)q) . Since pilferage and theft were not included in the Rules or in art
4(2) (a to p), courts have included them under the 4(2)q exception. I53 The goal behind art
N (2)q is to exonerate the carrier in cases where he, his crew or agents, are not at fault or
are not negligent in causing the loss or damage to the goods they carried.
This catch-all exception, imposes the burden of proof on the one claiming the
defence i.e. the carrier. The Supreme Court of Canada has addressed this issue, and
explained why art. N (2)q of the Rules is not so easy to apply. The court ascertained that
demonstrating the duty of due diligence alone was not enough. The carrier must explain the
152 Jean PINEAU, Le contrat de transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p. 206
«Le peril de mer est une cause d'exoneration frequemment invoquee par les transporteur,
mais a l'egard de laquelle les juges font preuve, avec raison, d'une extreme prudence;
compte tenu de l'evolution de la technique, des progres accomplis par les services
meteorologique, les dangers de la mer ne sont plus ce qu'ils etaient jadis : pour que Ie
mauvais temps, cause du dommage, soit considere comme un peril de mer, encore faut-il
qu'il soit tel qu'on n'aurait pas pu prevoir ou prevenir, comme un incident probable, Ie
danger d'avaries a la cargaison que ce mauvais temps comportait. Le danger inherent a
I'aventure maritime, tels les vents, les courants, les tempetes, les brouillards, est desormais
insuffisant pour constituer un cas d'exoneration: il doit revetir les caracteres
d'imprevisibilite et d'irresistibilite qui caracterisent Ie cas fortuit: ... », Michel
POURCELET, Le Transport Maritime Sous Connaissement Droit Canadien, Americain
et Anglais, Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p. 128-129 and 134-137
153 Willliam TETLEY, ibid.,id. note 35, p. 249
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cause ofloss.
An inexplicable cause will not dO. 1S4 The courts have endorsed the view that in cases where
the cause of loss is inexplicable, the carrier could establish some alternative explanation to
discharge his burden ofproof.1SS
In general, if the cause of loss is unknown, the carrier will be held responsible. It
would appear difficult to deny fault or negligence of the carrier in cases where the actual
causes of loss are not clear. In Pendle & River Ltd. v. Ellerman Lines Ltd. 156 the court
addressed the issue of unexplainable loss: Therefore, in cases where the carrier cannot
disclaim negligence or explain the cause of loss, the court will rule in favour of the cargo
owner. In the famous case of the Lady Drake, the court clearly stated the carrier's duty to
establish the cause of loss: " The breakage must have a cause and it is for the shipowner to
show what the cause is." 157
Thus, to be able and exempt itself, the carrier must prove three things. That the duty
of due diligence was fulfilled, what the actual cause of loss was or an alternative
explanation, and that, he and his crew or agents were not at fault or negligent in causing the
loss or damage to the goods. 158 Again, one realises that this article is not clear-cut.
154 Canadian National Steamships v. Bayliss (1937) S.C.R. 261.
155 Phillips & Co. v. Clan Line Steamers Ltd. [1943] 76 Lloyd's L.R. 58
156 [1927] 29 Lloyd L.R. 133 .
157 Bayliss v. CAN. National SS. (Lady Drake) [1935] A.M.C. 427 at p. 434, and at [1937]
S.C.R. 261 at p. 264 " ... it will be observed that the burden resting upon the carrier under
this clause is a very heavy one", Bstos ofCanada Ltd. v. Guilbault Transport Inc. [1978]
A.c. 393
158 (The Chyebassa) Leesh River Tea Co. v. British India Steam Navigation Co. [1966] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 193 this case is one ofthe rare times art. 4(2)q can be invoked. At p. 200 "If
a complete stranger had entered the hold unobserved and removed the plate, par. (q)
would I think apply if the shipowner couldprove that it was a stranger who removed the
cover, and reasonable care had been taken to prevent strangers getting on board the ship
and due diligence generally had been exercised. In the present case the act ofthe thief
ought to be regarded as the act ofa stranger. The thiefin interfering with the ship and
making her, as a consequence, unseaworthy, was performing no duty for the shipowners
at all, neither negligently nor deliberately nor dishonestly. ", Hourani v. Producers Ltd.
49 L1.L. Rep. 421 at p. 428, The courts have restricted the interpretation ofthis article by
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For some, this would seem a good thing. For others, it symbolises a deficiency with
the system. Thus, the US, Canada, France, Australia, and other shipping states argue that
this unpredictability in the law must be remedied with reforms or the adoption ofnew rules.
It should be noted that the French version of the Hague rules and its amended version in
1966 do not include this exception in their law. 159
ARTICLES IV (2)d-p
The remaining exceptions of the Hague Rules are not as prone to confusion, and are
mostly self-explanatory. Over the years, the judiciary has not experienced many difficulties
in applying them. Nonetheless, these exceptions were open to judicial interpretation, and
consequently, were, like the rest of the Hague Rules exceptions, subject to scrutiny and
criticism.
a. Article IV (2)d:
The Act of God, art. N(2)d, implies accidents that are the result of natural causes
and which are out ofthe human control. Since no particular cause is expressly aimed at, one
might consider this exception as an extension ofthe perils ofthe sea exception (art. N(2)c),
and a preview to the catch all N(2)q, exception. All three exceptions deal with events that
are in some way out ofthe carrier control, and further, have an element of "beyond ordinary
circumstances".
stipulating that the "or without the fault ... " should be construed to mean "and without
the fault.. .", in Brown & Co., Ltd v. Harrison [1927] All. E.R. Rep. 195, the court held
the carrier liable and denied him the use of art. 4(2)q on the ground that he (the
shipowner) did not prove that the loss did not occur without the "actual fault or neglect of
the agents or servants ofthe carrier", furthermore, the court held that the second word
"or" in art.4(2)q had to be read conjunctively, to mean "and" and not to be read
disjunctively like the shipowner argued.
159 L. 9 avril 1936, L. 18 juin 1966 (The French Local Law of April 9 1936 and of June
18, 1966), Martine REMOND-GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993
p.332
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" L 'acte de Dieu resultent des phenomenes de la nature qui ne peuvent pas etre
evites; par exemple, la foudre, une eruption volcanique susceptible d'atteindre Ie
navire. Sans doute la foudre peut etre prevue dans des conditions atmospheriques
determinees, mais aucune action humaine ne peut en prevenir les effets. Suivant
cette conception, la tempete est egalement un acte de Dieu. Mais la Convention en a
fi . , . I d' ,. .l ,,160azt un cas specza exoneratIOn c/o
Thus, the Act of God encompasses an unexpected and irresistible event, unable to
be resisted by any reasonable precautions, i.e. earthquake, lightning, volcanic eruption
etc... Carriers have the burden of proving that the cause of loss or damage is due to the
Act of God, and further, that no reasonable measure could of been taken to avoid such
occurrence. Being one of the oldest exceptions, its legitimacy dates back many years before
the Hague Rules adoption. However, over the years its applicability has diminished.
Technology has enabled the maritime industry to know when major natural events (i.e.
storms etc...) are coming, and therefore in most cases be ready for the eventuality.
Furthermore, this technology has empowered carriers with better built ships, more resistant
and better equipped to deal with all sorts of unexpected natural events. Consequently,
proponents of change want to eliminate this rule. Nonetheless no matter what the act ofgod
exception will always exist.
b. Article IV (2)e
The Act of war, art. IV(2)e, is one of those self explanatory exceptions. Since no
real problem of interpretation exist, the caseload on the issue is minimal. The Act of war
does not only encompass war. International tension and hostility are also covered, so long as
the carrier does not knowingly expose himself to the encountered events:
160 Georges MARAIS, T,es transports intemationanx de marcbandises par mer et 1a
nrispDIdence en droit compare, Paris, R. Pichon & R. Durand-Auzias, 1949, p. 154, Stewart
C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS, David FOXTON, SCDItion on Cbarterparties and Bills of
Lading, London, Sweet & Maxwell, Twentieth edition, 1996, p. 219, Rene RODIERE,
Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed, Dalloz,1997, at p. 348-350, Michel
POURCELET, I.e Transport Maritime Sons Connaissement Droit Canadien,
Americain et Anglais, Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p. 131
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"L'exoneration de responsabilite pourfaits de guerre nejoue qu'a la condition que
ces faits n 'aient pas pu raisonablement etre prevus et evites. Si, au contraire, Ie
transporteur, dans Ie but de gagner un fret eleve, expose volontairement une
cargaison qui devait etre tenue en dehors du conflit, il perd Ie benefice de ce cas
excepM. ,,161
Thus, to prevail, a carrier discharging his burden ofproof must show that the Act of
war was the cause ofloss or damage. Furthermore, the carrier will not be held responsible in
cases where the war is a civil one. 162 The Act ofwar has not been controversial, problematic
or ambiguous, its application has almost become a rarity. Since no one ever uses this article
anymore the view that The Hague Rules are outdated, unsuited for today's maritime
realities is enhanced.
c. Article IV (2)f
The Act of public enemies (art. N (2)f), is one of these exceptions with no set
definition and problematic interpretation that are ambiguous and vague. Hence, its meaning
remains uncertain. However, in practice, the general acceptance has been to incorporate
piracy, robbery, acts ofviolence etc. within its scope ofapplication:
" II n'est pas facile de donner une definition juridique de ce terme " ennemis publics
". Les auteurs de la Convention ne paraissent pas en la circomstance avoir eu des
notions tres nettes a cet egard. Qu'il nous soit permis de citer Ie passage suivant
extrait du rapport de la conference de La Haye, 1921:Quelle est, demanda Lord
Philimore, la signification de l'expression "faits d'ennemis publics" - Pirates?
Sir Norman repondit : - " Cela est pris du Harter Act, "du Canadian et de
l'Australian Act. Je ne sais pas?" Lord Philimore:
- " Cela peut signifierpirates?" Sir Norman Hill,
-" Cela peut signifierpirates. Je Ie suppose ".... 163
161 Georges MARAIS, ibid.,id., note 160, P. 155, Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews
BURROWS, David FOXTON, Semtion on Cbarterparties and Bills ofT.ading, London,
Sweet & Maxwell, Twentieth edition, 1996, p. 220-221, Michel POURCELET, Le
Transport Maritime SallS Connaissement Droit Canadien, Amerieain et Anglais, Les
Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p. 132
162 Pesquirias y Secaderos v. Beer (1949) 1 All E.R. 845.
163 Georges MARlS, ibid.,id. note 160, p. 156, Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS,
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Before being able to use this exception, carriers must demonstrate (like in all of the
exceptions) that they used reasonable care in trying to avoid the loss or damage to the cargo.
The success of this exception will depend on the individual facts of each case, since no
general definition can be found. However, our days, this exception has lost its momentum
and is never applied. According to shipping states maintaining such an exception is useless
therefore, they have incorporated it on their list of elimination. Once again, stressing the
necessity for change. On the other hand the CMI statistics demonstrate that acts of piracy
are constantly on the rise and thus we should not be so eager to eliminate this exception.
d. Article IV (2)g
Article IV (2)g, arrests or restraint ofprinces, rulers or people, or seizure under legal
process. This article applies to public acts, acts ofgovernment.
" restraints of princes includes any acts done, even in time of peace, by the
sovereign power of the country where the ship may happen to be. It covers any
restrictions imposed by order of an established government on importation or
exportation, e.g. quarantine regulations, embargoes, blockades or seizure of
contraband goods. ,,164
David FOXTON, Scmtton on Cbarterparties and Bills ofLading, London, Sweet &
Maxwell, Twentieth edition, 1996, p. 220-221, Michel POURCELET, T,e Transport
Maritime SOliS Connaissement Droit Canadien,Americain et Anglais, Les Presses de
l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p. 132
164 E.R. Hardy IVAMY, Payne and Tvamy's Carriage of goods by sea, 10th ed., London,
Butterworths, 1976, p.149, Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS, David FOXTON,
Scmtton on Cbarterparties and Bills of Lading, London, Sweet & Maxwell, Twentieth
edition, 1996, p.22l, Michel POURCELET, I.e Transport Maritime SOliS Connaissement
Droit Canadien,Americain et AngJais, Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p.
132, Miller v. Law Accident Insurance Co. [1903] 1 K.B. 712, Robinson Gold Mining Co.
v. Alliance Insurance Co. [1901] 2 K.B. 919, Lekas & Drivas v. Basil Goulandris [1962]
A.M.C.2366
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In the case ofNobel's Explosive Co. v. Jenkins165, the court addressed the restraint of
princes issue. In the case at hand, a ship sailing with goods to be delivered in Japan, reaches
Hong- Kong. That same day, war was declared between China and Japan. As a result, the
ship captain left the contraband goods in Hong Kong.
" A large body ofevidence was laid before me to show that if the vessel sailed with
the goods on board, she would in all probability be stopped and searched. It was
certain in that case that the goods would ofbeen conflScated, and quite uncertain
what course the captors would take with the ship and the rest of the cargo. I am
satisfied that if the master had continued the voyage with the goods on board, he
would ofbeen acting recklessly. ,,166
Thus, this rule will only work when some sort ofgovernment or state intervention is
involved. Hence, import and export restrictions, blockade and embargoes are all within its
applicability. Furthermore, carriers who wish to apply this exception should not have, at the
beginning of the voyage, knowledge of the situation. A prior knowledge of the situation
eliminates the rules applicability. Thus again, for some it would seem that the rules did not
reach their goal, since no real sense of security exists. For many, the only solution is the
adoption ofa different system or at least to reform the existing one.
e. ARTICLE IV (2)h, (Quarantine)
The quarantine exception is very similar to the arrest or restraint of princes'
exception, since similar elements are required in both exceptions. It takes some government
restriction for the rule to apply. The objective being to emphasise the health hazards carriers
might be exposed to. Again, for this exception to apply, carriers should not have prior
165 [1896] 2 Q.B. 326 " goods were shipped in England for Japan under a bill oflanding
excepting "restraints of princes". On the day the ship reached Hong Kong, war was
declared between Japan and China. The captain, therefore, landed at Hong Kong such part
of the cargo was contraband. Held, the delivery of the contraband goods in Japan was
prevented by the exceptedperil. "
166 ibid.,id., note 165, p. 330, Morrisey v. A. &J. Faith [1966] A.M.e. 71
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knowledge ofthe quarantine.
f. ARTICLE IV (2)i Act or omission of the shipper...
This exception was adopted to protect carriers from negligent shippers. Thus, in
cases where the shipper or his agents were negligent, there would be no basis of claim
against carriers. Article III (5) of the Rules imposes a duty on shippers to act reasonably and
deter them from being negligent. Thus, art N(2)i reinforces this duty imposed on shippers.
Furthermore, Hague's art. N(2)0 also mentions this rule. The aim being to ensure carriers
that shippers will not act negligently in sending their goods with insufficient marking,
number, weight or quantity, and later on, sue for damages. 167
g. ARTICLE IV (2)j. Strikes or lockout...
The strike exception is available to carriers in cases where the loss or damage to the
cargo is shown to be the result of strike, and not related to other causes. Thus, in General
Foods Corp. v. u.S.A. 168 the court held that since the carrier failed to show strike as the
cause of loss, he therefore could not exonerate himself Consequently, in the case at hand,
the carrier will not prevail ifhe cannot prove the loss resulted from the delay occasioned by
the strike and was not the result ofnegligent care given to the goods.
167 S. W. Sugar & Molasses Co. v. E.J. Nicholson [1956] A.M.C. 1146, Tribunal de
Commerce d'Alger, July 9, 1958; [1959] D.M.F. 487. Jean PINEAU, I.e contrat de
transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p. 207 « Cette cause d'exoneration du
transporteur vise Ie comportementfautifde son cocontractant ou du representant de celui-
ci et doit etre rapprochee des cas prevus sous les articles IV(2)n et (0), c 'est-a-dire
l'insuffisance d'emballage et l'insuffisance ou imperfection des marques qui sont des
exemples de fautes commises par Ie chargeur. », Michel POURCELET, T,e Transport
Maritime Sous Connaissement Droit Canadien, Americain et AngJais, Les Presses de
l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p.106
168 [1952] A.M.C. 310, Rene RODIERE, Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime,
12e ed, Dalloz,1997, at p. 351,
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Furthermore, as in the previous exceptions, to succeed, carriers should not be aware
of any strike. This view was clearly expressed in Bastos of Canada Ltd. v. Guilbault
Transport Inc. 169 The idea was to protect carriers from unpredictable events that were
beyond their control. In the important case of J. Vermaas' Scheepvaartbedrijf N. V. v.
Association Technique de l'importation Charboniere: The "Laga,,170, the court added that
the word "strike" included a sympathetic strike:
" Strikes in every sense of the word occurs today and are not concerned directly
with wages. They are concerned, for instances, with working conditions; and so I
think one has got to bear in mind that the meaning ofthe term "strike" must change
with the progress (ifthat is the right word) ofindustrial history, and it may have a
different meaning todayfrom the meaning given to it a century ago. ,,171
Thus, the jurisprudence clearly pointed out that the word "strike" cannot be given an
exhaustive definition. In the early days of shipping, it would of only covered stoppages
arising out of trade disputes. However, today the word encompasses a broader meaning. As
a result, in the Tramp Shipping Corporation v. Greenwich Marine Inc. 172, the court held
that a refusal to work part of the day was within the meaning of the word" strike". The fact
that the word "strike" is constantly redefined by the courts (even if it is to adapt to today's
maritime industry) creates a certain ambiguity with the rules. Consequently, making them
an easy target for criticism.
169 [1978] C.A. 393
170 [ 1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 582.
171 ibid.,id. note 170, p. 590. William Brothers (Hull), Ltd. v. Naamlooze Vennootschap W.
H Berghuys Kolenhandel [1915] 21 Com. Cas. 253, Jean PINEAU, Le contrat de transport,
Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p. 208 «Dans Ie passe, les greves ou les emeutes
auraient pu etre assimilees a priori a un cas de force majeure; Ie caractere
d'imprevisibilite est probablement plus difficile a demontrer aujourd'hui qu'il ne l'etait
hier et Ie caractere irresistibilite rencontre sans doute moins de resistance aujourd 'hui
qu 'hier ! Neanmoins, il apparazt que Ie seulfait d 'une greve, d 'un lock-out ou d 'une emeute
au port n 'est pas une cause d'exoneration :.. », Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS,
David FOXTON, SeDItion on Cbarterparties and Bj]]s of T,ading, London, Sweet &
Maxwell, Twentieth edition, 1996, p. 230-231, E.R. Hardy IVAMY, Payne and Tvamy's
Carriage ofgoods by sea, 10th ed., London, Butterworths, 1976, p.150
172 [ 1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 314.
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h. ARTICLE IV (2)k. Riots and civil commotion
Similar to the previous exception, it covers, damage or loss caused by strikers
picketing. Protecting carriers against uncontrollable violent acts of third parties, was the
Rules initial goal.
" Les emeutes et les troubles civils ne jouent Ie role de cas d'exoneration de
responsabilite du transporteur que s'ils presentent Ie caractere de cas fortuit ou de
force majeure, c'est- a-dire s'ils n'ont pu etre ni prevus, ni evites par Ie
173transporteur. "
i. ARTICLE IV (2)1, Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea
Article N (2)1 of the Rules, protects earners III their attempts to respond to
emergencies at sea. Thus, it allows carriers to save life or property at sea, without having to
worry about the consequences of what will happen to the goods carried. The objective was
to avoid situations in which carriers in fear of losing the goods they carry would no longer
I'e: 174attempt to save he or property.
Therefore, with such protection, earners will be less hesitant to save life or
property at sea. Furthermore, this rule should not be studied alone, it can also be seen in
conjunction with art. N (4) of the Rules which protects carriers in cases of deviation
responding to distress calls. The, primary objective is not to lose sight of what IS
173 Georges MARAIS, ibid.,id. note 160, p. 161., Michel POURCELET, I,e Transport
Maritime SOliS Connaissement Droit Canadien, Americain et Anglais, Les Presses de
l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p.133 at p. 134 "II s 'agit de la guerre civile ou des
soulevements populaires concertes diriges contre un gouvernement. II appartient au
transporteur, pour s 'exonerer, de rapporter la preuve que Ie trouble presentait les
caracteres de laforce majeure. ", S.S. Mormacsaga v. Crelisten Fruit [1969] A.M.C.
1621
174 Martine REMOND-GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993 p.382
« Si I'on veut que la solidarite en mer ne reste pas un vain mot, Ie transporteur qui se
deroute et depense ses soins pour tenter de sauver des personnes ou des biens ne doit pas
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necessary to do in a crisis situation. Carriers must attempt to save life or property even if
it would imply loss ofcargo.
fIlls nous paraient certains qu'ils s'appliquent exclusivement, comme cas
d'exoneration de responsabilite, aux operations d'assistance pretee en mer aux
navires en danger de perdition sur lesquels se trouvent des etres humains. n n'est
pas concevable qu'en dehors de cette hypothese la Convention de Bruxelles du 25
Aoat 1924 ait songe aetablir une presomption d'exoneration de responsabilitepour
des operations de sauvetage qui seraient depourvues de tout sentiment de solidarite
humaine et qui seraient au contraire inspirees par des considerations d'ordre
commercial.Ainsi, dans cet ordre d'idees, l'exoneration de responsabilite
n'existerait pas si un sauvetage etait tente apres un abordage avec un navire
abandonne. ,,175
etre penalise. »
175 Georges MARAIS, ibid., id., note 160, p. 165
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j. ARTICLE IV (2)m, Inherent defect...
This particular exception, although used often by carriers, led to some confusion and
has been difficult on the courts. The problem stems from having to determine what is
implied by the words inherent defect. The French had the clearest definition for "inherent
d &'. t,,176elec .
''Le terme ''freinte de route" a une signification bien precise et, comme toute
marchandise soumise aun transport par mer de quelque duree, celle-ci est sujette(a part des exceptions) ades differences de poids, en plus ou en moins, soit par suite
al'evaporation que subit la marchandise sous ['influence notamment de la chaleur
des cales, soit par l'absorption de l'humidite de l'air. n ny a d'exception acette
regie que pour quelques rares marchandises qui ne subissant pas d'influences
caracterisees, tels que des !ingots ou des barres de fer ou d'acier... n ne saurait etre
question de mettre a la charge du transporteur les diminutions de poids ou de
volume qui ne seront que la consequence normale et naturelle du voyage, sans qu'i!
y ait fait oufaute aucune du transporteur ou de ses agents. ,,177
176 William TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, 2 ed., Toronto, Butterworths, 1978, p. 219
"The French official version ofthe Hague Rules uses the proper terms "vice cache" which
means "hidden defect" and "vice propre " which means "inherent vice". The French text
also makes it clear that the exception refers to both hidden defect and inherent
vice .... Unfortunately, the erroneous English composite, "inherent defect" has become
commonplace in the jurisprudence. Nevertheless, ifone must use a single term in English,
"inherent defect" seems to cover both "hidden defect" and "inherent vice". , . Jean
PINEAU, Le contrat de transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p. 208, William D.
Branson Ltd. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba [1973] 2 LL.L.R. 535, Westcoast Food
Brokers Ltd. v. The Ship« Hoyanger» [1980] 31 N.R. 82 (F.C. App Div), Rene
RODIERE, Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed, Dalloz,1997,
at p. 352-353
177 Georges MARAIS, ibid.,id. note 160, p. 167, Michel POURCELET, Le Transport
Maritime SOliS Connaissement Droit Canadien, Americain et Anglais, Les Presses de
l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p.114-115
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The difficulty arose in detennining when the defect was inherent or hidden, in
contrast, to one resulting from lack ofcare to the goods carried, which is the carrier's fault.
The Hague Rules exception, art. IV(2)m, covers both the hidden defect and the inherent
vice. Thus, to be exonerated carriers must convince the court that the loss or damage to the
goods was the result of some hidden or inherent defect in the goods themselves, and not the
consequence ofa lack ofcare from their part. 178
In John (trading as C.F. Otto Weber) v. Turnbull, Scott Shipping Co., Ltd. and
Nigerian National Line, Ltd.: The "Flowergate,,179, the court held that as long as the carrier
shows on a balance ofprobabilities that the damage arose from the inherent or hidden defect
of the goods, and that art III(2) was fulfilled, the carrier is exonerated. In this case, the court
had to detennine whether moisture, which was the cause of damage to the goods (cocoa),
was the result ofan inherent vice or was due to improper stowage of the cargo.
" In my view the defendants have shown on a balance of probabilities that the
source of the water which damaged the cocoa in No. 5 lower hold was the cocoa
itself. They have shown that the voyage was an ordinary voyage. [ ..] They have
shown that the vessel was both seaworthy and cargoworthy. [ ..] They have shown
that her officers were, as I think, both competent and careful. They have shown that
the dunnage and matting were sufficient. [ ..] They have shown that the system of
ventilation adopted was [ ..] proper. [ ..] In addition, they have shown that the
cocoa in No. 5 lower hold was a potential source ofmoisture which could damage
the cargo and in the end they have convinced me that it did. ,,180
The inherent or hidden defect in the goods imply that the goods carried are unfit to
withstand the contracted voyage, regardless of the carriers diligent care. Thus, in the case of
Albacora S.R.L. v. Westcott & Laurance Line, Ltd., 181the court stipulated that:
178 Aunt Mid Inc. v. Fjell Oranje Lines [1971] A.M.C. 274, [1972] A.M.C. 677, Jefferson
Chemical Co. v. M.T. Grena [1969] A.M.C. 2443
179 [1967] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1
180 ibid.,id. note 179, p. 45.
181 [1966] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 53.
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" It follows that whether there is an inherent defect or vice must depend on the kind
oftransit required by the contract. ,,182
Furthermore, when the inherent vice is known to carriers, they have a duty to give the
required care for the specific goods carried. If such required care is not given, carriers
cannot tum to art. IV (2)m to exonerate themselves. i83 Thus, as was seen, courts dealing
with art. IV (2)m need to determine what kind of vice or defect they're facing.
Furthermore, they need to be convinced that carriers fulfilled all of their required
obligations, i.e. due diligence and seaworthiness, and that they had no knowledge of any
needed special care. Consequently, the jurisprudence on the issue has not been consistent.
Resulting in confusion and uncertainties with the working of the regime.
k. ARTICLE IV (2)n, Insufficiency of packing and
I. ARTICLE IV(2)o Insufficiency or Inadequacy of Marks
This Hague Rule exemption has also been marked by some confusion. Carriers
using this rule must show that the insufficiency of packing was not apparent and
consequently, the information was not mentioned on their bill of lading. The objective was
the protection of carriers in cases where the insufficiency of packing was unknown. As a
result, carriers could not be expected to give more care than the reasonable care expected of
them:
" Sufficient packing is normal or customary packing in the trade. Such packing
invariably prevents all but the most minor damage under normal conditions ofcare
and carriage. Some objects are packed very lightly, for example, steel rods are
normally tied in bundles without other packing, while some objects, such as
automobiles, are not packed at all. Nevertheless, what is customary is sufficient
packing, and the carrier is responsible for all but minor damage when cargo is
sufficiently packed. ,,184
182 ibid.,id. note 181, p.59.
183 Levatino Co. v. s.s. President Hayes [1964] A.M.C. 1247.
184 W. TETLEY, ibid.,id. note 35, p. 227, Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS,
David FOXTON, Semiton on Cbarterparties and Bills 00 ,ading, London, Sweet &
Maxwell, Twentieth edition, 1996, p.224, E.R. Hardy IVAMY, Payne and !vally's Carriage
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The court ascertained that as long as the packing used was customary in the
industry, carriers will be held responsible for any loss or damage. I85 The underlying idea
was to try and establish some sort of balance between carrier's duty of care and shipper's
duty to pack sufficiently. In Bach v. Silver Line (Silversandal) 186 the court explained what
was perceived by the notion of insufficient packing. The court stipulated that if carriers
show that the appropriate care was given to the goods, carriers could use art. IV (2)n to
exonerate themselves. In the case at hand a customary stowage of the goods carried was the
appropriate care.
In the Silversandal case, the court ruled that the carrier had used the customary
stowage and that the shipper also used the customary packing for such goods, i.e. bales.
However, in this case, the customary stowage was not enough to sustain the goods.
Consequently, the court clearly stated that in cases where the shipper knows that the
customary stowage ofthe goods would result in damage, he couldn't expect the carrier to be
responsible for such damage. If shippers want more they must provide for it. 187
Thus, carriers will not be held responsible for damages occurring when customary
care is used. Furthermore, carriers have the obligation to mention in their bills of lading any
apparent insufficienc/88, ifnot, they will not be able to apply art. IV (2)n, unless they prove
the insufficiency was not apparent.
As for art. IV(2)0 it refers to marks and markings on cargo being so unclear or
insufficient that cargo is lost or damaged. The carrier has the burden to prove that the marks
were insufficient. This rule is linked to article III(5) ofthe Hague Rules which states that the
of goods by sea, 10th ed., London, Butterworths, 1976, p.154, Michel POURCELET, Le
Transport Maritime SOliS Connaissement Droit Canadien, Americain et AngJais, Les
Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p.106-109
185 Continex Inc. v. Ss. Flying Independent [1952] A.M.C. 1499, Rene RODIERE,
Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed, Dalloz,1997, at p. 353-354
186 [1940] A.M.C. 731
187 ibid.,id., note 186, p. 731
188 Tribunal de Commerce de Rouen, June 19 [1959],[1960] D.M.F. v.12, p. 231
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shipper guarantees the marks, number, quantity and weight ofthe cargo.189
ID. ARTICLE IV (2)p, Latent defects
"Latent defect" is one of the least understood of all the exculpatory exceptions
available to carriers under the Hague Rules. It only applies to defects in ships, and
not in the cargo, which is a "hidden defect" or an "inherent vice". A latent defect is
usually a defect in construction and is rarely due to wear and tear. ,,190
Again, the objective was to protect carriers in cases of loss or damage, due to some
construction defect in the ship beyond their control. Hence, for the exoneration to apply,
carriers, after a diligent inspection of the ship, must have no knowledge of the defect.
Accordingly, this exception particularly puts to the test the duty of seaworthiness. To
succeed, carriers must therefore demonstrate that the ship was seaworthy, and further, that
the defect could not of been discovered with a competent examination accepted under
industry standards. Therefore, by proving these elements, carriers fulfil their obligation of
due diligence i.e. art. ill(l) ofthe Rules.
189 William TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, Toronto, Carswell, 1965, p.131, Else-Skou
[1962] D.M.F. 660, the court of appeal ofAlger held on December 12, 1961 that since the
cargo was improperly marked the shipper was responsible for part of the loss., E.R. Hardy
N AMY, Payne and Ivamy's Carriage ofgoods by sea, 10th ed., London, Butterworths,
1976, p.155, Michel POURCELET, I,e Transport Maritime SOlIS Connaissement Droit
Canadien, Americain et Anglais, Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p.109-
111 «Les marques sont importantes pour I 'identification des marchandises a I'arrivee et
pour permettre au destinataires d 'en prendre livraison. D 'autre part, les marchandises
qui sont placees dans des sacs, des cartons ou des conteneurs voyagent souvent dans les
memes cales si bien que les marquage permet au transporteur d 'identifier aisement et
rapidement la marchandise qu 'il doit decharger a tel port sur la route maritime...Les
marques doivent etre lisible jusqu'a la fin du voyage ... »
190 W. TETLEY, ibid.,id. note 35, p. 239, Rene RODIERE, Emmanuel de PONTAVICE,
Droit Maritime, 12e ed, Dalloz,1997, at p. 347-348, Michel POURCELET, Le Transport
Maritime SOliS Connaissement Droit Canadien, Americain et Anglais, Les Presses de
l'Universite de Montreal, 1972, p.116-117 «Le regime legal instituant une exoneration
pour vice cache echappant a la diligence raisonnable, il faut admettre que Ie vice cache
du navire est celui qui ne peut etre decele par un examen attentifet meticuleux... il
n 'incombe pas au transporteur de proceder a un examen du navire dans ses moindres
details et a I 'aide d 'appareils dont I 'utilisation aurait peut-etre eventuellementpermis de
decouvrir la faiblesse de telle ou telle partie du navire.»
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Hence, the difficulty with this exception lies in the task of distinguishing between a
loss that is really due to a latent defect and one that is due to negligence, unseaworthiness
and lack of due diligence. Courts have encountered the concept of latent defect in Real
Estate Law, however, in maritime law it was a novelty and accordingly there were no real
maritime precedents or guidelines to direct the courts in such a complex task.
Consequently, courts have not been able to establish a coherent and uniform caseload on the
Issue.
F. THE EFFECT OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE EXCEPTIONS
Courts have expressed the view that even if the cause of loss is within the list of
exceptions, if negligence is proven, carriers cannot rely on the exception, unless they can
refute the evidence, and show that negligence was not involved.
In Ismail v. Polish Ocean Lines: The "Ciechocinek" 191, the court ascertained that
exoneration clauses would not apply ifnegligence has been demonstrated.
" A shipowner will not be exoneratedfrom losses arisingfrom any ofthese excepted
causes where there has been any neglect on his part to take all reasonable steps to
avoid them; or to guard against their possible effects; or to arrest their
consequences. Thus, where cargo was damaged by water escaping from a boiler
pipe cracked by frost, it was held that the loss was occasioned by the negligence of
the master in leaving the boilerfull on a cold night, ... ,,192
191 [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 170., Sun Oil Co. v. MIT Carisle, 711 F.2d 805,811 (3d Cir.
1985), Henry N. LongleY,ibid.,id. note 44, p. 1-2
192 CARVER Carriage by sea, British Shipping Law, v.l. 13 ed., by R.P. Colivaux,
London, Stevens & Sons, 1982, p.19
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paragraph - 2 THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A. The carriers burden
One of the main problems found in The Hague Rules is their silence regarding the
burden of proof issue. Consequently, under such circumstances, the judiciary experienced
difficulties in dealing with this situation. However, they did the best they could under these
conditions. Thus, the case law and doctrine on the issue have not always been clear and
uniform
The solution put forth by maritime authors193 i.e. William Tetley, Payne and Ivamy,
lPineau, M. Remond-Gouilloud, Scrutton, R.Rodiere, De Pontavice, led to the conclusion
that most cases dealing with responsibilities and immunities of carriers should be resolved
with carriers discharging the burden of proof. The argument advanced was based on the
premise that carriers were the only ones with most, if not all, of the crucial facts and
information relating to the cause of loss or damage.
In great part, the caseload on the issue has tried to follow the solution put forth by
most of the maritime authors193. Accordingly, since carriers are the only ones with the
knowledge of what happened or could of happened, the burden of proving what the cause
ofloss or damage is, rests on them. However, their duties do not start here.
193 William TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, Toronto, Carswell, 1965, p.90, Martine
REMOND-GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993 p.372-373, Stewart
C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS, David POXTON, Semtion on Cbarterparties and Bills of
I,ading, London, Sweet & Maxwell, Twentieth edition, 1996, p.205 "Instead the carrier
will generally be liablefor loss, damage or delay occurring when the goods are in his
charge, unless he establishes that all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid
the occurrence causing the loss, damage or delay were taken ", Jean PINEAU, I ,e contrat de
transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p. 197-198, Rene RODIERE, Emmanuel
de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed, Dalloz,1997, at p. 340 and 355
87
The Hague Rules are very clear on this issue explaining how carriers need to
demonstrate that art. ill (1 )(2) has been respected. The Rules are adamant about the pre-
requisite nature of art. ill, and the carriers ability to use art. IV (2) and its list of
exceptions. Therefore, before any issue of exoneration can be discussed, carriers must
convince the court that the ship was seaworthy and the due diligence standard was
respected. Up to this point, the Rules are more or less cohesive. However, complications
surface with the adoption of art. IV (2) and its list of exceptions. The core questions are
who proves what and when?
In Maxine Footwear v. Canadian Government Merchant Marini 94, the court
expressly stated that, if art. ill (1) is not fulfilled, carriers cannot rely on the exceptions of
art. IV (2). In Toronto Elevators Ltd. v. Colonial SS. Ltd. 195, the court said the obligation to
exercise due diligence is also a pre-requisite to using art. IV (2). Therefore, the burden is on
carners.
In Pendle & Rivett Ltd. v. Ellerman Lines Ltd.196, the court tackled the question of
knowing who has the burden of proving the cause of loss or damage to the goods carried. It
ascertained that in cases where the court is uncertain about the cause of loss or damage, the
party on whom the burden rests must lose:
194 [1959] A.C. 589. Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS, David FOXTON, Scmtton
on Cbarterparties and Bills ofT,ading, London, Sweet & Maxwell, Twentieth edition, 1996,
p.205
195 [1950] Ex. C.R. 371, William TETLEY, Marine Cargo Claims, Toronto, Carswell,
1965, p.90, Martine REMOND-GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993
p.372-373, Jean PINEAU, Le contrat de transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p.
197-198 «A la maniere anglaise, l'article IV(l) vient ajouter que Ie transporteur ne sera
pas responsable (la forme negative produit, en anglais, meilleur effet que la forme active)
des dommages resultant de l'etat d'innavigabiZite «a moins qu'iZ ne soit imputable a un
manque de diligence raisonnable de la part du transporteur a mettre Ie navire en etat de
navigabilite [.} Ie tout conformement aux prescriptions de I'article III(l) » ce meme article
IV(l) poursuit : « Toutes les fois qu 'un [.} dommage aura resulte de l'innavigabilite , Ie
fardeau de la preuve en ce qui concerne l'exercice de la diligence raisonnable tombera sur
Ie transporteur. »
196 [ 1927] Lloyd L.R. 133
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" The jurisprudence is not always to the effect that the carrier must prove what
caused the loss or damage, but the law would seem properly set out in Pendle &
Rivett Ltd. v. Ellerman Lines Ltd., where it was held that the carrier has the onus of
explaining the cause ofloss or damage. The contraryjurisprudence is vague, and, it
would seem, faulty, particularly because virtually all the information, ifavailable at
all, is available to the carrier alone. To exculpate a carrier when the cause of, the
loss is unknown is to make it beneficialfor carriers not to discover the cause."l 7
Thus, in practice the burden of proof is on carriers even if the rules are silent on the
matter. Nonetheless, this burden should not be seen as "going so far as to make the carrier
prove all the circumstances, which explain an obscure situation,,198. The idea is not to tum
this duty into an impossible task. Therefore, the carrier will be responsible for proving due
diligence, seaworthiness or the cause of loss in cases where such proof is connected to the
loss or damage claimed. In Bernstein Co. v. MIS Titania l99 the court made its opinion very
clear:
" The carrier's burden does not extend to proving diligence to make the vessel
seaworthy in all respects not causally connected with the ensuing damage, as under
the Harter Act. ,,200
Consequently, a carrier who resorts to the use of art. N(2) and its list of exceptions,
must prove:
1. The cause of loss
2. Due diligence to make the ship seaworthy and,
3. That the cause of loss is one of the listed exception (the one relying on the exception,
197 W. TETLEY, ibid.,id. note 64, p. 90.
198 Western Canada Ss. co. v. Canadian Commercial Corp. [1960] S.c.R. 632, p.641,
United States ofAmerica v. Ocean Bulk Ships, Inc., mlv "Overseas Hariette" and mlv
"Overseas Marilyn", (United States Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, 10 April 2001), See
Tubacex, 45 F.3d p.954, Quaker Oats, 734 F.2d p.241, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. MIV
Leslie Lykes, 734 F.2d 199,207 (5th Cir 1984), In re Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp.,
677 F.2d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1982)
199 [1955] A.M.C. 2040.
200 Ibid.,id. note 199, p. 2044.
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must prove the exception)?OI
B. The shippers burden
The shipper's burden, as in the carrier's case is not defined anywhere. However,
common sense led to the accepted view that shippers must prove their goods were damaged.
They must also show that they were the holders of a clean bill of lading. Furthermore, they
need to show that the goods received were not in the same condition as when shipped. As a
result, carriers did not fulfil their contract to deliver the goods in the same condition as
when they got hold of them. Once shippers prove this, the onus shifts to carriers.202
As was seen the accepted practice has been to spare the shipper/cargo owner of the
burden of proving the cause of loss, unseaworthiness or due diligence. However, the fire
exception differs from all the listed exceptions, shifting part of the burden from carriers to
shippers. Here again, the Rules were silent on whom lies the burden of proof. Nonetheless,
common practice and national fire statutes paved the way to the ambiguous modem view.
Hence, carriers must prove the cause of loss (i.e. the fire) and the duty to exercise
due diligence. The shift in the onus of proof occurs at this level. Once carriers prove that the
cause of loss is due to fire and that they exercised due diligence, shippers must prove that
the fire was the result of fault or privity of the carrier. On this fact opinions are divided
amongst nations. On the one hand, the American courts follow the view that the shipper has
the burden to prove fault or privity of the carrier and on the other hand, the English put the
burden on the carrier and the French courts put the burden on the shipper except for the fire
exception where the burden is shifted to the carrier. These two courts (French and English)
hold the carrier responsible to disprove fault or privity regarding the fire exception.203
201 W. TETLE, ibid., id. note 64, p. 104 " The carrier, first ofall, must prove the cause of
the loss, then due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy and, finally, the defence of
"error" is open to him... ; (the person relying on an exception, usually must prove the
exception). "
202 Robin Hood Flowers Mills Ltd. v. N.M Patterson & Sons Ltd. [1967] A.M.C. 1451.
203 W. TETLEY, ibid..,id. note 64, P.1l2 "In Great Britain, where the fire statute is set
out in the Merchant Shipping Act, 194, s. 502(1), the courts have placed the burden on the
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As a result, the "burden of proof' issue remains unclear and with no definite
guidelines, leading to uncertainty in the law. The burden ofproving absence ofnegligence is
another ambiguous issue ofthe Hague Rules, there is no clear indication ofwhen such proof
must be made and by whom? Nevertheless, the courts gave their opinion on the issue. In
Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget v. Maritime Agencies (southampton), Ltd.204, the court held
that carriers will not be able to use the excepted perils exception as long as they have not
proven proper care was used.
On the other hand, the House of Lords in another decision the Albacora S.RL v.
Wescott and Laurance Lines, Ltd.205, expressed a different view. It stated that the duty or
burden to prove no negligence, as a precedent before being able to use art. IV (2) and its
exceptions, is not stipulated anywhere. The Hague Rules make no mention of this specific
obligation. Nonetheless, in practice carriers must prove the cause of loss and in the process
can give proof excluding their negligence. The burden of proof issue, is one of a great
number of issues that have led to confusion and worldwide conflicting jurisprudence. This
lack ofcohesion and formal guidelines made the need for reform more pressing.
carrier to prove that there was no fault or privity on his part ... The burden ofproofis again
one which is not clearly defined and it would seem both claimant and carrier must do their
utmost to prove the fault andprivity on one hand and to disprove it on the other. In the final
analysis, however, it would appear that the claimant has the burden ofproving the fault and
privity ofthe carrier, and this is the position taken in France also. ", Marvia, June 21, 1960
[1961] D.M.F. 340 (Aix Court ofAppeal) and at p.116 regarding the fire exception the
French position is slightly different. "The carrier, under the local French Law, seems to
have a heavier responsibility than under the Hague Rules in respect offire. Ifthe cause of
the fire is unknown, the carrier has been held responsible under the local Law, because the
carrier cannot prove the fire was "cas fortuit" or "force majeure"...and he must do so,
being the guarantor under art. 4., Djerada, November 23, 1962 [1963] D.M.F. 544 (Paris
court ofAppeal)
204 [1953] 2 All E.R. 570.
205 [ 91 66] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 53.
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paragraph -3 THE EXONERATION CLAUSES:
A. WHEN ARE THEY VALID?
The idea pertaining to incorporating exoneration clauses was to limit or eliminate
carrier's responsibilities for the loss or damage to the goods they carried. However, with the
adoption of The Hague Rules, these old ways of conducting shipping business were no
longer acceptable and were now considered part of the past. The arrival of a new maritime
regime put an end in theory at least, to the arbitrary and constant use of exoneration clauses.
Thus, with this new system, the validity of many incorporated clauses was put to the test
and resulted with an increased amount of groundless clauses. In practice, courts applying
The Hague Rules found themselves invalidating a great amount of exoneration clauses:
" To permit the carrier to limit its liability by limitation clauses would be to destroy
the fair balance intended by the Rules, as well as any real meaning that the Rules
would have. ,,206
Therefore, for a clause to be valid, it should not be contrary to the Hague Rules.
Article III (8) of the Rules, clearly stipulates that a clause relieving carriers of their duties
and responsibilities shall be null and void and of no effect. However, the clause will be
valid if it is not found to be contrary to the Hague Rules or if the contract of transport is not
covered by The Hague Rules. Thus an example of this can be found in in c.s.
Petrochemical Co. v. Montpellier Tanker co?07, where the court ascertained that the validity
of the clause at hand was not problematic. Since the transport contract was not covered by
The Hague Rules, the validity of the clause could not be tested or held invalid. However,
under the Hague regime such a clause would not ofbeen acceptable.
206 W. TETLEY, ibid.,id. note 35, p. 410
207 [1970] A.M.C. 1183
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In a recent case, the appeal court of Aix-en-Provence208 accepted as valid the
exoneration clauses found in a bill of lading, even if it was contrary to the Rules, since the
parties to the contract were two African states not members of the Hague Convention.
Furthermore, there was no mention in their contract of any applicable law clause in cases of
conflict. 209 The Rules applicability did not come into effect and the clauses were therefore
held valid. Thus, the accepted view is to validate exoneration clauses only when the Rules
do not apply or when the clauses are within the Rules scope. Thus according to Ivamy:
"It must be born in mind that, where the Act applies, no exception which does not
appear in the foregoing list can be included, except where a special contract is
permitted in the case of unusual shipments ofparticular goods; for to incorporate
some further exception would be to increase the carrier's immunity and diminish his
responsibility. ,,21
208 Cour d'appe1 d'Aix-en-Provence, February 14, [1989],
[1991] D.M.F. v. 43, p.116.
209 As of November 7,2001 The Hague and Hague Visby had a combined membership of
79 states (please refer to Annex B )
210 E R Hardy. IVAMY, Payne and Ivamy's Carriage of goods by sea, 13 ed.,
London & Edinburgh, Butterworths, 1989, p. 199-200
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B. WHEN ARE THEY INVALID?
On this issue, the law has been clear. Art. III (8) of The Hague Rules stipulates that
any clause contrary to the Hague Rules will be invalidated. The objective was to ensure a
minimum standard to be followed unanimously by all carriers (issuing bills of lading).
Ensuring that shippers are protect against inequalities ofbargaining powers between parties.
211
Furthermore, since the use of these clauses became so abusive, they required some
sort of legislation. Hence, the adoption of the Hague Rules set the limit of what was going
to be considered a valid clause or an invalid one.212 However, in practice, the coming into
force of the Hague Rules did not diminish the use of exoneration clauses. Carriers were still
incorporating all sorts of clauses in their bills of lading. 213 As a result, courts found
themselves ruling on the validity of many of these clauses. Judges were very strict in their
rulings whenever carriers tried to escape their legal responsibilities. The judiciary was fast
to annul these clauses and remind parties that The Hague Rules were the standard to be
followed. Therefore, if a clause in question went beyond the boundaries of article's III (8)
and IV(2) a-q, such clause would be held invalid.214
211 Reed & Barton Corp. and Others v. MV "Tokio Express" and others [1999] A.M.C.
1088, Fireman's Fund [1998] A.M.C. 587, Sky Refer [1995] A.M.C. 1825
212 Esau Belgium v. Nathaniel Bacon [1951] A.M.C. 1435, Jean PINEAU, T,e eontrat de
transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themes, 1986, p. 197 «Les clauses de non responsabilite
relatives au transport ou clauses attenuant cette responsabilite autrement que Ie prescrivent
les regles sont aujourd'hui nulles (art.III(8) R.L.H). »
213 , Stewart C. BOYD, Andrews BURROWS, David FOXTON, Semtion on
Cbarterparties and Bills ofT ,ading, London, Sweet & Maxwell, Twentieth edition, 1996,
pA04
214 Canadian National SS. v. Bayliss (the Lady Drake) [1937] S.C.R. 261., the carrier has
the burden of proof, Lekas & Divas, Inc. v. Goulandris, 306 F.2d 426, 432 (2d Cir. 1962),
Hecht, Levis & Kahn, Inc. v. S.S. President Buchanan, 236 F.2d 627, 631 (2d Cir. 1956)
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Thus, rust, decay, vermin, and negligence clauses were all found to be invalid and
given no effect. In all these cases, the clauses were held to be contrary to the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act. It further strengthened the view that clauses should not give carriers
more immunity than what The Hague Rules have established.215
Consequently, the validity issue of exoneration clauses is directly linked to the rules set by
the Hague Convention. Whenever the Rules applicability does not extend to the contract of
carriage, the validity or invalidity of the clauses is not an issue. On the other hand, if the
rules do apply, the courts have a duty to ensure that the exoneration clauses stay within the
boundaries ofthe Convention. 216
In Canada, The Carriage of Goods by Water Act of 1936 applies to any contract of
internal transport or any transport that commences in Canada.. Thus, goods that are loaded
at a port outside of Canada are not subject to the Hague Rules, unless it is clearly stipulated
in their contract, and hence, any clause inserted in the contract for carriage of goods is valid.
In order for the Hague Rules to apply the parties must stipulate in their clause paramount
that the Hague Rules will cover their contract.217
215 Copco S. & E. Co. v. Prins Frederik Hendrik [1955] AM.C. 2052, Pettinos v.
American Export Lines [1946] AM.C. 1252, Southern Cross [1940] AM.C. 65,
Macnamara & Son v. Hatteras 38 Lloyd L.R. 233.
216 Martine REMOND-GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993,
p.338-339
217 Jean PINEAU, I,e contrat de transport, Montreal, Les Editions Themis, 1986, p. 168
«En vertu de I 'article 2 de la Loi relative au transport des marchandises par eau
(desormais appelee Loi de 1936), les Regles de La Haye ... « sont executoires relativement
au transport de marchandises par eau dans des navires transportant des marchandises
d 'un port du Canada a tout autre port, soit a I'interieur, soil en dehors du Canada.. »
Seabridge Shipping S.A. v. A.C. Orssleff's EFEF's [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 685
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Chap 2 THE SCOPE OF THE HAGUE RULES REGIME
A. THEIR STRENGTH
As a system regulating maritime affairs, The Hague Rules innovated, changed and
more precisely modernized the shipping world as it was known. Their adoption was the
culmination of many years of hard labor and needed change. The pre-Hague shipping
industry was marked by the strong influence of shipowning nations. Thus, the Hague Rules
coming into force was seen as the solution to the inequality problem amongst cargo owning
and shipowning states and for a great number of years it was:
" The Hague Rules were for their time a remarkably successful achievement in
laying the basic ground rules for a shipowner's liability for loss of, or damage to,
cargo. The chief merit lay in their pragmatism. They focused on a relatively few
essential subjects and set out practical solutions with an economy of effort and in
traditional language well known to the maritime law. Legislation, like politics, is
the art ofpractical. Partly for this reason, the Rules achieved a remarkable success
and, by about 1960, had been incorporated in legislation enacted by the great
majority ofmaritime nations all over the world. ,,218
Thus, one of The Hague's primary objectives was to create a worldwide cohesive
maritime system. In theory, the goal was more or less achieved since by the mid-twentieth
century a large number ofmaritime states adhered219 to this system giving it an international
status.220
218 Anthony DIAMOND," Responsibility for loss of, or damage to cargo on a sea transit:
the Hague or Hamburg conventions?" in KOH SOON KWANG P., Carriage of Goods by
Sea, Singapore, Butterworths, 1986, p. 110.
219 Please refer to Annex B for the list of membership to the Hague Rules Convention.
220 Roger Clarke, "Cargo Liability Regimes", prepared for the OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development) MTC Maritime Transport Committee,
January 2001, p.11 " Because of the wide use of the Hague and Hague-Visby rules over
many years, their interpretation has been well established by case law..."
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"The most common argument against the adoption ofthe 1978 Hamburg Rules was
the fear that a new regime would unsettle the law. Opponents stressed that 5 decades of
applying the 1924 Hague Rules have produced an enormous caseload and have finally
reached an internationally uniform regime. Adoptinr; a new regime would only create
confusion and increase conflict as well as expenses. ,,22
More than half a century later, one realizes that The Hague Rules cleared the way to
future maritime reforms. As the first worldwide compulsory legislation, the Rules were able
to establish some sort of compromise between shipowning and cargo owning nations (even
if only a minimum one). The caseload has demonstrated that courts rulings were very strict,
narrow, and tough in their application of the law, making it hard on carriers to escape their
responsibilities and obligations.
Hence, in practice, the Rules were of some assistance to shippers and did alter the
pattern of abuse that existed prior to their adoption. A major argument for maintaining them
is based on the fact that unanimity on certain issues was achieved. Consequently, some
argue it would be a loss ofvaluable work to let the effort of over fifty-year's go to waste. It
took the maritime industry half a century to achieve some sort ofcohesion, why do we need
to go backward, and start all over. Furthermore, by now, courts are familiar with the system
and its framework. They know the positive and negative aspects of the regime. After years
ofjurisprudence, they have reached the stage of unanimity in most of their decisions. Thus,
to change and adopt a new regime means going back to many years of chaos and
uncertainties. It would also imply stepping back to times of insecurities and unpredictability
in the law.
221 John O. HONNOLD, " Ocean carriers and cargo; Clarity and fairness - Hague
or Hamburg ?", 24 I Mar 1, & Com, (1993), 81
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It took the judiciary a great number of years to achieve some predictability in the
application and interpretation of the rules. Changing regimes would mean having to go
through the process of interpreting a new system together with the task of trying to attain
unanimity. Therefore, the argument was to maintain the rules. Since so much progress has
already been made why not go forward and further what has already been achieved. The
idea was to work within what was already available and more importantly with what we
already knew and were familiar with.222
The problem associated with the rules was based on the fact that their adoption did
not alter the old view of the industry being led by shipowners. Thus, according to some the
tendency remained favorable to shipowners/carriers interests. The Hague list of exceptions
found in art. IV (2) of the Rules helped strengthen this view. Therefore, in theory, it would
seem that the rules are more favorable to the shipowners/carriers interests. However,
practice has proven this argument not to be totally true, according to Goldie:
/I Even when The Hague or Hague Visby Rules are applied, in practice the defences
available to the carrier become even more restricted. In the context of the Hague
Rules this means that in many countries it is increasingly difficult for the carrier to
prove the exercise ofdue diligence to make the ship seaworthy, and it is also more
difficult for him to rely on the exceptions listed in Article 4 Rule 2, in particular (b)
Fire, (c) Perils ofthe sea, (i) Act or omission ofthe shipper, etc... ,,223
Another argument put forth was to reform the Rules and not to eliminate them.
Consequently, maintaining the core of the Rules and adapting them to the realities of
today's maritime trade. As a result, courts and parties would be working within a known
framework, since all parties are already familiar with the system and its working. Avoiding
the need to go through a transitional period ofdiscovery and adjustment.
222 Roger Clarke, "Cargo Liability Regimes", prepared for the OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development) Maritime Transport Committee, January
2001
223 C.W.H. GOLDIE, " Effect of the Hamburg Rules on shipowners' liability insurance", 24
I Mar L & Com, (1993), 112.
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" ...the introduction of the Hamburg Rules would put the law into a state of
confusion and uncertainty for some decades. It would be many years after the
introduction ofthe new Rules before the law on carriage by sea would, once again,
be likely to crystallize. It is, in a sense, a choice between idealism and practical
,224
common sense. '
B. THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
Arguments against The Hague Rules were based on the premise that the rules no
longer suited today's shipping industry's needs. This view derived from the fact the rules
were outdated, cargo owning nations were not satisfied, no practical unanimity was attained,
maritime law was still an uncertain domain and unpredictability remained a problem.225
The most common criticism attributed to the rules was linked to the Hague Rules
list of exceptions (art. IV (2)), and more precisely the error in navigation and management
of the ship exception. Opponents have argued there is no reason to maintain a defence,
which exempts carriers in cases of negligence. Carriers have certain duties, one of which is
to deliver the cargo safely to destination, therefore allowing such defence to exist by treating
this type of negligence differently from others departs from the carriers primary duty of
care:
" Much ingenuity has been devoted to trying to justify these exceptions but, it is
submitted, there has not been any argument that really gets off the ground. It is
difficult to see why negligence in navigating a ship should have different legal
consequences from any other kind of negligence... The exception of negligent
navigation and negligent mana~ement of the ship are distinctly out ofplace in a
regime based on a duty ofcare.' 26
224 Anthony DIAMOND, ibid.,id. note 218, p.120
225 Roger Clarke, "Cargo Liability Regimes", prepared for the OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development) Maritime Transport Committee, January
2001
226 Anthony DIAMOND, ibid.,id. note 218, p. 111-112
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For its part the fire exception art. IV (2)b of the Hague Rules, did not escape
criticism. Proponents of change (shipper interest states) expressed their opinions loudly,
calling this article unfair and out of place. Since carriers are the only one's with relevant
evidence and real knowledge of what or who started the fire, it is difficult to comprehend
why it is the claimant's burden ofproof. Thus, showing once more the Rules lack ofjustice,
sense and balance between the interests involved. Consequently, pressing the need for
reform. The issue of burden of proof has also been added to the list of complaints. The
problem with this issue rests on the fact that no one knows for sure on whom lies the burden
ofproof, and what must be proven. Thus again, creating situations ofuncertainties.
" For nearly all the items in the lists ofresponsibilities and immunities, Hague fails
to deal with burden ofproof, an issue that is especially vital since, in most cases,
only the carrier has the facts. The few exceptions to Hague's silence, summarized in
a footnote, divide the burden ofproofbetween the parties; in common situations the
dividing lines are far from clear. This lack ofclarity and Hague's total silence on
mostpoints have led to conflicting case-law and international disharmony. " 227
Consequently a consensus developed, on the one hand, the rules were not practical
and on the other, they did not reach their objective of worldwide unanimity, and thus,
needed improvement. Confusion and unfairness marked the industry's practical reality.
Accordingly, the situation led to new proposals intending to modify or replace the Hague
. 228
regIme.
As a legal document the Rules have another negative aspect to them, they are
ambiguous, unclear and with no pre-established definitions. Consequently, in practice,
courts from across the world found themselves facing broad theories with no set standards
or directives, resulting in lack ofcomprehensiveness.
227 John O. HONNOLD, ibid.,id. note 221, p.98-99
228 Sir Alan Amocata et autres, ibid.,id....note 2, pAlO. Roger Clarke, "Cargo Liability
Regimes", prepared for the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development) Maritime Transport Committee, January 2001
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" Since the Hague Rules do not address the problems that result from the interplay
of its complex lists of carrier immunities and responsibilities, interpretations in
other countries come to various conclusions; these divergences lead to complex and
unpredictable problems of conflict of laws and more grounds for forum-
shopping. ,,229
Hence, the application of The Hague Rules led to different interpretations in
different countries. In many cases, the same facts resulted in different solutions and
conflicting solutions. Therefore, creating a regime built on uncertainties and
unpredictability. Thus, failing to attain the desired goal of having a universally applied
. 230
regnne.
Another strong argument has been retained in the fight against the Hague Rules. The
current maritime industry is different from the one that existed at the time the Rules were
adopted. Thus, with modernization and advanced technology, modem day carriers are no
longer facing the same dangers, perils or accidents. Modernity has enabled them to face
their voyages with more security and with less risk. Reaching destination safely is no longer
a big issue. Thus, allowing carriers to make use of the Hague Rules exceptions seems
contradictory and arcane. The exceptions were adopted to protect carriers from unexpected
risks and dangers. However, with modem technology, these risks were diminished and are
no longer a big part of maritime reality. Consequently, cargo-owning interests have pressed
for changes and in many instances for the adoption of a different Regime.231
229 John O. HONNOLD, ibid.,id. note 221, p. 97
230 C.W.H. GOLDIE, ibid.,id. note 223, p. 111
231 Georges ASSONITIS, ibid.,id. note 33, p. 202-203, Roger Clarke, "Cargo Liability
Regimes", prepared for the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development) Maritime Transport Committee, January 2001, Chester D. Hooper,
testimony before the "Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine",
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, United State Senate, April 21,
1998, " Uniformity with regard to cargo loss and damage existed in a great majority of
the maritime world when COGSA 36 was enacted by the United States. The unity was
based on the Hague Rules which were finalized in 1924. They were enacted domestically,
with minor exceptions, as the United States Carriage ofGoods by Sea Act in 1936, and
were ratified by the United States with the same exceptions in 1937. "
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Chap - 3 THE VISBY AMENDMENTS
Paragraph - 1 Why was there a need for change?
The Hague Rules were under intense scrutiny. For many years the Rules were
criticized for not standing up to their original scheme. The demand for change became more
and more pressing. Cargo owning states were not satisfied with the working or more
precisely failure of the Rules. In the late fifties talks of reform were becoming more urgent
and the need for change was no longer an option but a reality. Hence, in response to the
increasing use of containerization in maritime transport and the general dissatisfaction with
the per-package limitation the CMI (Comite Maritime International) held in 1963, a
conference in Stockholm to discuss the possible changes to the Hague Rules.
Those talks finally led to the Brussels Diplomatic Convention on Maritime law
where amendments to the Hague Rules were adopted. As a result, on February 23, 1968, the
signature of the Brussels Protocol came into force. The adopted amendments came to be
known as the Hague-Visby Rules.232 For the Visby amendments to apply, they needed to be
enacted or adopted in each of the respective states. The United Kingdom and France were
amongst the first to adopt the reforms, as well as Japan, New Zealand and Australia.
However, States that did not enforce these amendments i.e. India, Malaysia, the U.S., were
still governed by the previous Hague Rules regime, (if such regime applied in the first
place).233
232 Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
ofLaw Relating to Bills ofLading, Feb. 23, 1968, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 83
(Cmnd.6944), Please refer to Annex E for a draft copy of the Hague-Visby Rules
233 Chester D. Hooper, testimony before the "Subcommittee on Surface Transportation
and Merchant Marine", "Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation" United
State Senate, April 21, 1998, " Uniformity with regard to cargo loss and damage existed
in a great majority ofthe maritime world when COGSA 36 was enacted by the United
States. The unity was based on the Hague Rules which were finalized in 1924. They were
enacted domestically, with minor exceptions, as the United States Carriage ofGoods by
Sea Act in 1936, and were ratified by the United States with the same exceptions in
1937. "
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The adoption of the Hague-Visby rules did not change the existing Hague system of
responsibility and the carriers obligations, it did not replace the rules, it simply modified
some minor issues. The majority of the caseload decided over the years under The Hague
regime remained. The carrier's duty of care did not change, his obligation to exercise due
diligence to make the ship seaworthy, properly manned, equipped and supplied did not
change either. Thus, any issue that was not modified in the Visby Amendments continued to
be governed by The Hague Rules Regime:
" The Visby Rules were adopted to rectify certain flagrant inconsistencies which
had arisen over time in the Hague Rules and in particular, a) the diminution ofthe
real value of the per package limitation, b) a proper definition of" package" in
respect to containers, c) the by-passing ofthe contract (including the provisions of
the Hague Rules) by suits in delict and tort against the carrier, its servants or
agents. ,,234
However as a whole, the Visby amendments did not bring about great change. The
amendments were few and minimal. The list of 17 exception found in art.4(2) of the Hague
Rules remained unchanged.
234 William TETLEY, " Canadian comments on the proposed UNCITRAL Rules", 9 L
Mar I. & Com (1977-78),252
Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, ibid.,id. note 1, p. 480
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Paragraph - 2 THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HAGUE AND HAGUE - VISBY
A. The effect of the Visby amendments
In practice main issues such as burden of proof, limitation of liability, carrier's
responsibility and immunity (art. III(8) and art. N(2) of the Hague Rules) were not
addressed by the amendments. As a result, many States refused to adopt the Hague-Visby
Rules, dissatisfied with the minor reforms that were brought about.235
"The Visby amendments have certainly mitigated but they have not removed the
technical defects inherent in the Hague Rules and in most Hague Rules legislation. This is
due partly to the fact that many Hague Rules countries have not ratified the Protocol and
partly to the fact that those responsible for the Protocol adopted an excessively cautious
approach to the task ofreforming the Hague Rules and only recommended the minimum of
change. ,,236
Concerning the topic of this paper "the carriers rights, responsibilities and
immunities" the Visby Protocol did not depart from its predecessor the Hague Regime
and accordingly there is no change to signal. The Protocol simply modified the per-
package limitation to $663 or $2 per kilogram of lost or damaged goods. The
amendments clarified the definition of the term package found in the rules. Defining
package as the number of packages or units inserted in the bill of lading as packed in such
article of transport. The amendments also established that a carrier could no longer limit
his liability for intentionally caused damage or recklessly caused damage in cases where
the result of such damage was known.
The Visby amendments did not allow changing the bill of lading original conditions
by inserting contrary conditions when the bill is transferred to a party in good faith. The
amendments made it possible to extend to one-year the time limitation. It also broadened
the definition of carrier to include the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract with
a shipper.
235 Please refer to Annex B for a list of membership to the Hague/Visby Rules
236 Anthony DIAMOND, ibid.,id. note 218, p. 113.
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Shipper States viewed the Visby amendments as a failure. The changes were not
representative of the needed refOlms. These States that pressed and waited for these changes
for a great number ofyears found the result disappointing.
" Now in the years while the Visby amendments were being negotiated, and indeed
for some time after their conception in 1968, it was common to refer in a somewhat
condescending or disparaging tone ofvoice to those amendments since it seemed to
many people, even in the traditional maritime countries of the West, that the
amendments had missed a golden opportunity to conduct a comprehensive revision
of the Hague Rules so as to bring them up to date and to ensure that they were as
successful for the next forty orfjfty years as they had proved to be in the years
which had elapsed since 1924. ,,2
Consequently, the lack of success and adherence to the Visby amendments is linked
to the reaction of a number of States, refusing to accept such little progress. Thus, many
countries, in particular developing countries, prevented the ratification of the Visby
amendments. Hoping to pressure the maritime community to prompt the real reforms
needed.
" For the developing countries one major cause of dissatisfaction was that the
Hague Rules system, together with the bill of lading forms in use, meant that
shippers in developing countries, due to lack of expertise and weaker bargaining
power, were often unable to enforce the liability imposed on carriers by the Hague
Rules. In fact, it may have been overlooked that the effect ofthe Hague Rules have
not necessarily been the same in all parts ofthe world, and that demandfor a new,
simplified and amplified regime of liability were based on experiences somewhat
different from those ofindustrialized countries. ,,238
237 Anthony DIAMOND, The Hamburg Rules Seminar, Lloyds ofLondon Press Ltd.,
1978,p.2
238 Erling SELVIG, "The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and marine insurance
practice", v. 12 I Mar I. & Com, (1980-81), 304
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Shipper interest sought for greater change and the Visby amendments did not
measure up to their expectations. Accordingly, campaigning against them seemed the only
acceptable way to voice their dissatisfaction and request some real reforms. Hence, the
Visby failure paved the way to the coming forth of a totally new regime, known as the
Hamburg Rules. Regardless, one cannot lose sight that even if not very successful in their
efforts to reform, The Visby amendments remain a better alternative than The Hague Rules.
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PART II: THE HAMBURG RULES 1978
A. PREPARATION AND ADOPTION OF THE HAMBURG RULES
Its origins: the role ofUNCITRAL and UNCTAD
As of November 1, 1992239, the Hamburg Rules became more than just a subject of
debate. They are a practical reality of maritime law. With their adoption by 20 States
(Barbados, Botswana, Burkina-Faso, Chile, Egypt, Guinea, Hungary, Kenya, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leon, Tunisia, Uganda,
Tanzania and Zambia) they came into force, and now represent the latest attempt at
modernizing the international conventions governing the carriage of goods by sea. As of
November, 2001 the list ofmembership to the Hamburg Rules is 26 States?40
The new regime was adopted on March 31, 1978, by a diplomatic conference held at
Hamburg Germany. The new Convention came into force by a vote of 68 in favor, none
against and three abstentions. The adopted text was based on the draft convention by
UNCITRAL (the United Nations commission on international trade law).241
239 Report to Parliament on the Carriage ofGoods by Water Act, Transport Canada,
December 1999, pA " In November 1992, the Hamburg Rules entered into force but none
of the world's major trading nations has acceded to the Rules, nor has implemented its
provisions in national legislation."
240 Please refer to Annex B for a list of the Hamburg Rules membership,
Report to Parliament on the Carriage ofGoods by Water Act, Transport Canada,
December 1999, p.8 "The long period oftime - 15 years - before the Hamburg Rules
finally came into force, shows the reservations and reluctance ofgovernments to adopt
them. Indeed, none ofthe industrialized countries has ratified the Hamburg Rules. "
241 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978 (Hamburg Rules),
G.A. res. 48/34,48 U.N. GAOR Supp.(No. 49) at 331, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993), Refer
to Annex F for a draft copy of the Hamburg Rules
Stephen R. KATZ, "New momentum towards entry into force of the
Hamburg Rules",v.24 European Transport Law (1989),298
Samuel Robert MANDELBAUM, ibid.,id. note 1, p. 484
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However, the path to their adoption and implementation was not simple. These
Rules symbolized the light at the end of a long road, a road that was shared by many States
and organizations, which labored for decades, to attain the desired goal of a maritime
responsibility and liability regime that conciliates all interests. Bringing about the adoption
of the Hamburg Rules began with the realization that the old regime was not working and
did not comply with the maritime realities of modem times. It was obvious that change was
necessary. With a failed attempt at modifying the Hague Rules (i.e. the Visby amendments),
timing was right to campaign for a novel regime more adapted for today's maritime trade.
" So the first historical factor which led, in my view, to a demand being expressed
for a totally new cargo convention was the disappointment experienced by many
people at the outcome ofthe conferences held in the period between 1959 and 1968
for the purpose of bringing the Hague Rules up to date. This disappointment was
supplemented in some cases by the view that the Visby amendments did not go
nearly far enough to redress the traditional imbalance between ship and cargo and
to impose greater liabilities on shipowners. ,,242
The developing countries, at this point, were wearied with the existing system. The
dissatisfaction with the balance of responsibility between ship and cargo interests remained.
They requested the adoption of a new regime. One that would represent a consensus of all
views i.e. shippers, carriers, insurers, governments. Ending the old perception of a one sided
system favoring the interests of the carriers.
242 Anthony DIAMOND, ibid.,id. note 237, p. 2, Report to Parliament on the Carriage of
Goods by Water Act, Transport Canada, December 1999, p.3 " The adoption ofthe
Hamburg Rules is considered to have a more broadly basedpolitical background than
the Hague/Visby regime since they were adopted under the auspices ofthe united Nations
with the participation ofthe traditional maritime countries and large shipper nations, as
well as the developing countries which were convinced that the prevailing system was
running contrary to their interests. Their argument was that the 1924 Hague Rules and
the 1968 HaguelVisby Rules had been prepared in fora where they had not been
represented at the time. "
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" Already by 1968 it had become clear that the Hague Rules were unpopular among the
developing countries partly because they were thought to have been drafted in the interests
ofthe so-called colonialist or shipowning nations... because they had been negotiated as a
compromise between the major selfgoverning powers in 1924 at a time when the great
colonial empires were still intact and had then, as most cases, been imposed on their
colonies before those colonies had gained their independence. It was urged by the
developing countries and - even more - by those devoted to their interests, that they were
entitled to a share in the formulation of those laws which should govern their maritime
affairs. ,,243
Accordingly, the growing dissent within the developing countries culminated to
such a degree that they felt it was the appropriate time to work for change. The existing
system failed them. Hence, in the early seventies, under the initiative of the developing
countries, the United Nations was called in, and thus, their participation in the search of a
preferred system began. Their involvement would become central to finding a maritime
system that would be to the liking ofall parties. Up until that time, the CMI was the primary
organization involved in finding solutions to the broadening maritime issues. However, the
developing countries were not really involved within the organization, and did not feel it
was in a good position to defend their interests as best as possible.244
243 Anthony DIAMOND, ibid.,id. note 237, p. 2
244 Report to Parliament on the Carriage ofGoods by Water Act, Transport Canada,
December 1999, p.3 "By the 19970s, the Hague Rules were considered largely outdated
having been developed in the 1920s by maritime nations seeking to establish a balance
among their maritime interests, notably between shipowners and shippers, and their
respective responsibilities for carriage ofgoods. Notwithstanding the revisions adopted
by the 1968 Hague/Visby Rules, pressures from developing countries and major shipper
nations for a full re-examination ofcargo liability regimes has led to the development of
a new regime, the 1978 Hamburg Rules."
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" The UNCTAD initiative is explained by the fact that the Hague/Visby amendments
were considered far too modest. CUI has been criticized for its desire to retain
status quo instead of taking into consideration the need for changes caused by
modern transportation techniques and, in particular, required by the developing
countries. In addition, the CUI is generally considered to take care ofshipowner's
interests by resisting any changes in favor ofthe shipper. ,,245
In the late sixties, UNCTAD (United Nations Commission on Trade and
Development) set up a working group to examine the issue of carriage of goods by sea, and
more precisely to see if the existing regime was unfair to developing countries. Thus,
UNCTAD studied all existing legislation relating to bills of lading and carriage of goods by
sea, and determined whether the developing countries economic development and interests
were met.
" The Working Group on International Shipping Legislation of UNCTAD has
suggested some basic amendments to the Hague Rules, in relation to the:
(i) period ofresponsibility;
(ii) basis for liability (in particular the excuses for loss or damage caused by error
in the management ofthe vessel and byfire);
(iii) deck cargo;
(iv) jurisdiction and arbitration. ,,246
Thus, on December 1970, UNCTAD published a report on Bills of Lading, stating
its finding on the issue. UNCTAD found that the Hague Rules were unfavorable to cargo
owners. They criticized the list of exceptions found· in art. 4(2) of the Hague Rules. It also
found the Hague Rules to be ambiguous, and not cost effective, with overlapping insurance
costs.
245 Jan RAMBERG, Revision of the HagueNisby Rules on Bills ofLading,
eM I Doc 1973, p. 60, Martine REMOND-GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime,
2e edition, Pedone, 1993 p.340« Les Regles de Hambourg coupent aux querelles
de frontieres avec les textes concurrents: tout Etat qui y devient partie doit
denoncer la Convention de 1924; cette denonciation prend elfet a I 'instant ou
les Regles entrent en vigueur a son egard (art.31-1). Comme elles se veulent Ie modele de
I'avenir pour toutes les conventions de transport de marchandises, leur champ
d'application est Ie plus large possible. ». Report to Parliament on the Carriage ofGoods
by Water Act, Transport Canada, December 1999, p.3
246 Jan RAMBERG, Revision of the HagueNisbyRules on Bills ofLading,
eM I Doc 1973, p. 60
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Consequently, the Hague system was not working in the interest of the developing
countries, placing undue economic burdens on them.247 Developing countries were tired of
the old system, they had determined views on the direction they wanted a new regime to
take. The Hague system of responsibilities and immunities was the first item on their list of
changes. These States wanted the new system to have a different and more equitable sharing
of the risks in maritime transport. On the one hand, they demanded that carrier's
responsibilities be increased, and on the other hand, that cargo owner's burden be
decreased. Hence, most of the African, Asian and South American States were amongst the
proponents for the adoption of a new system, one more representative of their interests.
Consequently, it was felt that the United Nations was the only international body able to
answer their demands.
However, UNCTAD's work was seen to be too politically oriented and not legal or
technical enough. Thus, another organization within the United Nations was called in.
February 1971 marked the beginning of UNCITRAL's (United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law) involvement in trying to develop a new system. Hence, the task
was now divided between the two UN organizations, with UNCITRAL in charge of
. d . I . . 248economIcs an commercIa mantIme aspects.
UNCITRAL a well-known international body with the mandate to reduce
obstacles to international trades whom from conflicting and inadequate laws has
established an enviable reputation for professional, non-political and successful work.
Thus, UNCITRAL put forth a Working Group of 21 States representing each region and
legal system. This Working Group with the help of international organizations and
experts in the field completed after 5 years of labor a draft convention which was then
247 Anthony DIAMOND, ibid.,id. note 237, p. 3
248 Report to Parliament on the Carriage ofGoods by Water Act, Transport Canada,
December 1999, pA "In the case ofthe Hamburg Rules, the preparatory work was done
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) at the
request ofand in Cooperation with the committee on shipping ofthe United Nations
Conference on trade and development (UNCTAD)."
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transmitted to all governments and interested international organizations for comments.249
Thus, from 1971 to 1976 UNCITRAL and its Work Group reviewed a number of
important issues dealing in great part with carrier responsibilities and exoneration, burden
of proof, and jurisdiction, amongst others. Each question was analyzed and examined in
detail. The parties' opinions, comments and criticisms were heard and taken into account,
thus tIying to represent all the interested views. Each association was given the opportunity
to be heard and to voice its preferences in the choice of alternative solutions. In regard to the
question dealing with the basis of liability regime, opinions from all sides were heard.
Thus, the Maritime Law Association of the US, UK, Federal Republic of Germany,
German Democratic Republic and Canada, all favored a system of liability based on a list of
defences. The main reason being, that a voluminous case law has been established and,
therefore, it would be a great loss to abandon it. However, States like Italy and Sweden
preferred a more general formula.25o
Early on, the UNCITRAL Work Group opted to work toward the adoption of a new
maritime regime, rather then to modify the old one. The reason was clear considering the
reality that the Hague Rules were the subject of so much opposition and criticism, and over
the years became unpopular amongst a great number of States. Furthermore, the old system
did not cover a number of new issues that needed to be addressed. 251
249 John 0, HONNOLD, " Ocean carriers and cargo: clarity and fairness-Hague
or Hamburg? ", v. 24 ! Mar I. & Com (1993), 79
250 Jan RAMBERG, Revision of the HagueNisby Rules on bills oflading, CM! Doc
1973, p.93. Report to Parliament on the Carriage ofGoods by Water Act,
Transport Canada, December 1999, pA
251 Michel ALTER, Les travaux de la CNUDCI, " La convention sur les
transports de marchandises par mer", p. 739
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The commission therefore, adopted a Draft Convention on the Carriage ofGoods by
Sea. Thus, in May 1976 UNCITRAL published its final draft of the new proposed system.
April 30, 1979 represented the Convention's deadline for its signature. Thus, in 1976 all
governments and interested organizations were given a copy of the Draft Convention, to
look over and to bring forth their various comments, opinions and views on all relevant
issues.
Not surprisingly, the Draft Convention was the object of heated comments in the
years preceding their adoption. A number of delegations confronted each other on the most
controversial issues, one of which being, the carrier's responsibilities and immunities issue.
The Germans, the Soviets, the Japanese and the British, were amongst the delegations that
did not want change in the existing system of responsibilities. However, the majority of
delegations were in favor of such a change that was at the heart of the new system, and
hence, defeated the mounting opposition against its adoption. Once all the voices were
heard, it was time for the Convention to be approved by all States. Consequently, in 1978 a
diplomatic conference was held in Hamburg Germany, to adopt this new system?52
" In 1978 a diplomatic conference of seventy-six States and many interested
international organizations met at Hamburg and on March 30, 1978, without
dissent adopted the U.N Convention on the Carriage of Goods by sea-the /I
,253Hamburg Rules. '
252 Roger Clarke, "Cargo Liability Regimes", prepared for the OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development) MTC Maritime Transport Committee,
January 2001, p.24 "The Hamburg rules, on the other hand, place on the carrier a wider
and more general liability for the goods while in the carrier's charge; and they replace
the 17 Hague defences with three (art. 5(1,4&6), the main one being that the carrier
'took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrences and its
consequences '. "
253 John O. HONNOLD, ibid.,id_ note 221, p.79-80
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chap 1 THE CARRIER'S LIABILITY REGIME
sec 1 - Maintaining the principle of the Hague Rules: the responsibility of the carrier
should be based on fault and neglect
The Hamburg Rules represent a departure from the previous system. However, no
one will argue that some continuation endures between the two systems. The Hamburg and
the Hague Rules are based on the same basis of responsibility. ill both systems, carriers are
not strictly liable in cases of loss or damage to the goods. Furthermore, the carrier basis of
responsibility is based on fault or neglect, even if in each system it's expressed differently.
Nonetheless, the overall understanding is the same and the underlying idea follows the same
objective.
" Although the carrier liability regime of the Hamburg Rules does differ in a
number of important respects from Hague and Visby, there is some continuity
between the Hamburg Rules and its predecessors. First, the standard of
reasonableness and fault of the Hamburg Rules may also be found in Hague and
Visby, albeit much less prominently. In addition, both Hague and Visby place
affirmative duties upon carriers. In effect, what the Hamburg Rules have done in
article 5(1) is to take the catch-all "exception" of Hague's article 4(2)(q), and to
turn it into a general duty with the burden ofproofbeing on the carrier to disprove
fault. This general duty is thus allowed to swallow nearly all the defences of
Hague. ,,254
Thus, by looking closely at The Hague and Hamburg Rules one realizes that both
systems are somewhat similar. Article IV(1) of The Hague Rules clearly states, that if the
carrier uses due diligence, he will not be held liable. Furthermore, some exceptions in art.
IV(2) of the Hague Rules, use the basis of fault to hold the carriers responsible for loss or
damage to the goods they carry. The same can be found in the Hamburg Rules.
254 Douglas A. WERTH, "The Hamburg Rules revisited - A look at U.S. options ",
v.22 r Mar L & Com (1991),68, Report to Parliament on the Carriage ofGoods
by Water Act, Transport Canada, December 1999, p.4
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The fact is demonstrated again in art. IV(2)b of the Hague Rules which stipulates
carriers will not be held liable, unless the loss or damage is caused by their actual fault or
privity. Hague's art. IV(2)p. stipulates carriers will not be responsible for latent defects
undiscovered by due diligence, and most importantly, the catch-all exception found in
article IV(2)q of the rules, stipulating that carriers will not be held liable for any cause of
loss that arose without their actual fault or privity. Consequently, one easily realizes that
the Hague Rules are not based on a system of strict or objective liability. They are based on
a system of fault and neglect, even if they don't formally stipulate it. Therefore, by
comparing and analyzing both systems, one can observe some sort of continuity in the
newer system, even if in theory it's worded differently.255
" Insofar as the basis of the liability regime is concerned, however the Hamburg
Rules represent a continuity ofthe traditions ofmaritime law while at the same time
providingfor a moderate increase ofthe level ofliability ofcarriers by sea and the
removal of peculiarities inherent in the existing law. This was the basis for the
''package deal" at Hamburg... The liability of the carrier is still based on the
principle of fault and neglect. This principle has been incorporated into the
Hamburg Rules in the affirmative and generalform ofliability for presumedfault or
neglect (Article 5, parag. 1). ,,256
255 Please refer to Annex F for a draft copy ofThe Hamburg Rules, i.e art. 5
256 Erling SELVIG, " The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and marine insurance
practice ", vol. 12 I Mar L & Com (1980-81),305
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sec 2 - THE BASIS OF LIABILITY: ARTICLE 5(1) OF THE HAMBURG RULES
parag 1 - THE SCOPE, OBJECTIVE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ART. 5(1)
The Hamburg system of liability is based on the premise of presumed fault or
neglect. Thus, to escape liability, the carrier must prove he was not negligent or at fault.
Hence, the Hamburg Rules are based on a general formula, unlike the Hague Rules that are
based on a long list of defences. It also implies that as a general rule the burden of proof
rests on the carrier. The carriers general responsibility is to be found in article 5(1) of the
Hamburg Rules, which expressly outlines their basis of liability. Thus, carriers will be held
liable if the occurrence that caused the loss or damage to the goods took place while the
goods were in their charge.
Article 5 of the Hamburg Rules stipulates that:
1. The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss ofor damage to the goods, as well as from
delay in delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took place while
the goods were in his charge as defined in article 4, unless the carrier proves that he, his
servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the
occurrence and its consequences. Hence, to escape liability a carrier must prove that he, his
servants or agents, took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the loss and
d h d · . d 257amage to t e goo s It came .
257 Report to Parliament on the Carriage ofGoods by Water Act, Transport Canada,
December 1999, pA "The Hamburg Rules introduced a new approach to cargo liability
according to which the carriers are held responsible for the loss or damage to goods
while in their charge, unless they can prove that all reasonable measures to avoid
damage or loss were taken. Carrier liability is extended to reflect the different categories
ofcargo now carried, new technology and loading methods, and other practical
problems affecting the shippers such as losses resulting from delays in delivery. "
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" The carrier is liable unless he proves that " he, his servants or agents took all
measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its
consequences". This general rule - at least if interpreted on the basis of the
"common understanding" attached to the convention - expresses a principle offault
liability and not ofstrict liability. It has also made possible a simplification ofthe
liability regime, because it became unnecessary to retain the catalogue of
exceptions and certain other provisions srecifying the duties of the carrier, which
are now contained in the Hague Rules. ,,25
The Hamburg Rules wanted to depart from the previous system, and thus, by
adopting a general formula, it simplified the system of carrier's responsibility and liability.
Consequently, the objective of the new system, as well as the essence of carrier's liability,
can be found in article 5(1) ofthe Hamburg Rules.
" The carrier's core liability is for loss or damage to goods and for delay in their
delivery caused during his period ofresponsibility. That period begins with taking
the goods over at the port of loading, and continues throughout carriage and until
delivery at the port ofdischarge. ,,259
Another breakthrough found in the Hamburg Rules can be found in article 4
Period ofresponsibility. Article 4 states that:
1. The responsibility of the carrier for the goods under this convention covers the period
during which the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of loading, during the
carriage and at the port ofdischarge.
The new convention clearly extends the time frame of the carrier's responsibility. No
longer from reception/loading of the goods to their discharge but it now covers the period
when the goods are at the port of loading thus before loading and after discharge. The
Hamburg Rules took into account the modem shipping practice ofcarriers taking custody of
the goods in port before and after the actual sea carriage also known as i.e. port to port.
258 Erling SELVIG, ibid.,id. note 256, p. 305-306, Report to Parliament on the Carriage
ofGoods by Water Act, Transport Canada, December 1999, pA-5
259 C.C. NICOLL, "Do the Hamburg Rules suit a shipper-dominated economy? ",
vol. 24 I Mar L & Cam (1993), 152
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Accordingly, ensuring that during this time any loss to the goods rests on the party in
control and who is most able to guard against such loss or damage.
The Hamburg Rules opted for a much simpler formula i.e. article 5(1) of the Rules.
Nonetheless, this new set ofRules, even if simpler than the previous system, are not perfect
and like The Hague Rules are also subject to criticism. The Hamburg system of liability has
been described as a two-part formula. In the first part, one must define what is meant by the
terms of "occurrence" and "agents" and further, on whom lies the burden of proof On the
other hand, what is meant by " all measures that could reasonably be required", what kind of
standard ofcare are the rules aiming at.
" I pause onlyfor a moment to draw your attention to the fact that this dual test, set out
in words ofextreme simplification, replaces all the provisions ofthe Hague Rules with
regard to seaworthiness, as well as all the provisions of the Hague Rules setting out
the carrier's duty ''properly and carefully" to look after the goods in other respects,
together with the so-called catalogue ofexceptions" which qualify the latter duty. ,,260
Article 5(1) ofthe Hamburg Rules has generated some discussion on the interpretation
it must be given. The fear among some States was that their courts would interpret art. 5(1)
too strictly, or that there would be some confusion with its application. As a result, and to
quiet the mounting opposition to the new system of liability, the drafters of the Hamburg
convention decided to include an annex, giving a more detailed definition to some of the
troublesome issues.
260 Anthony DIAMOND, ibid~,id. note 218, p. 9
118
Since article 5 (1) stipulates that the carrier must use the reasonable carrier test to
avoid loss or damage to the goods he carries, courts facing such an article, must decide what
is a reasonable carrier, and not what was the necessary action to take to avoid the loss or
damage. Hence, to escape liability the carrier must demonstrate that he took all reasonable
measures (not the necessary measure) to avoid the loss or damage.
However, in cases where the circumstances of the loss or damage are unknown or
uncertain, the carrier cannot prove that he took all the reasonable measures to avoid liability,
and therefore, cannot escape liability. Since, the system is based on a presumed fault, the
carrier that does not disprove fault, cannot escape liability.261 Thus, in some manner, the
Hamburg Rules are tougher and stricter on carriers. However, in other ways, the system can
only work on a case by case basis, since courts will base their decisions on facts and not on
a universally accepted formula. Consequently, one realizes, although the rules were
simplified, uncertainties remain. Only over time, could some sort of secure understanding
be achieved. In the meantime, courts are dealing with a new system and new interpretations
need to be put to use. Thus, a common universal understanding is not yet a reality, and will
not be for a long time.
As in the case of The Hague Rules, only after decades of applicability, could it be
said, that a certain unanimity, consistency and degree of predictability in the outcome of
some cases was achieved. The Hamburg Rules success, on a practical level, will only be
known in the years to come. However, for a great number of countries, the Hamburg
Rules are already a great success, even if only in theory.
261 George ASSONITIS, ibid_,id. note 33, p. 215.
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parag 2 - THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A. On whom lies the burden of proof?
The Hamburg Rules are based on a system of fault liability, accordingly, the burden
lies on the carrier, and to escape such presumed fault he must disprove his fault in the
events that led to the loss or damage to the goods he carried. Hence, art. 5(1) of the
Hamburg Rules, outlines the ordinary course of the required procedures needed for a carrier
to escape liability. Article 5(1) asserts that the onus ofproof is on carriers.
" The only help given by the Rules is to be found in Annex II This set's out a
"common understanding" adopted in the course of the diplomatic conference. The
Annex reads that "it is the common understanding that the liability of the carrier
under the Convention is based on the principle ofpresumed fault or neglect". It is
almost as though the delegates felt themselves to be drowning when they came to
consider the meaning of Article 5, Rule 1 and, at the last moment, set out their
"common understanding" in the hope that it might act as a kind of raft in a
shipwreck. But though Annex II points in favor of the solution that the burden
usually rests on the Carrier, it does not really answer the question " What is to give
rise to the presumption offault or neglect,,?262
The carrier's representatives at the Hamburg Conference were worried that the
interpretation of Article 5(1) will lead to a stricter interpretation of the burden of proof
issue. The fear was based on the apprehension that in practice courts were going to interpret
this Article as a strict or objective liability. Depicting the liability more severely than the
actual basis (of fault or neglect) intended by the drafters of the system. Accordingly,
incorporating Annex II to the rules appeased the apprehension ofmost parties.
262 Anthony DIAMOND, ibid.,id. note 237, p. 10
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Thus, as a general practice it came to be accepted, that the initial burden must be
discharged by carriers who must prove that they took reasonable care of the goods.
Furthermore, it only seemed logical to presume such fault or neglect, since the goods got
damaged or lost while they were in the carriers custody, as the Rules state, " if the
occurrence which cause the loss or damage ... took place while the goods were in his
charge..."
The rational behind such a rule, is based on the premise that primarily carriers are
the ones with the most information of what happened to the goods or what could of
happened to them, therefore, avoiding the imposition of such unfair and difficult burden on
shippers. In contrast to cases tried on the basis ofthe Hague Rules regime.
In comparison, the Hamburg Rules have made great progress in the burden of proof area.
The new Rules have simplified and unified a very complex area of the Hague system. One
of the most common Hague Rules criticism, related to the fact that they were unclear and
uncertain on the burden of proof issue. The Hague Rules had no clear mention on whom
should bear the onus of proof. Furthermore, in practice, the Hague Rules led to so many
interpretations that the onus ofproofwas shifted from one party to the other. Due to the lack
of guidelines and set standards, the results were unclear and unpredictable in law.
Consequently, the search to have a unified international maritime convention, failed, at least
regarding the issue ofburden ofproof.
The Hamburg Rules provided a welcomed improvement in the law. Even though the
new Rules did not expressly stipulate that in most cases, the onus of proof was on carriers,
(Fire being one of the exceptions). The adoption of Article 5(1) and Annex IT, eliminated
any doubt, accordingly, there was no longer place for mistake, ambiguous and divergent
interpretations.
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The carrier will be responsible for the loss or damage to the goods, if they were
under his charge when the loss occurred, and if he does not prove that he took the required
reasonable measures to avoid such loss. Hence, he must prove that he was not negligent or
at fault. Therefore, the Hamburg Rules are stricter on carriers and are more shipper friendly,
Accordingly, satisfying the demands of cargo owning and developing States. As in all
compromises, an exchange must be reached in order to attain the favored outcome. ill
Hamburg the Hague Rules Fire exception was the compromise. The old fire exception
remains unchanged. The onus of proof is on shippers and not carriers, this setback is
minimal, the Hamburg Rules burden ofproofremaining a more just and uniform system.
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sec 3 - UNDER HAMBURG: WHAT HAPPENS TO THE SEAWORTHINESS
THEORY?
In the early days of shipping, the duty of seaworthiness was onerous. Carriers had an
absolute duty to provide a seaworthy ship. Since carriers were the only one's with control of
the ship's seaworthiness, it only seemed normal to hold them responsible for such a duty.
Hence, when time came to regulate the issue of carriage of goods by sea, and consequently,
adopt some international convention dealing with maritime issues, incorporating the
seaworthiness concept in these legislation's was readily accepted. Accordingly, the Hater
Act and the Hague Rules have both included the carrier's obligation of seaworthiness.
" The concept that a vessel must be seaworthy upon commencement ofthe voyage is
ofancient origin. Long before there were any international conventions, the general
maritime law recognized an implied warranty of seaworthiness. Decisions in the
U.S. courts recognized this warranty as absolute, and as one which did not depend
upon the owner's knowledge or his diligence. It was not even to be displaced by
clauses in a common carrier's bill of lading excusing a carrier from latent defects.
... Both the Harter Act and the Hague Rules reduced this duty ofthe carrierfrom an
absolute to one of exercising "due diligence" before and at the beginning of the
voyage. The Hamburg Rules do not mention unseaworthiness at all. Liability ofthe
ship is placed upon an entirely different basis. ,,263
The seaworthiness theory is part ofthe Hague Rules system of carrier's liability and
immunity. This duty is clearly stipulated in the Rules, as a result, courts are very familiar
with its applicability. Consequently, the duty has a central role in the working ofthe Hague
system. Notwithstanding, this very old tradition has been abandoned by the Hamburg Rules.
The new Rules have opted to eliminate any mention of seaworthiness, and preferred to go
with a different system of responsibility, based on "reasonableness" rather then
seaworthiness.
263 R. Glenn BAUER, " Conflicting liability regimes: Hague- Visby v. Hamburg
Rules -A case by case analysis ", v. 24 I Mar I. & Com, (1993), 54
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The rationale behind the shift was based on practical facts. Modem shipping practice
is not what it used to be. The early days of maritime trade carried more risks and dangers:
ship's were not as solid, well equipped or modernized with the latest technology. Today
voyages are much less dangerous and hazardous, the timing of the voyage is more
predictable. The ships are more solid, resistant and no longer built in the same manner, out
of wood. As a result, reducing the probability of unseaworthiness?64 To accommodate the
demands of shipping nations and to adapt to the industry's evolution, the Hamburg Rules
were drafted without the seaworthiness theory.265
264 Roger Clarke, "Cargo Liability Regimes", prepared for the OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development) MTC Maritime Transport Committee,
January 2001, p.1?" .. .delay in delivery is as much a legitimate concern ofcargo
interests as is loss or damage to the goods themselves; the timing ofsea journey is less
unpredictable than it was 80, or even 40, years ago; customers expect great
punctuality; ... "
265 ibid.,id. note 264, at p. 18-19" Businesses, including shipping, are rapidly adapting
themselves to electronic communications and documentation. Governments are having to
update their laws to recognise these new business methods. Ofthe more modern regimes,
the Hamburg rules make provision, taken up in the Nordic Code, for electronic
signatures on bills oflading, ..But the Hague and Hague- Visby rules, drafted as they
were before the electronic age, contain no reference to electronic media. "
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chap 2 - DEPARTING FROM THE HAGUE RULES EXCEPTIONS
sec 1 - ERROR IN MANAGEMENT AND NAVIGATION OF THE SHIP
Article IV (2) of the Hague Rules, provides a long list of defences available to
carriers. The error in management and navigation of the ship, has by far, been the most
controversial defence available to shipowners. As a general rule, maritime law has always
held carriers responsible for their negligence. However, shipowners found ways to escape
their responsibilities, and hence, adopted in their bills of lading exculpatory negligence
clauses. Thus, explaining the origin of the error in management and navigation of the ship
defence. The incorporation of this exception in The Hague Rules results from compromise.
Carriers accepted responsibility for negligence in most cases, in exchange for exoneration
relating to negligence in the management and navigation of the ship. Today, such
compromise does not make sense on a legal or moral basis. ill practice the effect of such
exoneration results in injustice and could no longer be tolerated. 266
266 Chester D. Hooper, testimony before the "Subcommittee on Surface Transportation
and Merchant Marine", "Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation" United
State Senate, April 21, 1998, " At the outset, those interests favoring the Hamburg Rules
insisted that the error ofnavigation or management defense be eliminated. The defense
would exonerate a carrier ifcargo were lost or damaged as the result ofan error in the
navigation ofa vessel or the management ofa vessel at sea. The drafters ofthe Hague
Rules in the 1920s reasoned that an error ofnavigation or management at sea was
beyond the control ofeither the shipowner or the cargo owner. They decided not to
assign liability for matters not under the control ofeither party to a contractfor carriage
ofgoods by sea. Thus, any damage to or loss ofcargo caused by an error ofnavigation
or management ofa vessel at sea effectively would be suffered by cargo interests.
Correspondingly, any damage to the vessel caused by an error ofnavigation or
management would be suffered by the carrier. .. sectors ofthe maritime industryfavoring
the Hamburg Rules insisted on the elimination ofthe error ofnavigation and
management defenses, ... "
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" It is difficult to see why negligence in navigating a ship should have different legal
consequences from any other kind of negligence... The exceptions of negligent
navigation and negligent management of the ship are distinctly out ofplace in a
regime based on a duty of care. They were, of course, essentially a trade -off, a
concession to shipowners in return for the annulment ofother traditional exception
clauses... But whatever the historical reasons for the exceptions, it is submitted that
h I b · ifi d ,,267t ey cannot any onger eJustl Ie .
Since its inclusion in The Hague Rules, this exception has been the object of heated
debates. Shipping and developing States argued for its abolition. Over the years, this article
became a major obstacle in the negotiations for reform. Nonetheless, refusing to back away
from this issue, cargo-owning nations ultimately succeeded. During the UNCITRAL
negotiations, the error in management and navigation of the ship defence was at the core of
the discussions that led to the adoption of the Hamburg Rules. The delegates were basically
divided in two groups. On the one hand, those in favor of abolishing this defence, and on
the other, those in favor of maintaining it. The debate went from suggestions ofmaintaining
the defence, to partial abolition, hence, eliminating the error in management of the ship,
since this was the part of the defence that caused confusion, and retaining the latter part of
the defence, error in the navigation of the ship, since this part generated no confusion.
However, the demand for total abolition, by the majority of states, represented the most
. 268
common suggestion.
One of the CMI recommendations regarding the error in the management and
navigation of the ship was:
267 Anthony DIAMOND, ibid.,id. note 218, p. 111-112
268 Rene RODIERE, Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, l2e ed, Dalloz,1997,
at p. 385
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" Considering that the particular risk pertaining to carriage of goods by sea
resultingfrom perils ofthe sea and the accumulation ofrisks, as well as any change
ofthe present risk allocation, could be met by an adaptation ofthe present system of
insurance and, in order to achieve a better harmonization ofthe different branches
of the law of carriage of goods, the CMI RECOMMENDS that the particular
defences for error in the navigation and the management ofthe ship as well as for
,269fire be deleted. '
fu the end, the decision was to abolish the defence of error in the management and
navigation of the ship, and work toward a new system of liability. A system more objective,
just and representative of all parties concerned. Thus, the Hamburg Rules system of
responsibility based on a general fonnula of liability left behind the long list of the Hague
exceptions. Error in management and navigation of the ship is no longer acceptable. 270
" Error in the navigation and management ofthe ship would no longer be a defence
for the carrier under UNCITRAL. Carriage by sea under the Hague/Visby Rules is
virtually the last legal sphere where a carrier is not responsible for its faults. It is
felt by many that it is now time to withdraw this exception granted long before the
advances of technology. Error in navigation, too, is being interpreted more and
more restrictively by the expansion of the seaworthiness provision to the whole
voyage... society would probably benefit by the removal of the "error" exception
because it is a rule ofcommerce that the person responsible for a loss should be
held responsible in law; otherwise the negligent practices will be repeated and
,271
never corrected. '
269 Recommendation on the Hague Rules, CMI Doc. 1974. p. 98
270 Roger Clarke, "Cargo Liability Regimes", prepared for the OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development) MTC Maritime Transport Committee,
January 2001, p. 26" Moreover, in view oftechnological advances over 80 years and of
the far more demanding safety standards that shipowners now have to meet (not least
under the international Safety Management Code), is it any longer acceptable for
carriers to escape liability by pleading the "act, neglect, or default ofthe master,
mariner, pilot, or the servants ofthe carrier in the navigation or in the management of
the ship? Such a defence would be grotesque and inadmissible ifpleaded in a case of
liabilityfor injury to a ship's passenger orfor environmental damage from an oil spill,
and I believe that democratic governments wouldfind it hard to justify to their
legislatures today re-enacting any exemption from carrier liability in these terms. "
271 William TETLEY, " Canadian comments on the proposed UNCITRAL Rules An
analysis ofthe proposed UNCITRAL text", vol. 9 I Mar I. & Com, (1977-78), 255
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Consequently, after years of pressure from developing States as well as shipping
nations, the Hamburg Rules adopted a system based on fault or neglect, and not tolerant of
negligence in any sort of way. Accordingly, aligning themselves to other transport
1 . 1 . ,272egIs atlon s.
sec 2- FIRE: THE EXCEPTION TO THE NEW RULE
Fire always held a special status in maritime law. The reason being most fires arise
due to unknown causes, and result in difficulties establishing responsibility. Consequently,
carriers find themselves in a vulnerable position. Hence, to correct the situation, the industry
dealt with this issue differently and more leniently. Distinguishing the fire exemption with
special treatment. The Hague Rules upheld this tradition. The exemption favored carriers so
long as the loss or damage due to fire was not actually caused by their fault or privity.
Accordingly, imposing a very heavy burden on shippers. Shippers were required to
demonstrate that the fire resulted from the carrier's fault or privity. ill effect a very difficult
task. Cargo owners are not part of the voyage, and thus, do not have access to pertinent
information's regarding the carriers involvement (or not) in the way the loss occurred.
Nonetheless, for the greater good, the fire exception was ultimately accepted as a
. 273
compromIse.
The Hamburg Rules did not depart from this tradition, and like The Hague Rules also
maintained the fires special status.
272 Martine REMOND-GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993 p. 334
« Surtout Ie texte se rapproche d'autres Conventions regissant Ie transport: Varsovie et
Convention routiere CMR, ce qui facilitera I 'harmonisation, Ie jour venu. »
273 Rene RODIERE, Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed , Dalloz,1997,
at p. 386
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" Under art. 4(2)(b) ofThe Hague Rules the carrier was not responsible unless he
was at fault. UNCITRAL at article 5(4) makes two major changes and retains a
defect of the Hague Rules. Firstly, as under the Hague Rules, the claimant must
prove the fault or neglect. This is particularly burdensome because the facts are
available to the carrier and not to the cargo owner. Secondly, the claimant must
prove that the fire only "arose"from the fault or neglect ofthe carrier. Once the fire
starts the carrier is presumably not responsible if it or its servants or agents are
negligent in putting out the fire or preventing it from spreading. Thirdly,
UNCITRAL does extend the fault oj the carrier under the Hague Rules 4(2)(b) to
faults ofthe servants and agents. ,,27
One would think, such anachronism would no longer exist under a modem
regime. However, reality demonstrated otherwise. To the dismay of many, the Hamburg
Rules did not abolish this carrier privilege, so once again, this exception got a special
status. At the center of the Hamburg negotiations, we found the fire issue along with the
error in management and navigation of the ship. To reach some sort of harmony, a
compromise was reached, to maintain the fire exception. The Hamburg Rules fire
provision was thus incorporated with some minor variations. Nonetheless, the main
objective remained the same, and therefore, shippers lost this round.
" The Hamburg fire exception appears to have grown out of a "horse-traders
compromise" proposed by Nigeria, under which the defence ofnegligent navigation
would be removed and the fire exception retained. ,,275
Accordingly, the new Rules were adopted without opposition from any major
maritime nation. As a result, this new system symbolizes evolution and progress in
maritime trade. Except for the fire exemption which does not make sense in modem
maritime law. The fire exemption remained to attain balance in the negotiations and for
consensus to be reached.
274 William TETLEY, ibid.,id. note 271, p. 266
275 R. Glenn BAUER, ibid.,id. note 263, p. 67, Rene RODIERE, Emmanuel de
PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, 12e ed, Dalloz,1997, at p. 386 «L 'incendie, par une
mesure de transaction hfitive et sans valeur, donne lieu a un traitement special, qui
constitue en soi un contresens puisque les Regles ont voulu poser une regIe generale et ne
plus s 'encombrer de cas exceptes et qui paraft se ramener a ceci que l'incendie constitue
une presomption simple favorable au transporteur.»
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Chap 3 - THE EFFECT OF THE HAMBURG RULES
parag 1 - THEIR STRENGTH
Like the adoption of any new convention, the Hamburg Rules were and still are the
object of scrutiny. This new regime will be the subject of many debates, analysis, criticism
and praise. The opinions in favor or against them are endless. Nonetheless, an examination
of a large number of comments, written about them, makes it possible for us to find some
overall agreement. No one can contest that the Hague Rules were outdated and no longer
suited to answer a number of new modern day shipping problems. Thus, the adoption of a
new system was necessary. The Hamburg Rules were therefore the logical step in the
process of modernizing maritime trade. The Rules attempted to update the system, modify
the failures found in the old one, and complete some ofthe obvious lacunas. 276
" The revision ofThe Hague Rules within the UN system was based on a widely held
dissatisfaction with both the substance and the form of the existing law. Although
the needfor a thorough revision was evident to many by the early nineteen sixties,
when the question was discussed within the Comite Maritime International, it was
not until later that the issue became one ofpolitical importance. The fact that the
Visby Rules amounted to a mere face-lifting triggered off the comprehensive
revision which was later undertaken by UNCTAD and UNCITRAL based on a
conviction that the Hague Rules "were being exploited more to evade liability than
to anchor responsibility" ,,277
276 Rene RODIERE, Emmanuel de PONTAVICE, Droit Maritime, l2e ed, Dalloz,1997,
at p. 385, G. Auchter, « La convention sur Ie transport de marchandises par mer (Regles
de Hambourg)>>, Droit Europeen des Transports, vo1.XIV, (1979), 3, S.R. Katz « New
momentum towards entry into force ofthe Hamburg Rules », Droit Europeen des
Transports, 24 (1989), 297
277 Erling SELVIG, ibid.,id. note 256, p. 302
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One of the greatest accomplishments of the Hamburg Rules is the abolition of the
Hague Rules system of liability and their long list ofexemptions. ill particular, the deletion
of the error in the navigation and management of the ship exception, which put an end to
the long and controversial debate over their existence. Furthermore, the simplification of the
carrier basis of liability, based on fault or neglect, has replaced the view that the maritime
transport regime is a privileged one, not resembling other transport carriers.278
The notion that maritime carriers could in many instances escape their liability in
cases of negligence did no longer suit modem maritime ideology. Therefore, eliminating the
Hague exceptions, even if perceived as an excessive move, was the only adequate
alternative.
" Proponents of the Hamburg Rules view them as a welcome change. They assert
that the Hamburg Rules more equitably distribute risk ofloss between carriers and
cargo, particularly with respect to abolishing the nautical fault defense. This
defense alone very well could have been the impetus for the United Nation's
action. ,,279
The Hamburg Rules have also improved the burden of proof issue. No more
uncertainties regarding on whom lies the burden ofproof. The issue under the new Rules is
clearer. Once it has been established that the loss or damage to the goods occurred while
they were in the carriers charge, the carrier has the obligation to show that he was not
negligent or at fault in the cause of loss. Furthermore, the carrier must show that he used the
reasonable means to avoid such loss. Thus, the new system departs from the difficulties that
were symbolic of the previous Hague system. Under Hamburg the carrier's system of
liability is influenced by the other conventions covering the international transport of cargo
278 Roger Clarke, "Cargo Liability Regimes", prepared for the OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development) MTC Maritime Transport Committee,
January 2001, p.17-24, Rolf Herber, "The UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by
Sea, 1978: Hamburg Rules, Its Future and the Demands ofDeveloping Countries", Y.B.
Mar.L. (1984), 81
279 Douglas A. WERTH, " The Hamburg Rules revisited - A look at U.S. options ", v. 221.
Mar I. & Com., (1991), 72
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b . ·1 d d 280yau, raJ. an roa .
Shipper oriented nations expressed the VIew that with a new carrier's liability
regime, and a simplified burden of proof, the number of litigated cases are bound to
decrease, and courts interpretations will be less unpredictable. They further argued that the
HagueNisby system of exoneration led to lower standards ofcare, and uneconomic results.
The Hamburg proponents also stressed the point that the new Rules adoption is not the
result of unprecedented legislation. The Rules were inspired by the HagueNisby Rules, as
well as other international conventions, and thus, reflect a broad spectrum of already known
legal texts, hence, facilitating their interpretation.281
" The Hamburg Rules shift the risk of loss from cargo to carrier in other ways as
well: they place the burden ofproof more firmly upon the carrier; increase the
liability limit; extend the period of time during which the carrier's duties attach;
and double the period during which suit may be brought. In addition, Hamburg
permits recovery for loss or damage caused by delay, and clarifies the
"container!packa;e" and other issues which in the past have helped carriers evade
responsibility. ,,28
On the other hand, the Hamburg Rules are, from a political stand point, a unifying
force. For the first time, all nations, shippers and carriers, decided what will govern their
carriage of goods by sea, gone are the feelings that the maritime industry is led by
shipowning States, regarding their sole interests. In theory, the Hamburg Rules permitted
a political unity that was not achieved with the adoption process of the Hague Rules.
280 The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air October 12, 1929478 D.N.T.S. 371 also known as The Warsaw
Convention. Under the Warsaw Convention the carrier is presumed liable upon simple
proof of damage or loss to the cargo. The International Convention Concerning the
Carriage of Goods by Rail, May 9, 1980 also known a CIM. The Liability system under
the CIM has been assessed to be based on absolute liability, strict liability or system of
liability without fault i.e. art. 27(1). As for the Convention on the Contract for
International Carriage of Goods byRoad, Geneva, May 19,1956 also known as CMR the
basis of liability is a presumption of liability against the carrier once the cargo owner has
established the fact of the loss or damage.
281 Douglas A. WERTH, ibid.,id. note 254, p. 73, Martine REMOND-GOUILLOUD,
Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993 p. 333
282 Douglas A. WERTH, ibid.,id_ note 254, p. 72
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This convention took into consideration the interests of developing States along
with those of shipowning States. At once unifying (in theory) interests relating to carriage
of goods by sea. Moreover departing from the disapproving feeling developing States
expressed all those years. 283
" ... the developing countries have become increasingly active in international co-
operation, also in the field of transport. As a rule these countries take a skeptical
attitude towards conventions in the making ofwhich they had no say, and the Hague
Rules were no exception. In addition, Western shipowners have for a long time,
through the liner conferences, dominated the carriage ofgeneral cargo to andfrom
developing countries. It is not surprising, therefore, that these countries were
inclined to regard the Hague Rules as a convention by which a number ofprivileges
had been bestowed upon the shipowners in charge oftheir foreign trade transport.
From this point of view a revision of the Hague Rules was needed in order to
redress inequities in international law and to establish a liability regime for
carriage by sea in conformity with acceptedprinciples ofjustice. ,,284
283 Martine REMOND-GOUILLOUD, Droit Maritime, 2e edition, Pedone, 1993 p. 333
and 340, Report to Parliament on the Carriage ofGoods by Water Act, Transport Canada,
December 1999, p.3-4
284 Erling SELVIG, ibid.,id note 238, p. 303-304, Rolf HERBER, " The UN Convention
on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978: Hamburg Rules, Its Future and the Demands of
Developing Countries", Y B Mar L (1984), 81, Stephen ZAMORA, "Carrier Liability
For Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport", 23 Am T Comp Ie, (1975) 391
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parag 2 - THEIR SHORTCOMING
In practice, the Hamburg Rules are not universally accepted. Their adoption was
gradual, ifnot slow. The adopting members are mostly developing States thus, making it, a
shipper dominated convention285 . Industrialized States have shown no hurry to adhere the
new system, and in the process kept their opposition and criticism well known.286
" Although many shippers have always individually favored the Hamburg Rules,
they were, until recently, not sufficiently organized to present their case effectively.
By contrast, the opponents of the Convention have been well organized and
effectively campaigned against it. They have traditionally included the closely-knit
fraternity of ocean carriers, concerned that the shift in the allocation ofrisks and
responsibilities effected by the Hamburg Rules would increase their costs and thus
add to the commercial pressure to which they were already subject... ,,287
Thus, opponents of the convention managed to install doubts in governments
regarding the effect such adherence would have on their national interests. Therefore, the
Hamburg Rules were and still are the subject of opposition. One of the arguments against
the Hamburg Rules refers to their new basis of liability at art. 5(1). The objection is based
on the fact that the basis of liability is new and has never been tested before. Thus,
interpretation will not be so simple, it will lead to unnecessary and expensive litigation due
to more confusing and unclear provisions. Consequently, opponents feel it is not very smart
to leave one uncertain system the "Hague" for another "Hamburg".288
285 Please refer to Annex B for a list of membership to The Hamburg Rules
286 Report to Parliament on the Carriage ofGoods by Water Act, Transport Canada,
December 1999, p.8 "Only three OECD countries have ratified the Hamburg Rules
(Austria, Czech Republic and Hungary) while nine countries do not plan to ratify them
(Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Korea, Poland) and eight countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden) would consider ratification if there ere sufficient
number ofcountries in favour ofthe Rules. "
287 Stephen R. KATZ, "New momentum towards the entry into force of the Hamburg
Rules ", (1989) 24 European Transport law, , 298-99
288 John A. MAHER, Joan D. MAHER, "Marine Transport, Cargo Risks, and the
Hamburg Rules: Rationalization or Imagery?" (1980) 84 Djck L Rev., 183, George F.
CHANDLER, "A Comparison of COGSA, the HagueNisbyRules, and the Hamburg
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" They see the Hamburg Rules as more confusing and less clear than the
alternatives, and believe that the adC;Jl/ion of the Hamburg Rules would lead to
unnecessary and expensive litigation.' 89
Therefore, some prefer to stay with a system that they already know, the idea being,
to avoid uncertainty, expensive and unnecessary litigation, confusing and less clear
provisions, exacerbating a double insurance expense, higher costs in liability insurance.
" Long-term predictability would suffer because the Hamburg Rules make claims
,290
more dependent on fact and less dependent on the law. '
Rules" (1984) 15 I Mar L & Com, 233, Birch F. REYNARDSON, "The Implications on
Liability Insurance ofthe Hamburg Rules" in The Hamburg Rules 1-2, Lloyd's ofLondon
Seminar Sep 28, 1978, Thomas CHENAL, "Uniform Rules for a Combined Transport
Document in light of the Proposed Revision ofthe Hague Rules" (1978) 20 Ariz L Rev.
975, Stephen ZAMORA, "Carrier Liability For Damage or Loss to Cargo in International
Transport", (1975) 23 Am I Camp L, 391, Robert HELLAWELL, "Less-Developed
Countries and Developed Country Law: Problems for the Law ofAdmiralty" (1968) 7
Colurn I Transnat'l T, 203, Michael F. STURLEY, " Changing Liability Rules and Marine
Insurance:Conflicting Empirical Argument about Hague, Visby, and Hamburg in a Vacuum
ofEmpirical Evidence"", (1993) 24 I Marl, & Com 1, 120
289 Michael F. STURLEY, ibid.,idnote 18, p. 121
290 John O. HONNOLD, ibid.,id note 46, p. 105
135
This view has been supported by a number of authors291 . It has been demonstrated
that the Hague Rules regime has achieved some sort of certainty in their results, and this
would no longer be under the new Hamburg regime. For example, in the known case of
Yawata Iron & Steel v. Anthony Shippinl92 the court found that error in the navigation was
the cause of loss, since the master of the ship opted to go forward, in time of severe wind
and storm. The result was failure of one of the ship hatches, water entering the ship, and
eventually sinking it. Under Hague, the carrier is exonerated under the error in the
navigation defense. However, under Hamburg the outcome is uncertain. It will depend on
the court's interpretation of the facts at hand.293
" Under the Hamburg Rules, this case might go either way. Negligence of the
master would no longer be a defense, but his error may have been only an error in
judgment. The issue would become whether he acted in all ways "reasonably"
required under the circumstances. ,,294
291 William TETLEY, "The Hamburg Rules: A Commentary", (1979) T.loyd's Mar I
Com.L.Q. 4, Stephen R. KATZ, " New momentum towards the entry into force of the
Hamburg Rules ", (1989) 24 European Transport law, , 298-99, John A. MAHER, Joan D.
MAHER, "Marine Transport, Cargo Risks, and the Hamburg Rules: Rationalization or
Imagery?" (1980) 84 Djck I. Rey., 183, George F. CHANDLER, "A Comparison of
COGSA, the HagueNisby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules" (1984) 15 I Mar I. & Com,
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CHENAL, "Uniform Rules for a Combined Transport Document in light of the Proposed
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Comp I" 391, Robert HELLAWELL, "Less-Developed Countries and Developed
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292 1975 AMC 1602, 1976 AMC 2685
293 R. Glenn BAUER, ibid.,id note 263, p. 61
294 R. Glenn BAUER, ibid.,id note 263, p. 61
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This case is only one example among many, demonstrating that ambiguities and
uncertainties in the law have not miraculously vanished. The application of the Hamburg
Rules will face contradiction in the outcome of carriage by sea cases. The irony lays in the
fact that the adoption of the new regime was the answer to unclarity, ambiguity and
confusion that existed in the old system. However, the Hamburg Rules solution has not
painted a brighter picture. Hence, giving the impression that all the previous efforts were for
nothing.
/I The new Rules are not just an amendment ofthe Hague Rules. They are a totally
new cargo convention expressed in novel and unclear language unknown to the
maritime law. Far from imitating the pragmatism of the Hague Rules with their
limited objectives, the new Rules would cover virtually the whole topic of the
carriage ofgoods by sea. The drawback to the adoption of the Hamburg Rules is
that the maritime community would be throwing away the work ofclarification done
by the courts over the years and would be creating uncertainty and ambiguity in
areas where none existed before. ,,295
Furthermore, opponents argue that the new Rules are the result of the "economic
warfare mentality of the developing States". They express the opinion that such Rules
overlook existing laws, they are revolutionary and too radical, and consequently, will lead to
higher conflicts and litigation costs. 296
Another criticism ofthe new Rules is the fact that they abandoned the seaworthiness
theory, as well as all of the listed carrier defences. According to the Hamburg opponents,
the problem lies in the fact that most defences and carriers duties have already been
interpreted by the courts, therefore, to overlook their work would only lead, again, to
unnecessary years ofconfusion.
295 Anthony DIAMOND, ibid.,id. note 218, p. 118
296 Douglas A. WERTH, ibid.,id note 254, p. 64
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Introducing a new system of liability (art. 5(1) of the new Rules), will bring the
maritime industry to " ground zero and require many settled questions under Hague and
Visby to be re-litigated." Furthermore, the new Rules and their ambiguous standard of care,
based on reasonableness, will surely lead to a greater number of conflicts and confusion.297
The Hamburg Rules have also been faulted for increasing the overall insurance
costs. Opponent's view is that even if the shift in risk of loss to carriers will lead to higher
Protection & Indemnity (P&I) insurance costs, it does not necessarily imply that cargo
insurance rates will consequently be reduced. Thus, in the end increasing the consumer
costs. Another negative aspect of the Hamburg Rules is reflected in the vagueness that
marks the meaning of the new basis of liability. According to some authors298, the wording
of the new convention can lead to different understanding. In some legal jurisdictions, it
might be interpreted as a system based on the presumption of fault or neglect. However, in
other jurisdictions it might be interpreted as an objective or strict liability system. Therefore,
giving rise to a new wave of uncertainties. Consequently, opponents of the new system
refuse to adhere to it and keep campaigning against it.
A major argument against the Hamburg Rules is their minimal economic impact on
world trade in comparison to the Hague and HagueNisby regime. In Canada, the value of
trade with countries that adopted the Hamburg Rules is only 3%, more than 50% of
Canadian maritime trade is with countries that maintain either the Hague Rules i.e. the
US299 or the HagueNisby Rules.30o
297 Douglas A. WERTH, ibid.,idnote 254, p. 71
298 George F. CHANDLER, "A Comparison of COGSA, the HagueNisby Rules, and the
Hamburg Rules" (1984) 15 I Mar 1. & Com, 233, Birch F. REYNARDSON, "The
Implications on Liability Insurance of the Hamburg Rules" in The Hamburg Rules 1-2,
Lloyd's of London Seminar Sep 28, 1978,
299 Maritime Transportation System, An Assessment of the U.S. Marine Transportation
System A Report to Congress, September 1999 " The United States is the world's most
active trading nation, accountingfor 1 billion metric tons or nearly 20 percent ofthe
annual world oceanborne overseas trade. "
300 Please refer to Annex D for a chart ofPercentage of Canadian Waterborne, Trade and
Legislation on Carriage of Goods Implemented by Canada's Trading Partners, Report to
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CONCLUSION
In the last few decades, maritime law has been going through various refonns and
major changes. Today, the shipping industry faces three (or two if one considers the Hague
and HagueNisby as one and the same regime) carriage of goods by sea regimes, the Hague
or HagueNisby Rules and the new Hamburg Rules. Since the beginning of the century, the
maritime industry, with the help of a number of international and national organizations,
have been working toward "one goal", the adoption of a universal convention regulating
maritime trade.
From the onset, the objective was to reach acceptability, predictability, certainty,
clarity and unanimity among all the parties involved i.e. shippers, carriers and insurers. In an
ideal world, we could hope for and even succeed in reaching the desired goal of fulfilling
the expectations of all parties involved. However, in the maritime industry, as in any other
industry, we can only deal with what is, and not what should have been, i.e. the "practical
reality" we all must face. Hence, time and experience have demonstrated that such an
idealistic goal could not be attained. However, for a time, the Hague Rules were considered
the universal convention regulating maritime matters. Their adoption in the early twentieth
century represented a great evolution and progress in the maritime shipping world.
Parliament on the Carriage ofGoods by Water Act, Transport Canada, December 1999,
p.8 " To sum up, the Hamburg Rules have not contributed to the harmonious development
ofa widely accepted international regime on cargo liability as the supporters ofthe Rules
expected in the early years following their adoption ... The recent developments in
international law on cargo liability, the stagnant position ofthe Hamburg Rules
internationally and their minimal impact on Canadian seaborne trade, make the decision
to move to the Hamburg Rules less likely. "
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For the first time, a mandatory convention was going to regulate affairs of carriage
by sea. This was a novelty in such an old industry, whose working was based on customs
and the freedom ofcontract basis. Thus, it seemed natural to praise such an accomplishment
and indeed no one can contest that in those days, it was an accomplishment. In the early
nineteen hundreds, the maritime world was faced with the problem of bills of lading
exception clauses. Shipowners were in control. Standard type bills of lading exonerated
carriers from almost all imaginable causes ofloss.
Shippers were at a low point, disadvantaged and with no means to counter such
power. As a result, the goal of the Hague and Hamburg Rules was to apportion cargo losses
between all parties involved, and to further, attain a balance among their responsibilities.
Thus, Hague Rules article 3, set the carriers standard ofcare and basis ofresponsibility. The
concepts of seaworthiness and due diligence were inserted, imposing mandatory duties on
carriers. Duties that could no longer be escapable. Furthermore, the Rules imposed certain
pre-requisite duties on carriers before they could make use of any available exoneration.
Thus, Hague Rules article ID(l) is a pre-requisite to art. IV (2) and its list ofexceptions. The
seaworthiness and due diligence concepts, two of the most important aspects found in the
Hague Rules, represented the pre-requisite for discharging the carriers responsibilities. All
of those duties were tried and retried, and hence, over-time, were no longer abstract
concepts.
The 1924 convention was a great innovator. For the first time in maritime history,
an international convention limited the carriers practice of exemption. Article Ill(S) of the
Hague Rules regulated the issue in clear and simple terms. Any exemption clause found
to be contrary to the Rules would be null and void. The aim was to change the pattern of
abuse that existed and promote fairness and balance between shippers and carriers.
Carrier's rights and immunities are expressed in art. IV of The Rules. Here again, the
convention outlines the importance of the carriers responsibilities found in art. III by
restating them in art. IV(1). Only after discharging such duties, are carriers allowed to
follow with the use of available defences (art. IV (2».
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No one can argue the fact that Art. IV (2) of the Hague Rules was and still is the
object of heated debates and criticism. Regardless of this fact, the Hague Rules still
managed to limit the carriers immunities to 17 listed defences. However, many still found it
to be too much, and consequently, the Rules became known as carrier oriented.
Nonetheless, the enormous caseload on the issue has demonstrated that escaping
liability was far from simple. Furthermore, in practice the Rules achieved some sort of fair
balance and predictability. A number of supporters went even further, expressing the view
that the Rules achieved a certain degree of certainty and universality. Consequently, it
appeared useless to have to start all over again With the adoption ofa new convention. Thus,
the solution according to some was to modify the Hague Rules. The Visby amendments
were therefore an attempt to modify and at the same time quiet the mounting criticism over
the regime. However, the modifications were far from what was necessary and expected.
They did not address a number of important issues such as the carrier's system of
responsibility and immunity, as well as the burden of proof and conflict of jurisdictions
among others.
On the one hand, the result brought cargo interests greater dissatisfaction with the
present system. On the other hand, this failure encouraged the implementation of a new
convention, and the momentum to go forward with their plans for change. They argued that
the Hague Rules were no longer fit for modem time's maritime industry and its advanced
technology. They further argued that the system's basis of liability was archaic and did not
suit the needs ofall parties concerned.
The Hague Rules list of exceptions and in particular the error in management and
navigation of the ship defense could no longer be tolerated or justified. Furthermore,
proponents for change argued that the Hague system lacked cohesion, clarity and
predictability on a majority of issues. They stressed the point that the rules were ambiguous
and uncertain in particular on the burden of proof issue, and also on the interpretation to be
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given to a number of defences and obligations.
Furthermore, since the adoption of the Hague Rules was the consequence of
industrialized maritime States at work, developing countries did not have a say in their
creation, and therefore, resented their adoption and applicability. Those States campaigned
for a new convention, one in which they would have a say, and one that also answered some
of their own concerns and represented their interests. The Hamburg Rules were the solution.
The consequence of developing countries at work. They were in direct response to the
growing dissatisfaction with the Hague regime.
The UN's UNCTAD and UNCITRAL were therefore called in. Their involvement
and hard work made it possible for the Hamburg Rules to be implemented. The UN's
participation gave them formal international coverage and acceptability. It further
legitimized their adoption. Consequently, the adoption of the Hamburg Rules modernized
the transit of cargo by ships. They replace the Hague Rules as well as clarify and simplify
maritime shipping matters. It abolished the list of available defences as well as the
seaworthiness/due diligence theory. It also changed the carrier basis of liability and clarified
the burden of proof questions. It shifted the risk of loss from shippers to carriers, evening
the balance between the parties and getting the approval of developing countries. It also
adapted maritime transport to all other types of transport.
No longer will exoneration, in cases of fault or neglect, be accepted. The new
system is based on the presumption of fault or neglect. This issue is made clear in article
5(1) of the Hamburg Rules, which states that the carrier will be held responsible for the loss
or damage to the goods under his charge, until he proves he was not at fault and that he used
the reasonable required measures to avoid such loss or damage. According to C.W.H.
Goldie:
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" ... it is probable that Article 5 ofthe Hamburg Rules, imposing
liability on the shipowner unless he can prove that he was not at fault, will increase the
already considerable difficulties facing the ship owner defending a large claim.
Even if, as mentioned earlier, the defences now available are often not of much help in
practice, the removal ofthose defences weakens the ship owner's position; the possibility of
successful reliance on Article 4 Rule 2 of the Hague Rules has in the past at least
encouraged cargo interests to accept reasonable settlements. ,,301
Except for the fire defence, which imposes the burden of proof on the cargo owner,
the new Rules are a step in the right direction. They represent the necessary evolution that
the Hague Rules and their modification did not attain. They adapted the realities of modem
maritime trade and eliminated the elements that were no longer tolerable in today's industry.
Many express the view that the adoption of a new convention can only lead to
greater litigation, more interpretations and thus, to confusion and uncertainties. As a result,
it will be like stepping back to the early nineteen hundreds. With the added disadvantage of
losing half a century of experience and judicial interpretation. On the other hand, reality has
also shown that even if in some cases predictability was achieved, it was expectable within
such an enormous caseload. However, no one will contradict that no overall unanimity has
been reached, controversy remains and the technological evolution factor has not been
resolved. Whether we agree with the new regime or not, we cannot refute that The Hague
Rules needed some modernizing.
301 C.W.H. GOLDIE, " Effect ofthe Hamburg Rules on shipowners'
liability insurance", v. 24 I Mar 1. & Com, (1993), 114
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Nonetheless, their merits cannot be forgotten. They reflected the realities of
maritime trade of the early twentieth century and they answered a number of pressing
concerns, one of which was the bills of lading exoneration clauses problem. However, over
the years, the needs ofmaritime trade have progressed and with them the need to adapt their
regulation. Thus, The Hague Rules were not able to answer this evolution, and therefore the
necessity to adopt a new system became urgent. Shipping states wanted a new regime, they
did not want to modify the existing Hague Rules and their modified version the Visby
Protocol. Trying to modify the existing system has not been successful in the past,
accordingly the solution seemed to point toward the adoption of a totally new system,
detached from past perception of favoritism and dissatisfaction. Hence, as of November 1,
1992, with the adhesion of the required 20 States, the Hamburg Rules came into force.
Consequently, today's maritime world faces three applicable conventions.
The question on everyone's mind is, which system should be the one to lead? Until
everyone agrees on the acceptable solution, if ever, we will have to face an industry being
regulated by three systems.302 As we have seen, all systems seek the same objective to
legislate the carriage of goods by sea in a fair and equitable manner and to the satisfaction of
all parties concerned. These systems are based on fault or neglect and also aim to apportion
the risk of loss between carriers and shippers, in a balanced way. However, the actual
working of a regime can only be known over time. Thus, it is easier to conclude on the
faults and merits of the Hague Rules (and HagueNisby) since we are facing over fifty years
of its application, rather than the Hamburg Rules which has not been put to the practical test
much.
302 Report to Parliament on the Carriage ofGoods by Water Act, Transport Canada,
December 1999, p.l0 " The international shipping community stands today at crossroads
between the Hague/Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and, increasingly, a plethora of
national regimes. "
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Nonetheless, a few observations are appropriate to make. The Hamburg Rules are
more suitable for modem maritime shipping needs, they expanded into areas that Hague did
not cover. They are more representative of all interests involved. For the fIrst time
developing States are in unanimous agreement over a maritime convention that regulates
them. The Rules have therefore gone beyond the scope of possibilities available under the
Hague or HagueNisby Rules. According to D.A. Werth:
" If any consensus can be reached regarding this whole business ofHague, Visby
and Hamburg, perhaps it is this: that the Hague Rules are no longer sufficient to
meet the demands of modern conditions of ocean carriage; that the Visby
Amendments standing alone are some improvement; and that the Hamburg Rules
are a mixed bag of improvements and regressions. Beyond these points, there is
little agreement. ,,30
Ultimately, these maritime conventions seek to achieve international unanimity.
But, since there will always be shippers, carriers and insurers, and since their interests will
always differ or be in conflict with one another, there can never be a convention that will
completely satisfy all parties. To wish and hope for such a convention is unrealistic.
The Hamburg Rules are far from being universally accepted.304 Nevertheless, over
time, there is a possibility of greater cohesion and acceptance, then there was under the
Hague Regime.
303 Douglas A. WERTH, ibid.,id note 254, p. 69
304 Report to Parliament on the Carriage ofGoods by Water Act, Transport Canada,
December 1999, p.8 "Only three OECD countries have ratified the Hamburg Rules
(Austria, Czech Republic and Hungary) while nine countries do not plan to ratify them
(Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Korea, Poland) and eight countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden) would consider ratification if there ere sufficient
number ofcountries in favour ofthe Rules. "
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" None of the many proposals of the past century has been free from controversy.
Some were so controversial that they were never enacted. The Hague Rules were so
controversial in the United States that it took Congress twelve years to enact them.
The Visby Amendments have given us a quarter century ofcontroversy, with no end
in sight. And the Hamburg Rules have been controversial practically since the
United Nations first began work on them over twenty years ago. Throughout this
century ofcontroversy, certain arFments have reappeared virtually every time that
the subject has been discussed. ,,30
Hence, with or without controversy, the Hamburg Rules do represent the best
alternative for today's maritime carriage of goods by sea. No one claims that the Rules are
perfect or that they will not have to face a period of transition or that courts as well as the
parties involved will all have to get adjusted to them. Undoubtedly, there will be problems
of interpretations and a certain period of confusion. However, it is only natural that the
adoption of any new legislation will be marked by a period of uncertainty. Regardless of
these facts, the Hamburg Rules are currently the only viable choice for today's maritime
industry. It may not be the best choice, but it is the only acceptable one the industry has at
this time.
Whether coveted or not, at some point, everyone will be faced with a choice to
make. Some nations are more innovative and will therefore progress at a faster pace,
others who need more time, will move at a slower pace. At whatever speed they change,
there is no way to avoid evolution; it will always catch up with everyone. The Hamburg
Rules caught up with some, and the rest will have to follow, at their own time and pace or
take up a new regime altogether. A new regime that departs from Hamburg or the original
Hague Rules and their modified version the Hague / Visby Rules or once again opt for a
regime that favours the route ofreform.
305 Michael F. STURLEY, ibid.,id note 18, p. 120
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Thus the US is one example of a state that would like to adopt a new regime based
on reforming the Hague Rules by adjusting to current maritime realities covered in the
Hamburg Rules. Australia is also working on a system based on combining elements from
both the HagueNisby and Hamburg Rules.306 Thus, even in the eventuality that the
Hamburg rules end up not being universally adopted, they will remain as a model for future
regImes.
306 Roger Clarke, "Cargo Liability Regimes", prepared for the OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development) MTC Maritime Transport Committee,
January 2001, p. 11 "There are at present at least three international regimes ofmaritime
cargo liability inforce in different countries ofthe world - the original Hague rules
(1924), the updated version known as the Hague-Visby rules (1968,further amended
1979), and the Hamburg rules (1978). The principal country with a system still based on
the original Hague Rules is the United States. Most ofthe other major trading nations of
North and Central America, Europe, the Far East and Australia, and south Africa, follow
the Hague-Visby rules or an adaptation ofthem .... There is, however, considerable
dissatisfaction with each ofthese regimes - with Hague and Hague Visby because they
are often seen as in need ofmodernization and as too restricted in scope, and with all
three because ofdisagreement over the substance. Over recent years, in the absence ofan
approach to these difficulties that commands widespread international agreement,
countries have tried to deal with them nationally in different ways; ... The Nordic
Maritime Code, for example, in force in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden,
incorporate a number offeatures ofthe Hamburg rules, although the four countries
continue to regard themselves as part ofthe Hague- Visby system ... there are now moves
in the United States to bring in a new national regime there to replace the legislation of
1936 based on the Hague Rules. "
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Historical Chart: Carriage ofGoods by Sea Responsibility and Liability regimes
1873
1882
1885
1893
1897
1905
1921
1924
1968
1978
1993
1994
The International Law Association was
founded, to prepare a "code of international
law."
Liverpool Conference, attempt to prepare a
draft model Bill of Lading known as the
"Conference form"
The International Law Association proposed a
set of rules that parties could voluntarily
incorporate by reference into their bills of
lading (known as the Hamburg Rules of
affreightment)
The US Harter Act
CMI (Comite Maritime International was
founded)
CMI first diplomatic conference on maritime
law, CMI began preparatory work on the laws
concerning carriage ofgoods by sea
General secretary of the Maritime
Law Committee of the International
Law Association attempts to draft a uniform
bill of lading i.e. Lloyd's list article
The adoption of the Hague Rules by the
International Law Association
The adoption of the Hague Visby Rules
The adoption of the Hamburg Rules
1993 COGWA, Canadian attempt to adopt the
Hamburg Rules (today does not longer seem
likely), China introduced a new civil code of
Maritime Law, it includes elements from
HagueNisby and Hamburg.
The Scandinavian states (Denmark,Finland
Norway and Sweden) adopted the Nordic Code
a combination ofHagueNisby and Hamburg,
Historical Chart: Carriage of Goods by Sea Responsibility and Liability regimes
1994
1995
1997
1998/1999
199912001
and OECD (Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development) MTC
(Maritime Transport Committee) held a "tour
de table" for an exchange of views for a
coordinated approach to the adoption of the
Hamburg Rules.
CMI (Comite Maritime International) made a
survey of national maritime associations on the
future of the Hamburg Rules
( doc.DSTIlSI/MTC (95) 15)
Australia modified its COGWA, including
some elements from the Hamburg Rules
COGSA 98 & COGSA 99 US attempt to adopt
a modified version of the Hague Rules
CMI & OECD (Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development) MTC
(Maritime Transport Committee) are back
trying to find a solution to cargo liability
ANNEXB
Membership list to the Hague, Hague Visby and Hamburg Rules
Countries
Hague rules (1924) HagueNisby Hamburg Rules
Rules(l968) (1978)
Afghanistan - - -
Albania - - -
Algeria X - -
Angola X - -
Antigua and Barbuda X - -
Argentina X - -
Armenia - - -
Australia - + -
Austria - - X
Azerbaijan -
-
-
Bahamas X - -
Bangladesh - - -
Barbados X - X
Belarus - - -
Belgium - + -
Belize X - -
Benin - - -
Bolivia X - -
Bosnia X - -
Botswana - - X
Brazil - - -
Brunei - - -
Bulgaria - - -
Burkina - - X
Burma - - -
Cambodia - - -
Canada - + -
Chad - - -
Chile - - X
China - - -
Colombia - - -
Congo X - -
Croatia X - -
Cuba X - -
Cyprus X - -
Denmark - + -
Dominica - - -
Ecuador - X -
Egypt - - X
EI Salvador - - -
Ethiopia - - -
Fiji X - -
Finland - + -
France - + -
Membership list to the Hague, Hague Visby and Hamburg Rules
Gabon - . -
Gambia X - -
Georgia - - -
Gennany - = -
Ghana X - -
Greece - + -
Grenada X - -
Guatemala - - -
Guinea - - -
Guyana X - X
Iceland - - -
India = - -
Indonesia - - -
Iran X - -
Iraq - - -
Ireland X - -
Israel X - -
Italy . + -
Ivory Coast X - -
Jamaica X - -
Japan - + -
Jordan - - -
Kazakhstan - - -
Kenya X - X
Kiribati X - -
Kuwait X - -
Laos- - - -
Latvia - X -
Lebanon - - X
Lesotho - - X
Liberia - = -
Libya - - -
Liechtenstein - - -
Lithuania - - -
Luxembourg - + -
Macedonia X - -
Madagascar X - -
Malawi - - X
Malaysia = - -
Mali - - -
Malta - - -
Mauritius X - -
Mexico - - X
Moldavia - - -
Monaco X - -
Mongolia - - -
Morocco - - X
Membership list to the Hague, Hague Visby and Hamburg Rules
Namibia - - -
Nauru X - -
Nepal - - -
Netherlands X = -
Niger - - -
Nigeria X - -
New Zealand - + -
North Korea - - -
Norway - + -
Oman - - -
Pakistan - - -
Papua-No Guinea X - -
P X - -
Peru X - -
Philippines - - -
Poland - + -
Portugal X - -
Qatar - . -
Romania - - X
Russia - - -
Rwanda - - -
St Kitts-Nevis X - -
St Lucia X - -
St-Vincent X - -
Salomon lsI. X - -
SamoaOcc. - - -
Saudi Arabia - - -
Senegal - - X
Seychelles X - -
Sierra Leone - - X
Singapore - X -
Slovakia - - -
Slovenia X - -
Somalia X - -
Spain - + -
Sri Lanka - X -
South Africa - = -
South Korea - - -
Sudan - - -
Suriname - - -
Swaziland - - -
Sweden - + -
Switzerland - + -
Syria - X -
Tadiikistan - - -
Taiwan = - -
Tanzania - - X
Membership list to the Hague, Hague Visby and Hamburg Rules
Thailand - - -
Togo - - -
Tonga - X -
Trinidad & Tobago X - -
Tunisia - - X
Turkey X - -
Turkmenistan - - -
Tuvalu X - -
Uganda - - X
Ukraine - - -
United Arab Emirates - - -
United Kingdom X + -
Uruguay - - -
USA X - -
Uzbekhistan - - -
Vanuatu - - -
Yemen - - -
Yugoslavia X - -
Zaire - - -
Zambia - - -
Zimbabwe - - -
- not ratified
X ratified
+ ratified the protocol SDR too
= not ratified, but the country applies a national law
Source: InfoMare, November - 7- 2001
Http://www.infomare.it/dbase/convuk.htrn
ANNEXC
Comparison of the Hague / Hague -Visby Rules and the Hamburg rules
Applicability
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules
Applies to contracts for the carriage of goods
by sea that are evidenced by a bill of lading or
a similar document of title, if:
1. The bill is issued in a Contracting State;
2. The carriage is from a port in a Contracting
State; or
3. The contract States that these rules apply.
Does not apply to charter-parties.
Scope of Coverage
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules
Covers the period of time when the goods are
loaded on the ship to the time they are
discharged from the ship. (Tackle-to-Tackle).
Hamburg Rules
Applies to all contracts for the carriage of
goods by sea between two States,if:
1. The port of loading is in a Contracting State;
2. The port ofdelivery is in a Contracting
State;
3. The contract of carriage is issued in a a
Contracting State; or the contract of carriage
States that these rules apply. Does not apply
to charter-parties
Hamburg Rules
Covers the period during which the carrier is
in charge of the goods at the port of loading,
during the carriage, and at the port of
discharge. Carrier is deemed to be in charge of
the goods at the time of receipt of goods to the
time ofdelivery. (Port-to-Port)
Carrier LiabilitylDuty of Care
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules Hamburg Rules
The carrier must exercise due diligence to:
1. To make the ship seaworthy;
2. Properly man, equip and supply the ship;
3. Make the parts of the ship in which goods
are carried, fit and safe for the receipt, carriage
and preservation of the goods.
The carrier shall properly load, handle, stow,
carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods
carried.
The carrier is liable for loss, damage, or delay
in delivery of goods, if the loss occurred while
the goods were under the carrier's charge,
unless the carrier proves that he, his servant or
agents took all measures that could reasonably
be required to avoid the occurrence and its
consequences. (loss or damage) i.e. The
reasonable man test.
Comparison of the Hague I Hague -Visby Rules and the Hamburg rules
Carrier Defenses to Liability
HaguelHague-Visby Rules
Loss or damage resulting from:
1. Unseaworthiness (but the carrier must show
that the unseaworthiness did not result from
carrier's lack of due diligence)
2. Error in navigation or management of the
ship
3. Fire (unless caused by fault of carrier)
4. Perils, dangers and accidents of the sea
5. Act of God
6. Act of war
7. Act of public enemies
8. Arrest or restraint of princes, rulers or
people, or seizure under legal process
9. Quarantine restrictions
10. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of
the goods, his agents or representative
11. Strike, Lockouts, stoppage or restraint
12. Riots and civil commissions
13. Saving or attempting to save life or
property at sea
14. Wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss
or damage arising from inherent defect,
quality or vice of the goods
15. Insufficiency of packing,insufficiency or
inadequacy of marks
16. Latent defects not discoverable by due
diligence
17. Any other cause arising without the actual
fault or privity ofthe carrier or its agents or
servants but the carrier bears the burden of
proof to show it was not at fault
Hamburg Rules
The carrier must prove that he, his servants or
agent took all measures that could reasonably
be required to avoid the occurrence and its
consequences
Source: The National Industrial Transportation League, Comparison of the Hamburg Rules,
Hague-Visby Rules, and the MLA Proposal to Reform the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA), Summary ofProposed Changes to COGSA, Nicholas J. DiMichael, Karyn A. Booth,
Jan 25,2001
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THE HAGUE-VISBY RULES
THE HAGUE RULES AS AMENDED BY THE BRUS-
SELS PROTOCOL 1968
Article I
In these Rules the following words are employed, with the meanings set out below:
(a) 'Carrier' includes the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a •
shipper.
(b) 'Contract ofcarriage' applies only to contracts ofcarriage covered by a bill of lading or any 5
similar document of title, in so far as such document relates to the carriage of goods by sea,
including any bill of lading or any similar document as aforesaid issued under or pursuant to a
charter party from the moment at which such bill of lading or similar document of title regulates
the relations between a carrier and a holder of the same.
(c) 'Goods' includes goods, wares, merchandise, and articles of every kind whatsoever except 6
live animals and cargo which by the contract of carriage is stated as being carried on deck and
is so carried.
(d) 'Ship' means any vessel used for the carriage of goods by sea.
(e) 'Carriage of goods' covers the period from the time when the goods are loaded on to the g
time they are discharged from the ship.
Article II
Subject to the provisions of Article VI, under every contract of carriage of goods by sea the 10
carrier, in relation to the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care and discharge of
such goods, shall be subject to the responsibilities and liabilities and entitled to the rights and
immunities hereinafter set forth.
Article III
"
1. The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence 12
to:
(a) Make the ship seaworthy; 13
(b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship; I.
(c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which 15
goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.
2. Subject to the provisions of Article IV, the carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle, 16
stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried.
1
3. After receiving the goods into his charge the carrier or the master or agent ofthe carrier shall, 17
on demand of the shipper, issue to the shipper a bill oflading showing among other things:
(a) The leading marks necessary for identification of the goods as the same are furnished in 18
writing by the shipper before the loading ofsuch goods starts, provided such marks are stamped
or otherwise shown clearly upon the goods if uncovered, or on the cases or coverings in which
such goods are contained, in such a manner as should ordinarily remain legible until the end of
the voyage.
(b) Either the number of packages or pieces, or the quantity, or weight, as the case may be, as 19
furnished in writing by the shipper.
(c) The apparent order and condition of the goods. 20
Provided that no carrier, master or agent of the carrier shall be bound to state or show in the bill 21
of lading any marks, number, quantity or weight which he has reasonable ground for suspecting
not accurately to represent the goods actually received. or which he has had no reasonable
means of checking.
4. Such a bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of the goods 22
as therein described in accordance with paragraph 3 (a), (b) and (c). However, proof to the
contrary shall not be admissible when the bill of lading has been transferred to a third party
acting in good faith.
5. The shipper shall be deemed to have guaranteed to the carrier the accuracy at the time of 2J
shipment of the marks, number, quantity and weight, as furnished by him, and the shipper
shall indemnify the carrier against all loss, damages and expenses arising or resulting from
inaccuracies in such particulars. The right of the carrier to such indemnity shall in no way
limit his responsibility and liability under the contract of carriage to any person other than the
shipper.
6. Unless notice of loss or damage and the general nature of such loss or damage be given in 24
writing to the carrier or his agent at the port of discharge before or at the time of the removal
of the goods into the custody of the person entitled to delivery thereof under the contract of
carriage, or, if the loss or damage be not apparent, within three days, such removal shall be
prima facie ~vidence ofthe delivery by the carrier of the goods as described in the bill of lading.
The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the goods has, at the time of their receipt, 2.S
been the subject ofjoint surveyor inspection.
Subject to paragraph 6bis the carrier and the ship shall in any event be discharged from all 26
liability whatsoever in respect of the goods, unless suit is brought within one year of their
delivery or of the date when they should have been delivered. This period, may however, be
extended if the parties so agree after the cause ofaction has arisen.
In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage the carrier and the receiver shall give 27
all reasonable facilities to each other for inspecting and tallying the goods.
6 bis. An action for indemnity against a third person may be brought even after the expiration of 28
the year provided for in the preceding paragraph if brought within the time allowed by the law
2
of the Court seized of the case. However, the time allowed shall be not less than three months,
commencing from the day when the person bringing such action for indemnity has settled the
claim or has been served with process in the action against himself.
7, After the goods are loaded the bill of lading to be issued by the carrier, master, or agent of 29
the carrier, to the shipper shall, if the shipper so demands be a 'shipped' bill oflading, provided
that if the shipper shall have previously taken up any docwnent of title to such goods, he shall
surrender the same as against the issue of the 'shipped' bill of lading, but at the option of the
carrier such document of title may be noted at the port of shipment by the carrier, master, or
agent with the name or names of the ship or ships upon which the goods have been shipped
and the date or dates of shipment, and when so noted, if it shows the particulars mentioned in
paragraph 3 ofArticle Ill, shall for the purpose ofthis article be deemed to constitute a •shipped'
bill of lading.
8. Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the 30
ship from liability for loss or damage to, or in connection with, goods arising from negligence,
fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this article or lessening such liability
otherwise than as provided in these Rules, shall be null and void and of no effect. A benefit of
insurance in favour of the carrier or similar clause shall be deemed to be a clause relieving the
carrier from liability. '
Article IV 31
1. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or resulting from un- 32
seaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the part of the carrier to make the ship
seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is properly manned, equipped and supplied, and to make
the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers and all other parts of the ship in which goods are car-
ried fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph 1 of Article III. Whenever loss or damage has resulted from unseaworthiness the
burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall be on the carrier or other person claiming
exemption under this article.
2. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting 33
from:
(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the 34
navigation or in the management of the ship.
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier.
(c) Perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters.
(d) Act of God.
(e) Act of war.
(f) Act of public enemies.
(g) Arrest or restraint of princes, rulers or people, or seizure under legal process.
(h) Quarantine restrictions.
3
3S
36
37
38
41
(i) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent or representative. 42
(j) Strikes or lockouts or stoppage or restraint of labour from whatever cause, whether partial or 4}
general.
.(k) Riots and civil commotions. ..
(1) Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea. 45
(m) Wastage in bulk of weight or any other loss or damage arising from inherent defect, quality 46
or vice of the goods.
(n) Insufficiency of packing. 47
(0) Insufficiency or inadequacy of marks. 4lI
(P) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence. 49
(q) Any other cause arising without the actual fault or privity of the carrier, or without the fault 50
or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the burden ofproof shall be on the person
claiming the benefit of this exception to show that neither the actual fault or privity ofthe carrier
nor the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier contributed to the loss or damage.
3. The shipper shall not be responsible for loss or damage sustained by the carrier or the ship 51
arising or resulting from any cause without the act, fault or neglect of the shipper, his agents or
his servants.
4. Any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or property at sea or any reasonable 52
deviation shall not be deemed to be an infringement or breach of these Rules or of the contract
of carriage, and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting therefrom.
5 (a) Unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before 53
shipment and inserted in the bill of lading, neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event
be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the goods in an amount
exceeding the equivalent of 666.67 units of account per package or unit or units of account per
kilo of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, whichever is the higher.
(b) The total amount recoverable shall be calculated by reference to the value of such goods S4
at the place and time at which the goods are discharged from the ship in accordance with the
contract or should have been so discharged.
The value of the goods shall be fixed according to the commodity exchange price, or, if there 55
be no such price, according to the current market price, or, if there be no commodity exchange
price or current market price, by reference to the normal value of goods of the same kind and
quality.
(c) Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used to consolidate goods, the 16
number of packages or units enumerated in the bill of lading as packed in such article of trans-
port shall be deemed the number of packages or units for the purpose of this paragraph as far
as these packages or units are concerned. Except as aforesaid such article of transport shall be
considered the package or unit.
(d) The unit of account mentioned in this Article is the special drawing right as defined by the 57
4
International Monetary Fund. The amounts mentioned in h_visby/art/art04_5asub-paragraph
(a) of this paragraph shall be converted into national currency on the basis of the value of that
currency on a date to be determined by the law of the Court seized of the case.
(e) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be entitled to the benefit of the limitation of liability ,8
.provided for in this paragraph if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission
of the carrier done with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that damage
would probably result.
(f) The declaration mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, if embodied in the bill of ,.
lading, shall be prima facie evidence, but shall not be binding or conclusive on the carrier.
(g) By agreement between the carrier, master or agent of the carrier and the shipper other max- 60
imum amounts than those mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph may be fixed, pro-
vided that no maximum amount so fixed shall be less than the appropriate maximum mentioned
in that sub-paragraph.
(h) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible in any event for loss or damage to, or 61
in connection with, goods if the nature or value thereof has been knowingly mis-stated by the
shipper in the bill of lading.
6. Goods ofan inflammable, explosive or dangerous nature to the shipment whereof the carrier, 61
master or agent of the carrier has not consented with knowledge of their nature and character,
may at any time before discharge be landed at any place, or destroyed or rendered innocuous by
the carrier without compensation and the shipper of such goods shall be liable for all damages
and expenses directly or indirectly arising out of or resulting from such shipment. If any such
goods shipped with such knowledge and consent shall become a danger to the ship or cargo,
they may in like manner be landed at any place, or destroyed or rendered innocuous by the
carrier without liability on the part of the carrier except to general average, if any.
Article IV bis 63
1. The defences and limits of liability provided for in these Rules shall apply in any action 64
against the carrier in respect of loss or damage to goods covered by a contract of carriage
whether the a9tion be founded in contract or in tort.
2. If such an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier (such servant or agent not 6>
being an independent contractor), such servant or agent shall be entitled to avail himself of the
defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to invoke under these Rules.
3. The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier, and such servants and agents, 66
shall in no case exceed the limit provided for in these Rules.
4. Nevertheless, a servant or agent of the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the 61
provisions of this article, if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of
the servant or agent done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that
damage would probably result.
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Article V 68
A carrier shall be at liberty to surrender in whole or in part all or any ofhis rights and immuni- 69
ties or to increase any of his responsibilities and obligations under these Rules, provided such
- surrender or increase shall be embodied in the bill of lading issued to the shipper. The provi-
sions of these Rules shall not be applicable to charter parties, but if bills of lading are issued in
the case ofa ship under a charter party they shall comply with the terms of these Rules. Nothing
in these Rules shall be held to prevent the insertion in a bill of lading of any lawful provision
regarding general average.
Article VI 70
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding articles, a carrier, master or agent of the carrier 71
and a shipper shall in regard to any particular goods be at liberty to enter into any agreement in
any terms as to the responsibility and liability of the carrier for such goods, and as to the rights
and immunities of the carrier in respect of such goods, or his obligation as to seaworthiness, so
far as this stipulation is not contrary to public policy, or the care or diligence of his servants or
agents in regard to the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care and discharge of the
goods carried by sea, provided that in this case no bill of lading has been or shall be issued and
that the terms agreed shall be embodied in a receipt which shall be a non-negotiable document
and shall be marked as such.
An agreement so entered into shall have full legal effect. 72
Provided that this article shall not apply to ordinary commercial shipments made in the ordinary 73
course of trade, but only to other shipments where the character or condition of the property to
be carried or the circumstances, terms and conditions under which the carriage is to be per-
formed are such as reasonably to justify a special agreement.
Article VII 74
Nothing herein contained shall prevent a carrier or a shipper from entering into any agreement, 7~
stipulation, condition, reservation or exemption as to the responsibility and liability of the carrier
or the ship fer the loss or damage to, or in connection with, the custody and care and handling
of goods prior to the loading on, and subsequent to the discharge from, the ship on which the
goods are carried by sea.
Article VID 76
The provisions of these Rules shall not affect the rights and obligations of the carrier under any n
statute for the time being in force relating to the limitation ofthe liability ofowners ofsea-going
vessels.
Article IX 78
These Rules shall not affect the provisions of any international Convention or national law 79
governing liability for nuclear damage.
6
Article X
The provisions of these Rules shall apply to every bill of lading relating to the carriage of goods 8.
between ports in two different States if
(a) the bill oflading is issued in a contracting State, or 82
(b) the carriage is from a port in a contracting State, or 83
(c) the contract contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading provides that these Rules or 84
legislation of any State giving effect to them are to govern the contract;
whatever may be the nationality of the ship, the carrier, the shipper, the consignee, or any other 85
interested person.
(The last two paragraphs of this Article are not reproduced. They require contracting States to 86
apply the Rules to bills oflading mentioned in the Article and authorise them to apply the Rules
to other bills of lading).
(Article II to 16 of the International Convention for the unification of certain rules of law 87
relating to bills of lading signed at Brussels on August 25, 1974 are not reproduced. They
deal with the coming into force of the Convention, procedure for ratification, accession and
denunciation and the right to call for a fresh conference to consider amendments to the Rules
contained in the Convention).
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UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE CARRIAGE
OF GOODS BY SEA
.(THE HAMBURG RULES) HAMBURG, 30 MARCH
1978
[Preamble]
The States Parties to this Convention,
Having recognised the desirability of determining by agreement certain rules relating to the ]
carriage ofgoods by sea,
Have decided to conclude a Convention for this purpose and have thereto agreed as follows:
PART I - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1 - Definitions
In this Convention:
1. "Carrier" means any person by whom or in whose name a contract of carriage of goods by 8
sea has been concluded with a shipper.
2. "Actual carrier" means any person to whom the perfonnance of the carriage of the goods, or 9
ofpart of the carriage, has been entrusted by the carrier, and includes any other person to whom
such perfonnance has been entrusted.
3. "Shipper" means any person by whom or in whose name or on whose behalf a contract of '0
carriage ofgoods by sea has been concluded with a carrier, or any person by whom or in whose
name or on whose behalf the goods are actually delivered to the carrier in relation to the contract
of carriage by sea.
4. "Consignee" means the person entitled to take delivery of the goods. II
5. "Goods" includes live animals; where the goods are consolidated in a container, pallet or 12
similarArticle of transport or where they are packed, "goods" includes suchArticle of transport
or packaging if supplied by the shipper.
6. "Contract of carriage by sea" means any contract whereby the carrier undertakes against 13
payment of freight to carry goods by sea from one port to another; however, a contract which
involves carriage by sea and also carriage by some other means is deemed to be a contract of
carriage by sea for the purposes of this Convention only in so far as it relates to the carriage by
sea.
7. "Bill of lading" means a document which evidences a contract of carriage by sea and the ,.
taking over or loading of the goods by the carrier, and by which the carrier undertakes to deliver
the goods against surrender of the document. A provision in the document that the goods are
to be delivered to the order of a named person, or to order, or to bearer, constitutes such an
undertaking.
8. "Writing" includes, inter alia, telegram and telex.
Article 2 - Scope of application
IS
16
-1. The provisions of this Convention are applicable to all contracts of carriage by sea between 17
two different States, if:
(a)The port ofloading as provided for in the contract ofcarriage by sea is located in a Contract- II
ing State, or
(b) The port of discharge as provided for in the contract of carriage by sea is located in a 19
Contracting State, or
(c) One of the optional ports of discharge provided for in the contract of carriage by sea is the 20
actual port ofdischarge and such port is located in a Contracting State, or
(d) The bill of lading or other document evidencing the contract of carriage by sea is issued in 21
a Contracting State, or
(e) The bill of lading or other document evidencing the contract of carriage by sea provides 22
that the provisions of this Convention or the legislation ofany State giving effect to them are to
govern the contract.
2. The provisions of this Convention are applicable without regard to the nationality ofthe ship, 23
the carrier, the actual carrier, the shipper, the consignee or any other interested person.
3. The provisions ofthis Convention are not applicable to charter-parties. However, where a bill 24
of lading is issued pursuant to a charter-party, the provisions of the Convention apply to such a
bill of lading if it governs the relation between the carrier and the holder of the bill of lading,
not being the charterer.
4. If a contract provides for future carriage of goods in a series of shipments during an agreed 2S
period, the provisions of this Convention apply to each shipment. However, where a shipment
is made under a charter-party, the provisions ofparagraph 3 ofthisArticle apply.
Article 3 - Interpretation of the Convention 26
In the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention regard shall be had to 27
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity.
PART II - LIABILITY OF THE CARRIER
Article 4 - Period of responsibility
ZI
1. The responsibility ofthe carrier for the goods under this Convention covers the period during 30
which the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of loading, during the carriage and at the
port of discharge.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1 of thisArticle, the carrier is deemed to be in charge of the 31
goods
2
(a) From the time he has taken over the goods from: 32
(i) The shipper, or a person acting on his behalf; or JJ
(li) An authority or other third party to whom, pursuant to law or regulations applicable at the J4
. port of loading, the goods must be handed over for shipment;
(b) Until the time he has delivered the goods: 35
(i) By handing over the goods to the consignee; or 36
(li) In cases where the consignee does not receive the goods from the carrier, by placing them at 37
the disposal of the consignee in accordance with the contract or with the law or with the usage
of the particular trade, applicable at the port of discharge, or
(iii) By handing over the goods to an authority or other third party to whom, pursuant to law or 38
regulations applicable at the port of discharge, the goods must be handed over.
3. In paragraphs 1 and 2 of thisArticle, reference to the carrier or to the consignee means, in 39
addition to the carrier or the consignee, the servants or agents, respectively of the carrier or the
consignee.
Article 5 - Basis of liability
1. The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the goods, as well as from 41
delay in delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took place while the
goods were in his charge as defined inArticle 4, unless the carrier proves that he, his servants
or agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its
consequences.
2. Delay in delivery occurs when the goods have not been delivered at the port of discharge 42
provided for in the contract of carriage by sea within the time expressly agreed upon or, in the
absence ofsuch agreement, within the time which it would be reasonable to require ofa diligent
carrier, having regard to the circumstances of the case.
3. The person entitled to make a claim for the loss of goods may treat the goods as lost if they 43
have not been delivered as required by article 4 within 60 consecutive days following the expiry
of the time fOr delivery according to paragraph 2 of thisArticle.
4. (a) The carrier is liable 44
(i) For loss or damage to the goods or delay in delivery caused by fire, if the claimant proves 45
that the fire arose from fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or agents;
(ii) For such loss, damage or delay in delivery which is proved by the claimant to have resulted 4Ii
from the fault or neglect of the carrier, his servants or agents, in taking all measures that could
reasonably be required to put out the fire and avoid or mitigate its consequences.
(b) In case of fire on board the ship affecting the goods, if the claimant or the carrier so desires, 47
a survey in accordance with shipment practices must be held into the cause and circumstances
of the fire, and a copy of the surveyor's report shall be made available on demand to the carrier
and the claimant.
3
5. With respect to live animals, the carrier is not liable for loss, damage or delay in delivery 48
resulting from any special risks inherent in that kind ofcarriage. If the carrier proves that he has
complied with any special instructions given to him by the shipper respecting the animals and
that, in the circumstances of the case, the loss, damage or delay in delivery could be attributed
. to such risks, it is presumed that the loss, damage or delay in delivery was so caused, unless
there is proof that all or a part of the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from fault or
neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or agents.
6. The carrier is not liable, except in general average, where loss, damage or delay in delivery 49
resulted from measures to save life or from reasonable measures to save property at sea.
7. Where fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or agents combines with another so
cause to produce loss, damage or delay in delivery the carrier is liable only to the extent that
the loss, damage or delay in delivery is attributable to such fault or neglect, provided that the
carrier proves the amount of the loss, damage or delay in delivery not attributable thereto.
Article 6 - Limits of liability 51
1. (a) The liability of the carrier for loss resulting from loss ofor damage to goods according to 52
the provisions ofArticle 5 is limited to an amount equivalent to 835 units ofaccount per package
or other shipping unit or 2.5 units of account per kilogram of gross weight of the goods lost or
damaged, whichever is the higher.
(b) The liability of the carrier for delay in delivery according to the provisions ofArticle 5 53
is limited to an amount equivalent to two and a half times the freight payable for the goods
delayed, but no exceeding the total freight payable under the contract of carriage of goods by
sea.
(c) In no case shall the aggregate liability of the carrier, under both subparagraphs (a) and (b) S4
of this paragraph, exceed the limitation which would be established under subparagraph (a) of
this paragraph for total loss of the goods with respect to which such liability was incurred.
2. For the purpose of calculating which amount is the higher in accordance with paragraph 1 55
(a) of thisArticle, the following rules apply:
(a) Where If container, pallet or similarArticle of transport is used to consolidate goods, the S(i
package or other shipping units enumerated in the bill of lading, if issued, or otherwise in any
other document evidencing the contract of carriage by sea, as packed in suchArticle of transport
are deemed packages or shipping units. Except as aforesaid the goods in suchArticle oftransport
are deemed one shipping unit.
(b) In cases where theArticle of transport itself has been lost or damaged, thatArticle of trans- 57
port, ifnot owned or otherwise supplied by the carrier, is considered one separate shipping unit.
3. Unit of account means the unit of account mentioned inArticle 26. 58
4. By agreement between the carrier and the shipper, limits of liability exceeding those provided 59
for in paragraph 1 may be fixed.
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Article 7 - Application to non-eontractual claims 60
1. The defences and limits ofliability provided for in this Convention apply in any action against 6'
the carrier in respect of loss or damage to the goods covered by the contract of carriage by sea,
. as well as of delay in delivery whether the action is founded in contract, in tort or otherwise.
2. If such action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier, such servant or agent, if 62
he proves that he acted within the scope of his employment, is entitled to avail himself of the
defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to invoke under this Convention.
3. Except as provided inArticle 8, the aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier and 6J
from any persons referred to in paragraph 2 of thisArticle shall not exceed the limits of liability
provided for in this Convention.
Article 8 - Loss of right to limit responsibility 64
1. The carrier is not entitled to the benefit of the limitation of liability provided for inArticle 65
6 if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from an act or omission
of the carrier done with the intent to cause such loss, damage or delay, or recklessly and with
knowledge that such loss, damage or delay would probably result.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions ofparagraph 2 ofArticle 7, a servant or agent of the carrier is 66
not entitled to the benefit of the limitation of liability provided for inArticle 6 if it is proved that
the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from an act or omission of such servant or agent,
done with the intent to cause such loss, damage or delay, or recklessly and with knowledge that
such loss, damage or delay would probably result.
Article 9 - Deck cargo 67
1. The carrier is entitled to carry the goods on deck only if such carriage is in accordance with 68
an agreement with the shipper or with the usage of the particular trade or is required by statutory
rules or regulations.
2. If the carrier and the shipper have agreed that the goods shall or may be carried on deck, the 69
carrier must .insert in the bill of lading or other document evidencing the contract of carriage
by sea a statement to that effect. In the absence of such statement the carrier has the burden of
proving that an agreement for carriage on deck has been entered into; however, the carrier is
not entitled to invoke such an agreement against a third party, including a consignee, who has
acquired the bill of lading in good faith.
3. Where the goods have been carried on deck contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of 70
thisArticle or where the carrier may not under paragraph 2 of thisArticle invoke an agreement
for carriage on deck, the carrier, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 5, is
liable for loss of or damage to the goods, as well as for delay in delivery, resulting solely from
the carriage on deck, and the extent of his liability is to be detennined in accordance with the
provisions ofArticle 6 orArticle 8 of this Convention, as the case may be.
4. Carriage of goods on deck contrary to express agreement for carriage under deck is deemed 71
to be an act or omission of the carrier within the meaning ofArticle 8.
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72Article 10 - Liability of the carrier and actual carrier
1. Where the performance of the carriage or part thereof has been entrusted to an actual carrier, 73
whether or not in pursuance of a liberty under the contract of carriage by sea to do so, the
. carrier nevertheless remains responsible for the entire carriage according to the provisions of
this Convention. The carrier is responsible, in relation to the carriage perfonned by the actual
carrier, for the acts and omissions of the actual carrier and of his servants and agents acting
within the scope of their employment.
2. All the provisions of this Convention governing the responsibility of the carrier also apply 74
to the responsibility of the actual carrier for the carriage perfonned by him. The provisions
of paragraphs 2 and 3 ofArticle 7 and of paragraph 2 ofArticle 8 apply if an action is brought
against a servant or agent of the actual carrier.
3. Any special agreement under which the carrier assumes obligations not imposed by this 75
Convention or waives rights conferred by this Convention affects the actual carrier only ifagreed
to by him expressly and in writing. Whether or not the actual carrier has so agreed, the carrier
nevertheless remains bound by the obligations or waivers resulting from such special agreement.
4. Where and to the extent that both the carrier and the actual carrier are liable, their liability is 76
joint and several.
5. The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier, the actual carrier and their ser- n
vants and agents shall not exceed the limits of liability provided for in this Convention.
6. Nothing in thisArticle shall prejudice any right of recourse as between the carrier and the 78
actual carrier.
Article 11- Through carriage 79
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 ofArticle 10, where a contract of carriage by 80
sea provides explicitly that a specified part of the carriage covered by the said contract is to
be perfonned by a named person other than the carrier, the contract may also provide that the
carrier is not liable for loss, damage or delay in delivery caused by an occurrence which takes
place while the goods are in the charge of the actual carrier during such part of the carriage.
Nevertheless, any stipulation limiting or excluding such liability is without effect if no judicial
proceedings can be instituted against the actual carrier in a court competent under paragraph 1
or 2 of article 21. The burden of proving that any loss, damage or delay in delivery has been
caused by such an occurrence rests upon the carrier.
2. The actual carrier is responsible in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 ofArticle 81
10 for loss, damage or delay in delivery caused by an occurrence which takes place while the
goods are in his charge.
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PART III - LIABILITY OF THE SHIPPER
Article 12- General rule
82
83
. The shipper is not liable for loss sustained by the carrier or the actual carrier, or for damage 8'
sustained by the ship, Wlless such loss or damage was caused by the fault or neglect of the
shipper, his servants or agents. Nor is any servant or agent of the shipper liable for such loss or
damage unless the loss or damage was caused by fault or neglect on his part.
Article 13 - Special rules on dangerous goods 85
1. The shipper must mark or label in a suitable manner dangerous goods as dangerous. 86
2. Where the shipper hands over dangerous goods to the carrier or an actual carrier, as the case 87
may be, the shipper must inform him of the dangerous character of the goods and, if necessary,
of the precautions to be taken. If the shipper fails to do so and such carrier or actual carrier does
not otherwise have knowledge of their dangerous character:
(a) The shipper is liable to the carrier and any actual carrier for the loss resulting from the 88
shipment of such goods. and
(b) The goods may at any time be unloaded, destroyed or rendered innocuous, as the circum- 89
stances may require, without payment of compensation.
3. The provisions of paragmph 2 of thisArticle may not be invoked by any person if during the 90
carriage he has taken the goods in his charge with knowledge of their dangerous character.
4. If, in cases where the provisions of paragraph 2, subparagraph (b), of thisArticle do not 91
apply or may not be invoked, dangerous goods become an actual danger to life or property, they
may be unloaded, destroyed or rendered innocuous, as the circumstances may require, without
payment of compensation except where there is an obligation to contribute in general average
or where the carrier is liable in accordance with the provisions ofArticle 5.
PART IV - TRANSPORT DOCUMENTS
Article 14 - Issue of bill of lading 91
1. When the carrier or the actual carrier takes the goods in his charge, the carrier must, on 91
demand of the shipper, issue to the shipper a bill of lading.
2. The bill of lading may be signed by a person having authority from the carrier. A bill of 9S
lading signed by the master of the ship carrying the goods is deemed to have been signed on
behalf of the carrier.
3. The signature on the bill of lading may be in handwriting, printed in facsimile, perforated, 96
stamped, in symbols, or made by any other mechanical or electronic means, if no inconsistent
with the law of the country where the bill of lading is issued.
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Article 15- Contents of biU of lading 97
1. The bill of lading must include, inter alia, the following particulars: 98
(a) The general nature of the goods, the leading marks necessary for identification of the goods, 99
an express statement, if applicable, as to the dangerous character of the goods, the number of
packages or pieces, and the weight of the goods or their quantity otherwise expressed, all such
particulars as furnished by the shipper;
(b) the apparent condition of the goods; 100
(c) the name and principal place ofbusiness of the carrier; 101
(d) the name of the shipper; 102
(e) the consignee if named by the shipper; 10)
(f) the port of loading under the contract of carriage by sea and the date on which the goods 104
were taken over by the carrier at the port of loading;
(g) the port of discharge under the contract of carriage by sea; 10'
(h) the number of originals of the bill oflading, if more than one; 106
(i) the place of issuance of the bill oflading; 107
(j) the signature of the carrier or a person acting on his behalf; 108
(k) the freight to the extent payable by the consignee or other indication that freight is payable 109
by him;
(1) the statement referred to in paragraph 3 ofArticle 23; 110
(m) the statement, if applicable, that the goods shall or may be carried on deck; III
(n) the date or the period of delivery of the goods at the port of discharge if expressly agreed 112
upon between the parties; and
(0) any increased limit or limits of liability where agreed in accordance with paragraph 4 ofAr- III
ticle 6.
2. After the goods have been loaded on board, if the shipper so demands, the carrier must issue II'
to the shipper a "shipped" bill of lading which, in addition to the particulars required under
paragraph I ofthisArticle, must state that the goods are on board a named ship or ships, and the
date or dates ofloading. If the carrier has previously issued to the shipper a bill oflading or other
document of title with respect to any of such goods, on request of the carrier, the shipper must
surrender such document in exchange for a "shipped" bill of lading. The carrier may amend
any previously issued document in order to meet the shipper's demand for a "shipped" bill of
lading if, as amended, such document includes all the information required to be contained in a
"shipped" bill of lading.
3. The absence in the bill of lading of one or more particulars referred to in thisArticle does not II'
affect the legal character of the document as a bill of lading provided that it nevertheless meets
the requirements set out in paragraph 7 ofArticle 1.
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Article 16 - Bills of lading: reservations and evidentiary effect 116
1. Ifthe bill oflading contains particulars concerning the general nature, leading marks, number 117
of packages or pieces, weight or quantity of the goods which the carrier or other person issuing
- the bill of lading on his behalf knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect do not accurately
represent the goods actually taken over or, where a "shipped" bill of lading is issued, loaded,
or if he had no reasonable means of checking such particulars, the carrier or such other person
must insert in the bill of lading a reservation specifying these inaccuracies, grounds ofsuspicion
or the absence of reasonable means of checking.
2. If the carrier or other person issuing the bill of lading on his behalf fails to note on the bill of 118
lading the apparent condition of the goods, he is deemed to have noted on the bill of lading that
the goods were in apparent good condition.
3. Except for particulars in respect of which and to the extent to which a reservation pennitted 119
under paragraph I of thisArticle has been entered:
(a) The bill of lading is prima facie evidence of the taking over or, where a "shipped" bill of 120
lading is issued, loading, by the carrier of the goods as described in the bill of lading; and
(b) Proof to the contrary by the carner is not admissible if the bill of lading has been transferred 121
to a third party, including a consignee, who in good faith has acted in reliance on the description
of the goods therein.
4. A bill of lading which does not, as provided in paragraph 1, subparagraph (h) ofArticle 15, 122
set forth the freight or otherwise indicate that freight is payable by the consignee or does not
set forth demurrage incurred at the port of loading payable by the consignee, is prima facie
evidence that no freight or such demurrage is payable by him. However, proof to the contrary
by the carrier is not admissible when the bill of lading has been transferred to a third party,
including a consignee, who in good faith has acted in reliance on the absence in the bill of
lading of any such indication.
Article 17 - Guarantees by the shipper 123
1. The shipper is deemed to have guaranteed to the carrier the accuracy of particulars relating 124
to the general nature of the goods, their marks, number, weight and quantity as furnished by
him for insertion in the bill of lading. The shipper must indemnify the carrier against the loss
resulting from inaccuracies in such particulars. The shipper remains liable even if the bill of
lading has been transferred by him. The right of the carrier to such indemnity in no way limits
his liability under the contract of carriage by sea to any person other than the shipper.
2. Any letter ofguarantee or agreement by which the shipper undertakes to indemnify the carrier 125
against loss resulting from the issuance of the bill of lading by the carrier, or by a person acting
on his behalf, without entering a reservation relating to particulars furnished by the shipper for
insertion in the bill of lading, or to the apparent condition of the goods, is void and ofno effect
as against any third party, including a consignee, to whom the bill of lading has been transferred.
3. Such letter of guarantee or agreement is valid as against the shipper unless the carner or the 126
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person acting on his behalf, by omitting the reservation referred to in paragraph 2 of thisArticle,
intends to defraud a third party, including a consignee, who acts in reliance on the description of
the goods in the bill of lading. In the latter case, if the reservation omitted relates to particulars
furnished by the shipper for insertion in the bill of lading, the carrier has no right of indemnity
-from the shipper pursuant to paragraph 1 of thisArticle.
4. In the case ofintended fraud referred to in paragraph 3 ofthis article the carrier is liable, with- 127
out the benefit of the limitation of liability provided for in this Convention, for the loss incurred
by a third party, including a consignee, because he has acted in reliance on the description of
the goods in the bill of lading.
Article 18 - Documents other than bills of lading 128
Where a carrier issues a document other than a bill of lading to evidence the receipt of the 129
goods to be carried, such a document is prima facie evidence of the conclusion of the contract
of carriage by sea and the taking over by the carrier of the goods as therein described.
PART V - CLAIMS AND ACTIONS
Article 19 - Notice of loss, damage or delay
130
131
1. Unless notice of loss or damage, specifying the general nature of such loss or damage, is IJ2
given in writing by the consignee to the carrier not later than the working day after the day
when the goods were handed over to the consignee, such handing over is prima facie evidence
of the delivery by the carrier of the goods as described in the document of transport or, if no
such document has been issued, in good condition.
2. Where the loss or damage is not apparent, the provisions ofparagraph I ofthisArticle apply IJ]
correspondingly if notice in writing is not given within 15 consecutive days after the day when
the goods were handed over to the consignee.
3. If the state of the goods at the time they were handed over to the consignee has been the 134
subject of a joint surveyor inspection by the parties, notice in writing need not be given of loss
or damage ascertained during such surveyor inspection.
4. In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage the carrier and the consignee must IJ5
give all reasonable facilities to each other for inspecting and tallying the goods.
5. No compensation shall be payable for loss resulting from delay in delivery unless a notice 136
has been given in writing to the carrier within 60 consecutive days after the day when the goods
were handed over to the consignee.
6. If the goods have been delivered by an actual carrier, any notice given under thisArticle to IJ1
him shall have the same effect as if it had been given to the carrier, and any notice given to the
carrier shall have effect as ifgiven to such actual carrier.
7. Unless notice of loss or damage, specifying the general nature of the loss or damage, is 138
given in writing by the carrier or actual carrier to the shipper not later than 90 consecutive days
after the occurrence of such loss or damage or after the delivery of the goods in accordance
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with paragraph 2 ofArticle 4, whichever is later, the failure to give such notice is prima facie
evidence that the carrier or the actual carrier has sustained no loss or damage due to the fault or
neglect of the shipper, his servants or agents.
8. For the purpose of thisArticle, notice given to a person acting on the carrier's or the actual 139
carriers' behalf, including the master or the officer in charge of the ship, or to a person acting
on the shipper's behalf is deemed to have been given to the carrier, to the actual carrier or to the
shipper, respectively.
Article 20 - Limitation of actions 140
1. Any action relating to carriage of goods under this Convention is time-barred if judicial or 141
arbitral proceedings have not been instituted within a period of two years.
2. The limitation period commences on the day on which the carrier has delivered the goods or 142
part thereof or, in cases where no goods have been delivered, on the last day on which the goods
should have been delivered.
3. The day on which the limitation period commences is not included in the period. 143
4. The person against whom a claim is made may at any time during the running ofthe limitation 144
period extend that period by a declaration in writing to the claimant. This period may be further
extended by another declaration or declarations.
5. An action for indemnity by a person held liable may be instituted even after the expiration 14'
of the limitation period provided for in the preceding paragraphs if instituted within the time
allowed by the law of the State where proceedings are instituted. However, the time allowed
shall not be less than 90 days commencing from the day when the person instituting such action
for indemnity has settled the claim or has been served with process in the action against himself.
Article 21 - Jurisdiction 146
1. In judicial proceedings relating to carriage of goods under this Convention the plaintiff, at 147
his .option, may institute an action in a court which, according to the law of the State where
the court is'situated, is competent and within the jurisdiction of which is situated one of the
following places:
(a) The principal place of business or, in the absence thereof, the habitual residence of the 141
defendant; or
(b) The place where the contract was made provided that the defendant has there a place of 149
business, branch or agency through which the contract was made; or
(c) The port of loading or the port of discharge; or ISO
(d) Any additional place designated for that purpose in the contract of carriage by sea. lSI
2. (a) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of thisArticle, an action may be instituted 152
in the courts of any port or place in a Contracting State at which the carrying vessel or any
other vessel of the same ownership may have been arrested in accordance with applicable rules
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of the law of that State and of international law. However, in such a case, at the petition of
the defendant, the claimant must remove the action, at his choice, to one of the jurisdictions
referred to in paragraph 1 of thisArticle for the determination of the claim, but before such
removal the defendant must furnish security sufficient to ensure payment ofany judgement that
may subsequently be awarded to the claimant in the action.
(b) All questions relating to the sufficiency or otherwise of the security shall be determined by III
the court of the port or place of the arrest.
3. No judicial proceedings relating to carriage ofgoods under this Convention may be instituted Is.<
in a place not specified in paragraph 1 or 2 ofthisArticle. The provisions ofthis paragraph do not
constitute an obstacle to the jurisdiction of the Contracting States for provisional or protective
measures.
4. (a) Where an action has been instituted in a court competent under paragraph i or 2 of ISS
thisArticle or where judgement has been delivered by such a court, no new action may be
started between the same parties on the same grounds unless the judgement of the court before
which the first action instituted is not enforceable in the country in which the new proceedings
are instituted.
(b) For the purpose of thisArticle the institution of measures with a view to obtaining enforce- 156
ment of a judgement is not to be considered as the starting of a new action;
(c) For the purpose of thisArticle, the removal of an action to a different court within the same IS7
country, or to a court in another country, in accordance with paragraph 2 (a) of thisArticle, is
not to be considered as the starting of a new action.
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, an agreement made by the lSI
parties, after a claim under the contract ofcarriage by sea has arisen, which designates the place
where the claimant may institute an action, is effective.
Article 22 - Arbitration IS9
1. Subject to the provisions of thisArticle, parties may provide by agreement evidenced in 160
writing that any dispute that may arise relating to carriage of goods under this Convention shall
be referred-to arbitration.
2. Where a charter-party contains a provision that disputes arising thereunder shall be referred 161
to arbitration and a bill of lading issued pursuant to the charterparty does not contain a special
annotation providing that such provision shall be binding upon the holder of the bill of lading,
the carrier may not invoke such provision as against a holder having acquired the bill of lading
in good faith.
3. The arbitration proceedings shall, at the option of the claimant, be instituted at one of the 162
following places:
(a) A place in a State within whose territory is situated: 163
(i) The principal place of business of the defendant or, in the absence thereof, the habitual 164
residence of the defendant; or
(ii) The place where the contract was made, provided that the defendant has there a place of 16S
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business, branch or agency through which the contract was made; or
(iii) The port of loading or the port of discharge; or 166
(b) Any place designated for that purpose in the arbitration clause or agreement. 167
. 4. The arbitrator or arbitration tribunal shall apply the rules of this Convention. 168
5. The provisions ofparagraph 3 and 4 of thisArticle are deemed to be part of every arbitration 169
clause or agreement, and any term of such clause or agreement which is inconsistent therewith
is null and void.
6. Nothing in thisArticle affects the validity of an agreement relating to arbitration made by the 170
parties after the claim under the contract of carriage by sea has arisen.
PART VI - SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS
Article 23 - Contractual stipulations
171
In
1. Any stipulation in a contract of carriage by sea, in a bill of lading, or in any other document 173
evidencing the contract ofcarriage by sea is null and void to the extent that it derogates, directly
or indirectly, from the provisions of this Convention. The nullity of such a stipulation does not
affect the validity of the other provisions of the contract or document ofwhich it forms a part. A
clause assigning benefit of insurance of the goods in favour of the carrier, or any similar clause,
is null and void.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of thisArticle, a carrier may increase his 17.
responsibilities and obligations under this Convention.
3. Where a bill of lading or any other document evidencing the contract of carriage by sea is m
issued, it must contain a statement that the carriage is subject to the provisions of this Conven-
tion which nullify any stipulation derogating therefrom to the detriment of the shipper or the
consignee.
4. Where the claimant in respect of the goods has incurred loss as a result of a stipulation 176
which is null and void by virtue of the presentArticle, or as a result of the omission of the
statement referred to in paragraph 3 of thisArticle, the carrier must pay compensation to the
extent required in order to give the claimant compensation in accordance with the provisions
of this Convention for any loss of or damage to the goods as well as for delay in delivery. The
carrier must, in addition pay compensation for costs incurred by the claimant for the purpose
of exercising his right, provided that costs incurred in the action where the foregoing provision
is invoked are to be determined in accordance with the law of the State where proceedings are
instituted.
Article 24 - General average In
1. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent the application of provisions in the contract of 178
carriage by sea or national law regarding the adjustment of general average.
2. With the exception ofArticle 20, the provisions of this Convention relating to the liability of 179
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the carrier for loss ofor damage to the goods also determine whether the consignee may refuse
contribution in general average and the liability of the carrier to indemnifY the consignee in
respect of any such contribution made or any salvage paid.
. Article 25 - Other conventions 180
1. This Convention does not modifY the rights or duties of the carrier, the actual carrier and 181
their servants and agents, provided for in international conventions or national law relating to
the limitation of liability of owners of seagoing ships.
2. The provisions ofArticles 21 and 22 of this Convention do not prevent the application of 182
the mandatory provisions of any other multilateral convention already in force at the date of
this Convention relating to matters dealt with in the saidArticles, provided that the dispute
arises exclusively between parties having their principal place of business in States members of
such other convention. However, this paragraph does not affect the application of paragraph 4
ofArticle 22 of this Convention.
3. No liability shall arise under the provisions of this Convention for damage caused by a 183
nuclear incident if the operator of a nuclear installation is liable for such damage:
(a) Under either the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Lia:bility in the Field 114
of Nuclear Energy as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 or the Vienna
Convention of21 May 1963 on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, or
(b) By virtue of national law governing the liability for such damage, provided that such law 185
is in all respects as favourable to persons who may suffer damage as either the Paris or Vienna
Conventions.
4. No liability that arise under the provisions of this Convention for any loss of or damage 116
to or delay in delivery of luggage for which the carrier is responsible under any international
convention or national law relating to the carriage ofpassengers and their luggage by sea.
5. Nothing contained in this Convention prevents a Contracting State from applying any other 187
international convention which is already in force at the date of this Convention and which
applies mandatorily to contracts of carriage of goods primarily by a mode of transport other
than transport by sea. This provision also applies to any subsequent revision or amendment of
such international convention.
Article 26 - Unit of account 188
1. The unit of account referred to inArticle 6 of this Convention is the Special Drawing Right 119
as defined by the International Monetary Fund. The amounts mentioned inArticle 6 are to be
converted into the national currency ofa State according to the value ofsuch currency at the date
of judgement or the date agreed upon by the parties. The value of a national currency, in tenus
of the Special Drawing Right, of a Contracting State which is a member of the International
Monetary Fund is to be calculated in accordance with the method of valuation applied by the
International Monetary Fund in effect at the date in question for its operations and transactions.
The value of a national currency in tenus of the Special Drawing Right of a Contracting State
14
which is not a member of the International Monetary Fund is to be calculated in a manner
detennined by that State.
2. Nevertheless, those States which are not members of the International Monetary Fund and IIJ()
. whose law does not permit the application of the provisions ofparagraph i of thisArticle may, at
the time of signature, or at the time of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession or at any
time thereafter, declare that the limits of liability provided for in this Convention to be applied
in their territories shall be fixed as: 12,500 monetary units per package or other shipping unit or
37.5 monetary units per kilogram of gross weight of the goods.
3. The monetary unit referred to in paragraph 2 of thisArticle corresponds to sixty-five and a 191
half milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred. The conversion of the amounts
referred to in paragraph 2 into the national currency is to be made according to the law of the
State concerned.
4. The calculation mentioned in the last sentence ofparagraph I and the conversion mentioned in 192
paragraph 3 of thisArticle is to be made in such a manner as to express in the national currency
of the Contracting State as far as possible the same real value for the amounts inArticle 6 as
is expressed there in units of account. Contracting States must communicate to the depositary
the manner ofcalculation pursuant to paragraph 1 of thisArticle, or the result of the conversion
mentioned in paragraph 3 of thisArticle, as the case may be, at the time of signature or when
depositing their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or when availing
themselves of the option provided for in paragraph 2 of thisArticle and whenever there is a
change in the manner of such calculation or in the result of such conversion.
PART VII - FINAL CLAUSES
Article 27- Depositary
193
I~
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the depositary of this 19~
Convention.
Article 28 - S!gnature, ratification, acceptance, approval, accession 196
1. This Convention is open for signature by all States until 30 April 1979 at the Headquarters 191
of the United Nations, New York.
2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory States. 198
3. After 30 April 1979, this Convention will be open for accession by all States which are not 19'1
signatory States.
4. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval and accession are to be deposited with the 200
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 29- Reservations
No reservations may be made to this Convention.
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Article 30 - Entry into force 203
1. This Convention enters into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of 204
one year from the date of deposit of the 20th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
-accession.
2. For each State which becomes a Contracting State to thiS Convention after the date of the 205
deposit ofthe 20th instrument ofratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention
enters into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of one year after the
deposit of the appropriate instrument on behalf of that State.
3. Each Contracting State shall apply the provisions of this Convention to contracts of carriage 206
by sea concluded on or after the date of the entry into force of this Convention in respect ofthat
State.
Article 31- Denunciation of other conventions 207
1. Upon becoming a Contracting State to this Convention, any State party to the International 208
Convention for the Unification ofCertain Rules relating to Bills ofLading signed at Brussels on
25 August 1924 (1924 Convention) must notifY the Government of Belgium as the depositary
of the 1924 Convention of its denunciation of the said Convention with a declaration that the
denunciation is to take effect as from the date when this Convention enters into force in respect
of that State.
2. Upon the entry into force of this Convention under paragraph 1 of article 30, the deposi- 209
tary of this Convention must notify the Government of Belgium as the depositary of the 1924
Convention of the date of such entry into force, and of the names of the Contracting States in
respect ofwhich the Convention has entered into force.
3. The provisions ofparagraphs 1 and 2 of thisArticle apply correspondingly in respect ofStates 210
parties to the Protocol signed on 23 February 1968 to amend the International Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading signed at Brussels on 25 August
1924.
4. Notwiths~dingArticle 2 of this Convention, for the purposes of paragraph 1 ofthisArticle, 211
a Contracting State may, if it deems it desirable, defer the denunciation of the 1924 Convention
and of the 1924 Convention as modified by the 1968 Protocol for a maximum period of five
years from the entry into force of this Convention. It will then notifY the Government of Bel-
gium of its intention. During this transitory period, it must apply to the Contracting States this
Convention to the exclusion of any other one.
Article 32 - Revision and amendment 212
1. At the request of not less than one-third of the Contracting States to this Convention, the 2lJ
depositary shall convene a conference of the Contracting States for revising or amending it
2. Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited after the en- 214
try into force of an amendment to this Convention, is deemed to apply to the Convention as
amended.
16
Article 33 - Revision of the limitation amounts and unit of account or monetary unit 215
1. Notwithstanding the provisions ofArticle 32, a conference only for the purpose of altering 21"
the amount specified inArticle 6 and paragraph 2 ofArticle 26, or of substituting either or both
of the units defined in paragraphs 1 and 3 ofArticle 26 by other units is to be convened by the
depositary in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article. An alteration of the amounts shall be
made only because ofa significant change in their real value.
2. A revision conference is to be convened by the depositary when not less than one-fourth of 217
the Contracting States so request.
3. Any decision by the conference must be taken by a two-thirds majority of the participating 218
States. The amendment is communicated by the depositary to all the Contracting States for
acceptance and to all the States signatories of the Convention for information.
4. Any amendment adopted enters into force on the first day of the month following one year 21'
after its acceptance by two-thirds of the Contracting States. Acceptance is to be effected by the
deposit ofa formal instrument to that effect, with the depositary.
5. After entry into force of an amendment a Contracting State which has accepted the amend- 220
ment is entitled to apply the Convention as amended in its relations with Contracting States
which have not within six months after the adoption of the amendment notified the depositary
that they are not bound by the amendment.
6. Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited after the en- UI
try into force of an amendment to this Convention, is deemed to apply to the Convention as
amended.
Article 34 - Denunciation 222
1. A Contracting State may denounce this Convention at any time by means of a notification in 223
writing addressed to the depositary.
2. The denunciation takes effect on the first day of the month following the expiration of one U4
year after the notification is received by the depositary. Where a longer period is specified in
the notification, the denunciation takes effect upon the expiration ofsuch longer period after the
notification is received by the depositary.
[Post Provisions]
[Post Clauses (If any: Signed; Witnessed; Done; Authentic Texts; and Deposited Clauses»)
Done at Hamburg, this thirty-first day of March one thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight, 22S
in a single original, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts
are equally authentic.
In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly authorised by their respective 226
Governments, have signed the present Convention.
Common understanding adopted by the United Nations Conference on the
17
227
Carriage of Goods by Sea (NCONF.89/13, annex 11) 228
It is the common understanding that the liability of the carrier under this Convention is based 229
on the principle of presumed fault or neglect. This means that, as a rule, the burden of proof
rests on the carrier but, with respect to certain cases, the provisions of the Convention modify
this rule.
Resolution adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Carriage ofGoods by Sea (NCON.891ol3,
annex III)
The United Nations Conference on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 231
Noting with appreciation the kind invitation of the Federal Republic of Germany to hold the 232
Conference in Hamburg,
Being aware that the facilities placed at the disposal of the Conference and the generous hos- m
pitality bestowed on the participants by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
and by the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg, have in no small measure contributed to the
success of the Conference.
Expresses its gratitude to the Government and people of the Federal Republic of Germany, and 234
Having adopted the Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea on the basis of a draft Con- m
vention prepared by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law at the request
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Expresses its gratitude to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law and to 236
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development for their outstanding contribution to
the simplification and harmonisation of the law of the carriage of goods by sea, and
Decides to designate the Convention adopted by the Conference as the: "UNITED NATIONS 231
CONVENTION ON THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA, 1978", and
Recommends that the rules embodied therein be known as the "HAMBURG RULES".
18
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